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ABSTRACT
M o s t (if not all) studies o n the perceptions of auditor independence were
conducted using a quantitative approach. Sending questionnaires to
collect data and testing hypothesis b y the use of statistics have been very
c o m m o n . T h e lack of literature o n auditor independence using a
qualitative approach has inspired this present study, since the advantages
of the qualitative approach cannot be reached b y the quantitative.
This is a perceptual study of auditor independence using an ethnographic,
qualitative approach. Twenty-nine Indonesian auditors have been
interviewed, in order to investigate their perceptions of factors that could
affect auditor independence. T w o theoretical models of independence,
auditors-firms conflict of interest of G o l d m a n and Barlev (1974) and
Flint's (1988) material circumstances to independence, are used to
explore the issues that w e r e investigated. These issues are not "truths" to
be proven, but used rather as interview guidelines. T h e interview data
are summarised and pattern coded as proposed b y Miles and H u b e r m a n
(1984) and then analysed through description, analysis and interpretation
suggested b y Wolcott (1994). T h e use of pattern coding allows the
researcher to classify answers and compare responses. T h e analysis
introduced b y Wolcott allows the researcher not only to analyse what
auditors say but also to interpret beyond what they say.
This study found that auditor independence would potentially depend on
external and internal factors or circumstances. T h e external factors or
circumstances are audit firms' characteristics, clients' characteristics, the
nature of auditors and clients relationship and sanctions enforced. Audit
firms' characteristics included the size of the audit firm and non-audit
services rendered to audit clients. T h e clients' backgrounds, existence of
a corporate audit committee and clients' contribution to audit fees are
regarded as clients' circumstances that could influence auditor
independence. Competition a m o n g auditors, clients' directors' roles and
the length of audit engagement are consequences of their relationship that
could affect auditor independence.
Sanctions enforced b y the
professional b o d y could also influence auditor independence. O n the
other hand, internal factors influencing auditor independence c o m e s from
auditors themselves. T h e state of professional ethics of auditors as a
consequence of professionalism and the auditors' religious values affect
auditor independence.
xii

In perceiving these factors, the study found that auditors have consensus
on the effect of sanctions on auditor independence. They believed that
sanctions could enhance auditor independence. Whereas, for other
factors the auditors have various perceptions ranging from impairment,
no effect and enhancement of auditor independence. In addition, the
study also identified the auditors' understandings on independence, major
threats and motivations a m o n g the above circumstances, the possibility to
be total or partially independent and the auditors' efforts to maintain their
independence.
The study concludes that auditor independence is a continuum, and is not
black and white. S o m e n e w potential factors influencing independence
have been found. The study also proposes a continuum model of
independence and "better" and "worse" circumstances that potentially
could affect auditor independence. Practical recommendations are
suggested to the Indonesian Institute of Accountants, the Indonesian
Government and relevant parties using auditedfinancialstatements.
Some limitations of the study are acknowledged such as the lack of
previous qualitative studies on auditor independence, the cross-sectional
data collection and a limited number of interviewees. S o m e suggestions
for future research include narrowing the research site into one big audit
firm and using a longitudinal process for data collection.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction
Independence is a very common term and frequently discussed not only in the
audit area but also in the other fields. It is not easy to define and even more
difficult to embody. Not only for auditors, but also for other professions who
serve the public interest and other parties involve. Many researchers have
defined the meanings of independence and many definitions have been
generated. There are different definitions of independence (Amernic and
Aranya, 1981, p. 13) because according to Malkin (1996) it is a very difficult
concept to define and even harder to comply with.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a relatively brief overview of the
study. This study is mainly concerned with auditors' perceptions on potential
factors influencing auditor independence based on selected Indonesian
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auditors interviewed. However, the study also investigates auditors'
understanding of independence, major threats and motivation to be

independent and the possibility to be totally or partially independent and their
efforts in maintaining independence. This study realises that at present, there
is little or no interest in researching auditor independence in general, and
Indonesia in particular, especially by using a qualitative approach.

Since auditors are human beings and audit activities involve social
relationships, this study tries to seek to understand auditors' perceptions and
their efforts to maintain auditor independence through an ethnographic,
qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one.

This chapter consists of the following sections. A brief overview of the need
for an independent auditor, followed by a discussion of auditor independence,
the background of the study, the subjects selected for the study, purpose of
the study, research questions, the methodological approach and the structure
of the thesis.

1.2. The Need for an Independent Auditor
This section briefly overviews the need for independent auditors in business
activities. Initially, accounting was needed by the business owner in order to
know about and control business activities. However, as the complexity of
business increased, accounting has developed and is required to provide
financial statements that are used by management, shareholders, creditors,
government, and other relevant parties. Therefore, to ensure reliable
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information for all the users of financial statements an independent review i
needed. There are at least two basic reasons for the need for auditing

(Stamp and Moonitz, 1978, p. 27). First, financial statements will be audited
because the government expects this as a statutory requirement. Second,
management needs it, because the function of auditing itself is to lend
credibility to financial statements.

In other words, financial statements will be reliable sources of information
the managers, resource providers, potential creditors, investors, employees
and other users if they are audited by an independent auditor (Gul, Teoh and
Andrew, 1991; Campbell 1985). Gill and Cosserat (1993, p. 16) and Porter,
Simon and Hatherfy (1996, p. 8) assert that the need for an independent
auditor is attributed to the following conditions: conflict of interest,
consequence, complexity and remoteness (see also Campbell 1985, p. 13;
Arens et al 1992, p. 16; Pound, Willingham and Charmichael, 1983, p. 4).
The discussion will continue in chapter two.

1.3. Auditor Independence
Independence is a familiar topic. Many people discuss independence without

further questioning its meaning, because they feel there is no need to do so.

But in audit, auditor independence is frequently referred to as a cornerstone
auditing (Malkin, 1996; Clikeman, 1998). Without it, audited financial
statements will be biased and useless (Firth, 1980). However, there is no
uniformity in the definition of the term independence (Kinney, 1999, p. 70).
There are many definitions of independence, it depends on who defines it,
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different people will give various meanings (Amernic and Aranya, 1981, p.
13).

Bartlett (1993, p. 3) states that in the early studies auditor independence was
not defined. This is because most people understood independence as a
term that did not need to be defined. But in recent studies auditor
independence has been defined as the auditor's ability to resist client

pressure or the auditor's ability to act with integrity and objectivity. Bartle
himself defines auditor's independence as "an unbiased mental attitude in
making decisions about audit work and financial reporting" (1993, p. 4).

Lee and Gu (1998, p. 534) simply define auditor independence as the
absence of collusion between the auditor and the manager of the client firm.
In the Indonesian Auditing Standards (IAI, 2001, p. 220.1), independence is
quite explicitly defined. It states that an auditor must not be influenced by
other parties, because an auditor must serve all parties.

1.4. Background of the Study
The career of an auditor is a unique profession. S/he is different from a
doctor or a lawyer. The central theme of this study rests in the professional
belief that independent auditors have to perform their work independently.
However, evidence shows that auditors are not only hired and fired by their
clients, but they have to face many other interests and pressures. This
situation is likened to two different grounds on which auditors must stand
simultaneously. The Cohen Commission asserted that since the auditor is
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hired and paid by someone who is affected by the auditor's work, total
independence is a practical impossibility (Clikeman, 1998).

This study also begins noting that auditors are like other human beings in that
their behaviours are affected by environmental, organisational, physiological,
psychological, and backgrounds (Ferris and Dillard, 1988, p. 282) and

therefore the possibilities from this observation would be: first, auditors will
successfully perform audit tasks independently; second, auditors tend to
perform audit task according to their own interests and clients' pressures; and
third, the auditors 'harmonise' or 'accommodate' their interests or clients'
pressure but are still in the corridor of audit standards.

Many studies have been conducted on this issue, and their findings are
varied. Studies include those by Firth (1980), Shockley (1981), Moore (1983),
Gul and Teoh (1984), Knapp (1985), Beattie (1999) among others. A
discussion of these studies will take place in Chapter Two. Having examined
previous studies on auditor independence, there are three limitations that can
be stated, these are: first, most (if not all) studies on auditor independence
have been conducted using a quantitative approach; second, most previous

studies investigated limited issues of independence; and third, most (if not all
studies did not include the auditors' cultural values. From this observation,

this study intends to investigate the general problem of what factors can affect
auditor independence as well impairing and enhancing it, through an
ethnographic and qualitative approach.
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1.5. Case Selected
This study investigates the independence of Indonesian auditors. The
reasons for selecting this topic include the following: there is only one
professional body of1 accounting in Indonesia, namely the Ikatan Akuntan
Indonesia (IAI) or the Indonesian Institute of Accountants. This is where all
public accounting practices in Indonesia must be registered and principals
must become members. The Professional Standards of the Indonesian
Institute of Accountants (SPAP) state that an auditor has to be independent,
which means an auditor must not be influenced by outside intervention,
because an auditor serves the public interest, not a certain party (IAI, 2001,
p.220.1). The Professional Standards define independence clearly, whereas

the Institute's Code of Ethics only states that the auditor must be independen
in fact and in appearance.

On the other hand, even though in the early development of accounting
Indonesia followed the Dutch system, today all matters that relate to
accounting and auditing mirror the US situation (Abdulkadir, 1982).
Accounting and auditing principles are adopted from the US, but the situation
within business activities and complexities, law enforcement and sociocultural values in Indonesia are quite different. Studies of auditor
independence in Indonesia are also still very limited, and according to the
knowledge of the researcher, there is only one published study on Indonesia
auditor independence by Supriyono (1988). His study investigated six factors
affecting auditor independence using the quantitative method, by sending
questionnaires to respondents and analysing data by the use of statistics.
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Based on the situations above, this present study will investigate auditors'
perceptions of factors that could influence their independence and matters
related to it by considering the social and cultural values of auditors. This
study will therefore investigate auditor independence with a broader and
deeper analysis through an ethnographic, qualitative approach.

1.6. Purposes of the Study
In the research process, this study will take into account the effects of the
auditors' socio-cultural values on their perceptions of auditor independence
and related matters. The study is based on auditors in Indonesia and the
purposes of this study are:
1. To seek to understand the auditors' perceptions of their independence.
2. To discover what factors actually impair the auditors' independence.
3. To discover what factors actually enhance the auditors' independence.
4. To develop some suggestions to improve the auditors' independence.

1.7. Research Questions
Since most previous studies that relate to auditor independence have
investigated four to six research variables, which relate to economic and

regulatory matters only, this study, will try to seek to understand what audit
feel about independence in a broader context, which will involve the sociocultural values of the auditors. An ethnographic qualitative approach will be
used in this research. The general research question of this study is:
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"What factors can affect auditors' independence?"

This general research question has several particular questions. These

particular research questions are 'working guide lines' rather than 'truths' to
be proven (Thomas, 1993, p. 35 in Creswell, 1994). These ten particular
research questions are as follows:

1. What is the effect on auditor independence if they also provide non-audit
services (NAS) to audit clients?
2. What is the effect on auditor independence if auditors work in a tight
competition audit market?
3. What is the effect on auditor independence if they audit their major audit
client?
4. What is the effect of audit firm size on auditor independence?
5. What is the effect of the existence of a corporate audit committee on
auditor independence?
6. What is the effect of the directors' roles on auditor independence?
7. What is the effect of the length of audit tenure with a certain client to
auditor independence?
8. What is the effect on auditor independence if there is punishment for the
auditor who performs poor audit quality.
9. What is the effect of the audited company's background (such as strong
financial condition, well recognised directors etc) on auditor
independence?
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10. What is the effect of religious values possessed by auditors on auditor
independence?

These particular research questions as already mentioned were used to guide
the researcher during the interviews, however, there was still the room to
expand the questions during the progress of the interview.

1.8. Methodological Approach

The purpose of this study is to investigate Indonesian auditors' perceptions on
factors affecting auditor independence and related matters to independence.
This study considers the effect of the auditors' local culture, religion, work
environment, ages, position, sex and experience. Ethnography is one of the
qualitative approaches that can be applied in order to discover these needs
(Hammersley, 1992, p. 12).

The reason for investigating auditors' perceptions is because auditors are the
most familiar party to their independence (Agacer, 1986). Since this study

investigates the insiders' perceptions, a semi-structured interview will be the
most valuable because the questions are more likely to conform to the

native's perception of reality (Fetterman, 1998, p. 481). In selecting auditors
to be interviewed and in order to get the right sources of data, the study
considers 'representativeness' of the object being studied as suggested by
LeCompte and Goetz (1984, p. 46).
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In the data analysis, the study uses a combination of Wolcott's (1994)
description, analysis and interpretation and that of Miles and Huberman
(1984) because by using transforming qualitative data proposed by Wolcott
(1994), the researcher will be able to analyse and interpret the meaning of
what the auditors say. Second, by using data reduction, display and a
conclusion that draws on Miles and Huberman (1984), the researcher will be
able to organise and present data in a comparable format between
responses.

There are four steps in the data analysis: first, summarising the interviews
data (Miles and Huberman, 1984); second, pattern coding to classify the
category (Miles and Huberman, 1984); third, making a description of data
summarised and patter coded (Wolcott, 1994); and fourth, analysing and
interpreting the data (Wolcott, 1994). The researcher is actively involved in
this research process, and so it becomes impossible to be objective.

Further discussion of the research methods applied in this study are
discussed in Chapter Three.

1.9. Structure of the Thesis
The study consists of nine chapters. The first chapter provides a brief
overview of auditor independence, the background of the study, research
purposes, research questions, the research approach taken and the structure
of the thesis.
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The second chapter discusses auditor independence in depth. In order to
build an understanding about auditor independence and to help provide a
framework for the study, Chapter Two is divided into two major sections. The
first section discusses the nature of auditing, services offered by auditors,
types of auditors, the need for independent auditors, and auditor
independence. The second section discusses models of auditor
independence proposed by Flint (1988) and Goldman and Barlev (1974). The
second section also reviews previous empirical studies on auditor
independence both perceptual and archival.

Chapter Three deals with the research methods applied in this study. This
involves three sections. The first section discusses the rationale and
arguments for selecting a qualitative approach and ethnography in particular.
The research site including the location of the research, accounting and
auditing development and the requirements for the auditors to be independent
are discussed in the second section. The third section concerns the research
design and includes data collection and data analysis. Data access and the
role of the researcher are also discussed in this chapter.

Chapters Four to Chapter Eight discuss the findings of the study. The
presentation of these chapters is based on four sections as follows: The first
introduces the theme; the second describes the theme from the interviews;
the third discusses the theme; and the last part is a conclusion based on the
discussion.
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Chapter Four discusses the effects of the characteristics of audit firms on
auditor independence and includes the size of the audit firm and non-audit
services offered by auditors. The chapter concludes with the finding that the
larger audit firms have a potentially positive effect on auditor independence.
Whereas those firms that have no non-audit services divisions should not
offer non-audit services to their audit clients unless they have different staff
and a different partner in charge of audit and non-audit services to minimise a
conflict of interest.

Chapter Five discusses the findings on the effects of the characteristics of
clients on auditor independence including the clients'
backgrounds/reputations, the corporate audit committee and the role of the
audit fee paid by clients. The chapter finds that the clients'
backgrounds/reputations have no effect on auditor independence except for
the scope of work, audit requirements and as a consideration in accepting an
audit engagement. The chapter discusses the benefit of the existence of a
corporate audit committee, and finds that auditors produce various arguments
about the effects of a corporate audit committee on auditor independence.
This study also discusses the effect of the audit fee paid by major clients as a
potential factor that could negatively affect auditor independence.

Chapter Six discusses the findings caused by the relationships among audit
firms, and the relationship between audit firms and clients. This chapter
includes a discussion of the effects of competition among audit firms, which is
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found to potentially have a negative effect on auditor independence. The

chapter also discusses the possibility that the clients' directors' real roles i
auditor appointment and remuneration are dangerous to auditor
independence. The length of an audit engagement (audit tenure) on auditor
independence is discussed in the last part of the chapter, and it is found that
the longer the audit engagement, the greater the potential for auditor
independence impairment.

Chapter Seven discusses the effects of sanctions imposed by the professional

body, the state of professional ethics and religion as sources of motivation for
independence. In this chapter, the study argues that sanctions given by the
professional body can enhance auditor independence. Furthermore, this
study also argues that an auditor's religious values can encourage
independence along with the professional ethics of the profession. This
chapter concludes that sanctions are an external factor that could enhance
auditor independence, whereas the professionalism of auditors and the
auditors' religious values are internal sources of independence.

Chapter Eight discusses the meanings of independence perceived by
auditors, major factors that could impair and enhance independence and the
possibility to be totally or partially independent and the auditors' efforts to
maintain their independence. In this chapter, the study has found that
auditors interviewed have a proper understanding of independence. The
study also enlarges the 'meanings' of independence as perceived by auditors
and discusses some major threats to independence (such as improper
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relationships, major clients, the weakness of an auditor's integrity) and the
motivation to be independent (professionalism, sanctions, religious values,
auditors level of education).
partially independent

and

It produces arguments for being totally or
the

practical efforts needed

to

maintain

independence are discussed.

Chapter Nine summarises and concludes the findings of the study and also
discusses the research contributions and recommendations. The limitations
of the research and suggestions for future research are also described.
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CHAPTER TWO

Auditor Independence in Focus

"Essential distinguishing characteristics of audit are the independence of its status
and its freedom from investigatory and reporting constraints"
(Flint, 1988, p.54)

2.1. Introduction
The main aims of this chapter are: first, to discuss auditor independence in
depth and second, to discuss and evaluate previous studies concerning this
topic. The chapter is divided into three major sections. In order to build an
understanding of auditor independence, the first section discusses the nature
of auditing, services offered by auditors, types of auditors, the need for
independent auditors and auditor independence. In order to provide a
framework for this present study, the second section will discuss previous
studies. In this section, the literature review will be divided into: first,
theoretical models of auditor independence; and, second, previous empirical
studies both perceptual and archival. The last section of this chapter consists
of a summary and a conclusion.
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2.2. The Nature of Auditing
The earliest evidence of a financial statement audit is unclear. However, a
model of auditing appeared in the twelfth century when the Bursary was
founded in the UK during the reign of Henry I (Wolnizer, 1987, p. 37; Gul et
al, 1992, p.1). Meanwhile, Pound at al (1983, p.5) asserted that the
Chamberlain of the City of London was subject to audit, towards the end of
the 13th century. The audits, at that time, were intended to ensure that the
state's revenue and expenditure transactions were properly reported (Gul et
al, p. 1) and to assure correctness and regulation compliance, and the
absence of fraud (Pound et al, p. 5).

The original meaning of audit is 'to hear' (Pany and Whittington, 1997, p. 9;
Porter, Simon & Hatherly, 1996, p. 2; Gul, Teoh and Andrew, 1992, p. 1).

Stamp and Moonitz defined the nature and the purpose of audit as:
An independent, objective and expert examination of a set of financial
statements of an entity along with all necessary supporting evidence. It
is conducted with a view to expressing an informed and credible
opinion, in a written report, as to whether the financial statements
portray the financial position and progress of the entity fairly, and in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
(1978, p. 27)
Similarly, the Statement of Auditing Standards (AUS 1) issued by the
Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants (ASCPA) and the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) defines audit as:
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... the independent examination of financial information of any entity,
whether profit oriented or not, and irrespective of its size, or legal form,
w h e n such examination is conducted with a view to expressing an
opinion thereon...
(quoted in Gul et al, 1992, p.3)

Even though numerous definitions of auditing have been proposed, the most
popular definition of auditing can be found in the American Accounting
Association Committee's report, entitled A Statement of Basic Auditing
Concepts (ASOBAC), which defines auditing as:
A systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence
regarding assertions about economic actions and events to ascertain
the degree of correspondence between those assertions and
established criteria and communicating the results to interested users.
(Richiute, 1989, p. 4)
From the quoted definitions, it can be seen, that auditing is a systematic
process involving a logical, structured, and scientific set of steps and
procedures (Gul, Teoh & Andrew, 1992 p. 4; Gill and Cosserat 1993, p. 12).
In obtaining and evaluating evidence, the audit is required to be done
objectively, without bias or prejudices. The assertions about economic
actions and events mean that the scope of auditing covers economic matters
involving the audited individual or entity. To ascertain the degree of
correspondence between those assertions and established criteria in auditing
that audited financial statements must be understood by all users', a 'common
language' and a set of accounting standards must be applied.
Communicating the results to the interested users is the last task of the
auditor. The auditor expresses an opinion and makes a written report, which
is communicated, to the shareholders, creditors and other relevant parties.
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2.3. Services Offered by Auditors
Basically, there are two types of services offered by auditors, attestation
service and non-attestation service. According to Gill and Cosserat (1993, p.
10) attestation service is rendered by auditors to their clients where the
auditors issue a written communication, which expresses a conclusion about

the reliability of a written assertion that is another party's responsibility. T
includes services such as audit, examination, review and other agreed upon
procedures. When auditors perform a non-attestation service they do not
issue an opinion, negative assurance, summary of finding or other form of
assurance (p. 11). Services such as accounting, tax, management
consulting, and insolvency and business recovery are examples of nonattestation services commonly rendered to clients.

As part of the attestation service rendered by auditors, audits can be divided
into three major types; financial statement audits, compliance audits and
operational audits (Pany & Whittington 1997, p 12; Porter, Simon & Hatherly,
1996, p. 3). Financial statement audit refers to an examination of a company
or institution's financial statements conducted by an independent auditor. The
main aim of this audit is to confirm whether accounting standards have been
properly applied in the company's financial statements. A compliance audit is
conducted to examine whether the auditee has done (or is doing) its activities
in accordance with the procedures or regulations established by an authority.
This audit is prepared for the authority that has set up the regulations.
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An operational audit, according to Pany & Whittington (1997, p. 12) is a study
of a specific unit of an organization for the purpose of measuring its
performance. While Gul, Teoh and Andrew (1992, p. 5) defined operational

audit as an appraisal activity within an organization for the review of entire
departmental operations as a service to management. This study will focus

solely on the audit of financial statements and the term 'audit', which is use
throughout the thesis will refer to this type of audit.

2.4. Type of Auditors
Auditors can be divided info three primary categories: independent auditors,
internal auditors and government auditors (see Gul, Teoh and Andrew, 1992;
Gill and Cosserat, 1993). Independent auditors are individual public
accountant or members of public accounting firms who render their services
to clients. The most important aspect of this type of auditor is independence
(Gul, Teoh and Andrew, 1992, p. 5). The second type of auditors are internal
auditors. Internal auditors are auditors who assist the management of an

entity to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The internal auditors ar
employees of the entity (Gil and Cosseat, 1993, p. 15; Gul, Teoh and
Andrew, 1992, p. 6). The last type of auditors are government auditors. This
type of auditor is employed by the government to do the three types of audits
discussed above. They audit the functions of departments, companies owned
by government and other entities or organizations related to the government.
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In this research, however, independent auditors will be the sole focus of the
study. The term independent auditor and auditor, therefore, is used
interchangeably throughout this thesis.

2.5. The Need for An Independent Auditor
Since business activity developed in society, accounting has become a
significant part of economic life. Initially, accounting was needed by the
business owner in order to know about and control business activities.
However, as the complexity of business increased, accounting has
developed, and government has required the publication of financial
statements, which are used by management, shareholders, creditors,
government, and other relevant parties. Therefore, to ensure reliable
information for all the users of financial statements an independent review is
needed.

Financial statements will be reliable sources of information for managers,
resources providers, potential creditors, investors, employees and other users
if they are audited by an independent auditor (Gul, Teoh and Andrew, 1991;
Campbell 1985). Gill and Cosserat (1993, p. 16) and Porter, Simon and
Hatherly (1996, p. 8) assert that the need for an independent auditor is
attributed to the following conditions: conflict of interest, consequence,
complexity and remoteness (see also Campbell 1985, p. 13; Arens et al
1992, p. 16; Pound, Willingham and Charmichael, 1983, p. 4). A discussion
of this matter follows.
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O n e explanation of the need for an independent auditor can be found in
agency theory, where the companies' owners, known as principals delegate
business decisions to another party, the agent w h o is usually the
manager/director. A company's financial statements are prepared by its
managers, w h o report their own performance. The owners need to review the
agent's performance.

However, the owner still wants their business

performance to look good in the eyes of the users of financial statements.

On the other hand, the users of financial statements need an accurate and
objective summary of the company's financial position.

From this

circumstance, it can be seen that the objective of the users of financial
statements is different from the preparer's

(management) objectives.

Consequently, a conflict of interest can occur in this regard. Accordingly, the
user of a financial statement seeks assurance from an independent auditor
who is free of any interest. According to Williams (1984) there are two
sources for the conflict. First, financial statements prepared by management
may consist of biased information in order to fulfil their own interests. Second,
the biased information m a y be unintentional. To solve this problem, therefore,
independent auditors are needed to report on whether the financial
statements are 'fair*.

The second reason why an independent auditor is needed is because of the
consequences of error. Consequence, according to Campbell (1985, p. 14)
refers to "the importance to the user of the decision taken by him on the basis
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of the financial statement. This factor recognizes that the process of
communication from the preparer to the user of financial statements will
normally result in providing information which will help the user in making
decisions". If the financial statements provided by management contain
errors for instance, the user of this financial statement could suffer a great
loss. To prevent this business risk, the user of financial statements needs to
be able to confirm that the financial statements are reliable. The independent
auditor is required to make this confirmation in order to improve the decisionmaking process.

The third reason for the necessity of an independent auditor is complexity. In
modem society, business activities are highly complicated, especially
economic transactions and accounting systems. Consequently, the chance of
errors in the reporting process by management is greater and as a result
there is a growing need by the user of financial statements to make sure that
financial statements have been examined by a qualified independent auditor
(Porter, Simon and Hatherly, 1996, p. 9). This condition clearly requires the
existence of an independent auditor.

Another reason why an independent auditor is needed is remoteness. The
user of a financial statement cannot gain direct access (due to lack of time,
physical remoteness, institutional barriers or lack of money) to the source of
information he/she receives in the financial statements. Therefore the user of
financial statements authorizes an independent auditor to investigate the
information contained in the financial statements.
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As discussed above, financial statements become more useful and reliable for
all parties w h e n they have been audited by an independent auditor.
Consequently, an independent audit is a must because it lends credibility to
audited financial statements.

2.6. Auditor's Independence
Independence is frequently referred to as a cornerstone of auditing (Malkin,
1996; Clikeman, 1998). Without it, audited financial statements will be biased
and useless (Firth, 1980). However, there is no uniformity in the definition of
the term independence (Kinney, 1999, p. 70). There are m a n y definitions of
independence, it depends on w h o defines it, different people will define
independence differently (Amernic and Aranya, 1981, p. 13).

In the early studies, auditor independence was not defined (Bartlett 1993, p.
3). However Bartlett himself defines auditor independence as "an unbiased
mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and financial reporting"
(1993, p. 4). While Lee and Gul (1998, p. 534) define auditor independence
as the absence of collusion between the auditor and the manager of the client
firm.

In the Indonesian Auditing Standards (IAI, 2001, p.

220.1),

independence is quite explicitly defined. It states that an auditor must not
easily be interfered with by other parties, because the auditor must serve all
parties and not tend to a certain party.
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Meanwhile, the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants and the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia define independence as " a
freedom from any interest incompatible with integrity and objectivity" (ASCPA
&ICAA, 1997, p. 632)

In the Statement of Auditing Standards (AUS 1, para 16) auditors are required
to be:
...straightforward, honest and sincere in their approach to their
professional work. They must be fair and must not allow prejudice or
bias to override their objectivity. They shall maintain an impartial
attitude and both be, and appear to be, free of any interest which might
be regarded, whatever its actual effect, as being incompatible with
integrity and objectivity.
It is not doubted that an auditor's opinion, without independence, is suspect
because independence is the cornerstone of the auditing profession (Gill and
Cosserat, 1993, p. 19). In other words, audited financial statements will only
be valuable when the independent auditor maintains his/her independence.
Auditors, therefore, have to maintain their independent attitude in doing their
work and also be seen to be independent by the users of financial statements
(Mautz and Sharaf 1982, p. 204). The former independence is generally
known as independence in fact, and the latter is commonly referred as
independence in appearance or perceived independence (Arens et al, 1992,
p. 71; Porter, Simon & Hatherly, 1996, p. 65). The importance of both forms
of independence has been asserted in the Statement of Auditing Practice
AUP 32 as follows:
The concept of independence is fundamental to auditing, since the
auditor's objective is to enhance, through the expression of an
independent opinion, the credibility of the reported financial information
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of an entity. The value of the independent audit lies both in the fact
that the auditor is, and is seen to be, independent of the audited entity,
and hence is able to carry out the audit free of any externally imposed
constraints.
(ASCPA & ICAA, 1997, p. 632)
From the Statement of Auditing quoted above, it is obvious that auditors have
to be careful in fulfilling their audit engagements, even though they are
independent in fact, if they become involved in situations that may lead people
to doubt their independence, their independence would be viewed as
valueless.

Mautz and

Sharaf (1982, p.

206) identified three dimensions of

independence:

1. Programming Independence: Freedom from control or undue
influence in the selection of audit techniques and procedures and in the
extent of their application. This requires that the auditor have freedom
to develop his o w n program, both as to steps to be included and the
amount of work to be performed, within the over-all bounds of the
engagement.
2. Investigative Independence: Freedom from control or undue
influence in the selection of areas, activities, personal relationships,
and managerial policies to be examined. This requires that no
legitimate source of information be closed to the auditor.
3. Reporting Independence: Freedom from control or undue influence
in the statement of facts revealed by the examination or in the
expression of recommendations or opinions as a result of the
examination. The relationship of reporting to the examination has been
neatly expressed in the following: "You tell us what to do and we'll tell
you what w e can write in our report; you tell us what you want us to say
in our report and we'll tell you what w e have to do".
In the literature, most studies concerning auditor independence relate to
perceived independence rather than independence in fact (Falk, Frucot and
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Zijl, 1995). The following issues relate to perceived independence which have
been studied extensively: provision of Management Advisory Services (MAS),
competition among audit firms, the size of audit firms, tenure of the audit
assignment, the nature of any conflict, the existence or non existence of an
audit committee and the financial condition of the client (Gul, Teoh and
Andrew, 1992, p. 95). Among these issues, MAS has become the most
frequently researched in the perceived independence area.

As argued by Knapp (1982, p. 39) perceived independence has become a
focus of the researchers' attention and independence in fact has not been
included. Researchers like Knapp (1982, p. 10) have also supported
Shockley (1981, p. 785) argued that perceived independence was of more
concern to the public rather than independence in fact, when he made the
following statement "...for credibility depends ultimately on the perception
rather than on the fact of independence". Moreover, Falk Frucot and Zijl
(1995) argued that auditor independence in fact was not observable ex ante
(see also Amernic and Aranya, 1981, p. 17; Beattie et al, 1999, p.68).

2.7. Selected Previous Studies
This section will review selected previous studies on auditor independence.
In order to build a frame work of auditor independence and to recognize what
other researchers have done in relation to auditor independence, this section
will be divided into the following parts: first, theoretical models of auditor
independence; and second, a discussion of previous empirical studies on
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auditor independence which will be divided into perceptual and archival
studies.

2.7.1. Theoretical Models of Auditor Independence
In this section theoretical models of independence will be discussed in order
to provide an understanding of auditor independence and its aspects. Some
theoretical studies of independence include DeAngelo's economic model
(1981), Antle's agency theory (1982), Nichols and Price's Exchange theory
model (1976), Flint's material circumstances to auditor independence (1988)
and Goldman and Barlev's behavioural model of independence (1974).

However, in this present study only the last two mentioned studies will be
discussed, viz Flint's material circumstances to independence (1988) and
Goldman and Barlev's behavioural model of independence (1974). There are
two reasons for discussing them. First, this present study focuses on
auditors' perceptions of independence and therefore this study can be
considered as a behavioural study, and the study of Goldman and Barlev
provides a behavioural approach, which considers how auditors and clients
influence one another. Second, Flint's study provides a discussion of more
comprehensive issues. Therefore these models are suitable to be referenced
for this study as an aid to help identify and explore the issues to be
investigated. The discussion will start with the material circumstances for
auditor independence proposed by Flint (1988) and will then be followed by a
behavioural model of independence by Goldman and Barlev (1974).
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2.7.1.1 Flint's (1988) Material Circumstances Affecting Independence
According to Flint (1988, p. 63) auditor independence is affected by five
conditions. These five circumstances are personal qualities, personal
relationship, financial interest or dependence, investigative and reporting
freedoms, and organizational status. A discussion of these five
circumstances follows:

1. Personal Qualities
Independence is heavily dependent on personal qualities. Flint divides
personal qualities into probity and strength of character. The probity of an

auditor's personal reputation is supported by the institutional status of auditin
as a profession. A member of a professional body is expected to have
accepted professional obligations as part of their conduct and to have a
concern for the public interest. The auditor is also expected to conform to a
code of ethics and to be subject to sanctions in the event of their failing to do
so (p. 64). Integrity, objectivity and strength of character are personal
attributes which should be possessed by an auditor. In the AUP 32, more
detail regarding these personal qualities is given as follows:

Integrity- the staunch observance of accepted standards of honesty
which must underlie all professional decisions and actions. A n auditor
w h o has integrity has a straightforward, honest and sincere approach
to professional work;
Objectivity- an unwillingness to allow prejudice or bias to influence
judgment and the maintenance of a fair and impartial attitude; and
Strength of character- the ability to maintain integrity and objectivity in
the face of pressure from others. T h e opinion of the auditors is vital to
the credibility of financial reports, and the governing body, recognizing
this, m a y seek to influence the auditor. Without the strength of
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character to withstand such pressure, the auditor will not be able to
express an independent opinion.
(ASCPA & ICAA, 1997, p.633).
However, according to Flint (1988, p. 64) public confidence is partly
dependent on the personal repute of individuals and on the belief in
professionalism. This statement is also supported by AUP 32 which states
'The personal qualities of the auditor are integral to the maintenance of audit
independence, but they cannot be maintained by rules or regulations and it is

incumbent upon the auditor to ensure that integrity, objectivity and strength of
character have been maintained. However, support for audit independence
can be derived from external sources such as legislation and through the selfregulatory procedures of the Society and the Institute" (p. 634). From this, it
can be seen that personal qualities will influence the auditor's independence.

2. Personal Relationship
Another circumstance that may influence independence are personal
relationships. "A person is disqualified from acting as auditor if a personal
relationship exists which would be liable to influence their mental attitude"
(Flint, 1988, p. 64). A spouse, parent or child, employer, employee or any
people who will be affected by the outcome of the audit are prohibited from
being in charge as an auditor. Flint recognizes this personal relationship as a

conflict of interest. Flint furthermore states that receipt of personal favours,
gifts or privileges by an auditor could consciously or unconsciously influence
the auditor's mental attitude.

3. Financial Interest or

Dependence
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An auditor's financial interest in connection with the firm being audited could
become a conflict of interest in the mind of the auditor. According to Flint
(1988, p.66), the following circumstances, which would result in a conflict of
interest, relate to this issue. They generally comprise: investment by the
auditor, borrowing by the auditor, settlement of the auditor's remuneration, the
auditor as a beneficiary, and a disproportionate fee dependence on an
audited organization.

Investment by the auditor in the audited company could lead to a conflict of
interest and influence the mental attitude of the auditor. Therefore total
absence of investment will remove all doubt (p. 68). Auditor independence is
threatened w h e n the auditor and client relationship is like debtor and creditor.
This relationship could influence the freedom to investigate and report.

The settlement of the circumstances for the auditor's remuneration could also
be dangerous to auditor independence if clients (or any parties) are in a
strong bargaining position to determine the fee size and so clients could bring
pressure on auditor independence. A relationship, which could financially
benefit auditors such as the use of facilities by auditors, could threaten the
auditors' independence. Auditor independence is also under threat w h e n the
audit firm depends heavily on one audited company (client). It is clear that an
auditor m a y tend to give into the clients' pressures, especially if the audit firm
wants to be appointed for the next engagement.
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4. Investigative and Reporting Freedom
An auditor is hired to investigate the facts and to attest the reports prepared
by management. In doing his job, investigative and reporting freedom are
essential, as stated by Flint (1988) "The only basis on which auditors can
make an unqualified attestation, report or opinion which will satisfy the needs

and expectations of users and fulfil the social function of the audit, is that t
should have an unrestricted right of access to all relevant information which
exists and which they believe is necessary and that they should be subject to

non constraints in attesting, reporting or expressing their opinion as they thin
appropriate as a result of their investigation" (p. 73). Once the auditor
becomes restricted in his access to information and publishing reports, his
independence becomes impaired.

5. Organisational Status
The constitutional and organisational arrangement in the appointment of
auditors is very important for the independence of auditors. According to Flint
(1988), a proper arrangement for the appointment of an auditor would secure
the independence of this auditor, conversely an improper arrangement would
decrease independence (p. 75). There are at least two conditions to be
considered in the appointment of an auditor, these are: conditions of
appointment and conditions of operation (p. 76). Furthermore, he asserts
that the essential principle in the appointment of an auditor should not be
made by the person(s) whose position would be affected by the outcome of
the audit. Another thing that can impair auditor independence is, whether or
not the auditor renders services other than audit.
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2.7.1.2. G o l d m a n and Barlev's (1974) Auditor-Firm Conflict of Interests
In their study, Goldman And Barlev (1974) identify that the auditor is
potentially involved in three conflicts of interest. They also identify the auditorfirm balance of power and propose three ways to reduce the conflict of
interests.

2.7.1.2.1. Conflicts of Interest in the Auditing Role
These three conflicts of interest are: first, the auditor-firm (client) conflict of
interests; second, the shareholders-management conflict of interests; and last
the auditor's self interests-professional standards conflict. T h e causes of
these conflicts will be illustrated below.

When the shareholders and management have the same interests and when
an audited report m a y cause potential investors not to invest and potential
creditors not to lend their credit, and also w h e n the audited report m a y
weaken the value of shares and m a n a g e m e n t c o m e s under criticism, this
situation could lead m a n a g e m e n t to try to influence the audited report so it
becomes more 'favourable'. O n the other hand, the auditor has to produce
the audited report based on the professional standards and therefore this
therefore creates a conflict of interest between the auditor and the firm
(client).
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A conflict of interest can arise between management and shareholders when
an audited report is used to evaluate the management's performance.
Management, therefore would possibly fry to influence the auditor so that the
audited report would be more 'favourable' in order to convince shareholders.
In this situation, the auditor would be trapped between the shareholders and
the management's conflict of interest.

Auditors, as in other professions, are always tempted to violate their
professional standards. For example, auditors by violating standards and
tending to agree with the clients' wishes may have a personal gain but they
will have breached their professional ethics. This situation can be viewed as
internal conflict between an auditor's self-interests and his/her professional
integrity.

2.7.1.2.2.The Auditor-Firm Balance of Power
Both the auditor and the firm have potential to influence each other. The
firm's main sources of power, according to Goldman and Barlev, can be

classified as three in number. These are the ability of the firm to hire and fire
the auditor, the ability to determine the auditor's fees and the ability to
determine work conditions.

On the other hand, the auditor's main sources of power come from the nature
of the problem solved, those who benefit from the service and the state of the
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auditor's professional ethics. These three sources of power are expected to
enable auditors to withstand the pressure and to be independent.

According to Goldman and Barlev, problems solved by a professional can be
both routine and non-routine problems. They illustrate this distinction noting
the difference between the medical and the auditing professions.

They

argued that a physician solves non-routine problems of his client, whereas an
auditor solves s o m e non-routine problems, but m a n y issues were familiar and
did not require m u c h professional judgement. Therefore they classified the
auditor as one w h o solves routine problems which form part of a continuum.
In this regard, it can be seen that the higher the proportion of non-routine
problems dealt with by a professional, the more power he/she has against a
client.

Benefits from the services rendered by a professional do not always belong to
the paying client, as the medical client has a direct benefit from his/her doctor.
In this regard, the more services rendered by a professional that directly
benefit the client, the more important these services are to the client and the
greater the professional's power. Goldman and Barlev argued that auditors
were paid by clients but the services were mainly used by third parties.
Consequently, based on the realities that auditors are professionals w h o solve
mainly routine problems and that their services are for the benefit of third
parties the auditors are then very vulnerable to clients' pressure.
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An auditor's conduct in performing audit tasks are prescribed by a code of
ethics and audit standards. The more the code of ethics and audit standards
are enforced, the more the auditors' power increases, and the less the
enforcement of the code of ethics and standards, the more the auditors'
power decreases.

In their study, Goldman and Barlev (p. 714) also identified two implications of
controversial developments from the audit profession namely non-audit
services and audit firm size. Non-audit services (as they call management
services) have become pro and contra issues. The proponents argue that
providing non-audit services to audit clients would not impair auditor
independence. Conversely, the opponents believe that providing non-audit
services would generate a conflict of interest and finally impair independence.
Goldman and Barlev proposed a way out of this dilemma when they
suggested that auditors offer non-audit services to audit clients with a
limitation. Non-audit services are not involved with the client decision-making

process for two reasons. First, the auditors' conflict of interest will be limited
and second, by allowing this, the source of the auditors' power would
increase, because most consulting services are non-routine and directly
benefit the client firm.

The size of the audit firm has also become an issue in the discussion of
auditor independence. Many argue that the larger audit firms are more able
to resist clients' pressure because they are not dependent on one client. Also
a study of companies who changed their public accountant, as quoted by
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Goldman and Barlev, found that a national (larger) audit firm would be more
beneficial when making a public offering. On this issue, again Goldman and
Barlev suggested that it should not be concluded that large audit firms were
immune from clients' pressure. The court cases, they furthermore argued,
showed that large audit firms' independence was not always guaranteed.

In addition to the above, Goldman and Barlev offered solutions to the auditfirm conflicts of interests with the following suggestions: (1) reducing the
potential power of management vis a vis the auditor by limiting management's
freedom of action, (2) decreasing the auditor's flexibility of action, and (3)
Changing the auditing role structure.

Limiting management's freedom can be done by instituting a more difficult
process to replace an auditor and by the arrangement of an audit committee
chaired by non-directors. Decreasing the auditor's flexibility by reducing the
choice of financial reporting standards is expected to increase the detection of
malpractice and therefore would increase independence. The third parties as
major users of an auditor's services have to be protected. Since an auditor
has no contract with third parties, the legal liabilities of an auditor to third
parties have to be set. This, as stated by Goldman and Barlev is an important
issue in increasing independence.

The relationship between a firm's source of power and an auditor's source of
power is shown below as a model of independence.
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Figure 1

Behavioural M o d e l of I n d e p e n d e n c e
Of Goldman and Barlev (1974, p. 712)

Independent Variables

Intervening variable

Dependant variable

Finn's source of power
(i) Ability to hire and
fire auditor
(ii) Ability to determine
auditor's fees
(iii) Ability to determine
work conditions

Amount
of firm's
power

z.

Auditor's ability
to withstand —I
pressure

Behaviour according to
professional standards

Auditor's source of power
(i) Nature of the problem ^
/
solved (routine-nonroutine) Amount of
(ii) Beneficiaries from the auditor's
services (firm, third parties) power
(iii) State of professional
ethics

2.7.1.3. A g e n c y a n d Behavioural Theory
The theoretical models discussed above of Flint (1988) and Goldman and
Barlev (1974) have inspired the theoretical framework of this present study.
The theories inherent in these two studies are agency theory and behavioural
theory.

The existence of auditors is derived from agency theory w h e r e the
shareholders (owners/principals) extend their trust to directors (agents) to run
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their business.

T h e principals give authority the agent to do business

activities in order to gain profit. Not all agents' activities are in line with the
principals' interests, for examples inefficiency and business activities that
constitute misconduct.

In monitoring and controlling the activities of their

agent, and also for the needs of third parties such as potential creditors,
potential investors and government, shareholders hire auditors to examine
corporate financial statements.

However, in performing the audit tasks

auditors can fall into a conflict of interest as Goldman and Barlev illustrate
above. Meanwhile, Flint argues that s o m e circumstances that could affect
auditor independence.

The auditors, on the one hand, need to be independent to perform the audit
tasks, they have to be professional as set by their professional body, but on
the other hand the auditors, as h u m a n beings are tempted by a conflict of
interest (as introduced by Goldman and Barlev) and circumstances (as
identified by Flint). A s argued by Ferris and Dillard (1988, p. 282) individual
behaviour could be influenced by variety of factors such as environmental,
organizational, physiological, psychological, and background. Auditors in this
regard, are not an exception.

The purpose of this study therefore is to

investigate the factors that could affect auditor independence in the context of
Indonesian auditors.
empirical researches.

T h e next section reviews s o m e selected previous

39
2.7.2. Previous Empirical Studies on Auditor Independence
This section examines previous empirical studies on the factors influencing
auditor independence. The studies can be classified into perceptual and
archival. Perceptual studies refer to the studies on auditor independence or
related to auditor independence which measure or investigate the perceptions
of parties involved in using financial statements such as bankers, financial
analysts, stock-brokers, shareholders, and auditors. On the other hand,
archival studies on auditor independence refer to studies measuring or
investigating auditor independence based on available publications (archives)
by analysing the relationship between variables. Selected previous studies
have been summarised according to the country base: developing countries,
developed countries and cross-countries. Studies on factors influencing
auditor independence have been conducted in developed countries such as
the US (eg. Shockley (1981); Scheiner and Kiger (1982); Moore (1983;
Knapp (1985) Bartlett (1993)), the UK (eg. Firth (1980) and Beattie et al
(1999)), Australia (eg. Lindsay, (1989); Wines (1994); Barkes et al (1995);
and Craswell et al (1997)), and Canada (Amernic and Aranya (1981).

Few studies of auditor independence have been conducted in developing
countries. Gul and Teoh (1984) and Teoh and Lim (1996) produced auditor
independence studies in Malaysia. Supriyono (1988) represents the only
study of auditor independence in Indonesia. While cross-cultural studies of
auditor independence have been done by Agacer and Doupnik (1991) in three
countries which include the US, the Philippines and Germany. Most previous
empirical studies are classified as perceptual studies (please see figure 2),
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and only a few studies are archival such as Scheiner and Kiger (1982), Wines
(1994), Barkes, Simnett and Urquhart (1995) Pringle and Buchman (1996),
Craswell, Laughton and Stokes (1997), and Kleinmen, Palmon and
Anandarajan (1998) (please see figure 3).

In the Indonesian context, Supriyono (1988) has investigated six factors
influencing auditor independence. These include financial interest,
competition, non-audit services, audit tenure, audit firm size and audit fee. In
collecting data he sent questionnaires to financial chief executives of listed
companies, loan officers of banks, auditors and a capital market executive
agency. Data collected was analysed by proportion analysis, chi square tests
and analysis of variance. He found that all six factors impaired auditor
independence.

In the literature, there is a lack of studies investigating entire factors that co
affect auditor independence. The previous studies were normally concerned
with investigating three to six issues which influenced auditor independence.
The previous studies showed that all perceptual research projects used
questionnaires in collecting data, and both perceptual and archival studies
used a quantitative approach in analysing data. In their questionnaires, the
respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions by selecting a
dichotomous (yes or no, enhance or impair) or score scale answer (likert
scale, the most to the least). It is important to note that although auditor
independence is closely related to individual behaviour, there is a lack of
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cultural nuances in the previous studies as stated by Kleinman et al (1998, p.
33) except for the study by Agacer (1987).

The studies of factors affecting auditor independence can be classified into
the following issues/variables. These nine issues are now discussed.

2.7.2.1. Non-Audit Services (NAS)
Since many researchers include the non-audit service issue in their studies, it
can be stated that the non-audit services issue is the most researched issue
on auditor independence. Providing non-audit services by audit firms to audit
clients will increase the question of auditor objectivity and independence
(Agacer and Doupnik, 1991). It is clear that, once an audit firm renders non-

audit services to its particular client, its independence will be attacked by it
conflict of interest, between maintaining its independence and professionalism

and following a client's pressure to gain financial interest. In general, previou
studies on the effect of non-audit services to audit clients on auditor
independence have had inconsistent findings (Kleinman et al 1998). Some
studies have confirmed that providing non-audit services will impair the
perception of auditor independence (see Shockley, 1981; Moore, 1983;
Lindsay, 1999; Wines, 1994;). On the other hand, the findings of other
studies argued that providing non-audit services to audit clients does not
affect the perception of independence (see Gul and Teoh, 1984; Pringle and
Buchman, 1996).
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2.7.2.2. Competition
Competition is one form of relationship among audit firms that is viewed as
likely to impair auditor independence. This is because high-level competition
could lead to unfair practice among audit firms. A high level of competition
among audit firms could result in a difficult situation in seeking and retaining

clients and this could lead them to cut or reduce their fee to an irrational leve
in order to seek and retain clients. Previous studies however have showed
this high-level competition among audit firms in a different light. Shockley
(1981) and Lindsay (1989) in their studies concluded that auditor competition
could impair auditor independence. On the other hand, the study of Knapp
(1985) on financial statements users' perceptions found that competition had
no significant effect on auditor independence. Meanwhile, the study of Gul
(1989) as quoted by Beattie et al (1999) found that auditor competition has a
significant positive impact on auditor independence.

2.7.2.3. Major Clients
The issue of audit fees contributed by major clients to audit firms is also
viewed as a factor that could affect auditor independence. The reason is
because a large fee contribution generated by a particular client could lead to
the dependency of audit firms on that client. However, studies that have
investigated this issue have no conclusive findings. The archival studies of
Barkess et al (1995) and Craswell et al (1997) did not find any impairment in
having major clients. On the other hand, another group of studies found
evidence that having major clients could impair auditor independence
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(Supriyono, 1988; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Beattie et al 1999).

Study by

Kleinman et al (1998) found that auditors maybe more flexible with larger
clients.

2.7.2.4. Audit Firm Size
S o m e audit firms have grown into large international audit firms, frequently
called the big-five audit firms. These audit firms are linked world-wide. O n
the other hand, local audit firms, ranging from one to several partners still
exist. Because of the different natures of local/small and large audit firms, the
size of audit firms is perceived to be a factor that could affect auditor
independence (Shockley, 1981, p. 786). The larger the audit firm, the smaller
the contributions of certain clients' fees, therefore the larger audit firms are
less dependent on individual clients (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961, p. 213). This
perception has led to several empirical researches. O n the size of audit firm
issue, previous examined studies have shown a conclusion that the larger the
audit firm, the more independent their auditors (Shockley, 1981; Amernic &
Aranya, 1981; Supriyono, 1988; Lindsay, 1989; Kleinman et al, 1998).

2.7.2.5. Corporate Audit Committee
It is a dangerous situation where the company's management is able to
appoint and dismiss an auditor. This obviously could put more pressure on
the auditor and then consequently the auditor would be reluctant to disagree
with the management.

Mautz and N e u m a n (1970, p. 7) stated that a
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corporate audit committee is "a standing committee of the board of directors
established to work directly with the auditors both independent and internal,
as well as with representatives of other accounting related activities as seem
appropriate". Furthermore they asserted that the purpose of an corporate
audit committee is to strengthen the audit function within a company and
therefore it adds protection both for directors and shareholders (p. 56). A
corporate audit committee consisting of non-director members is likely to
enhance auditor independence (Wolnizer, 1987, p. 156). This is because the
committee which consists of non-director members has no conflict of interest
in executing their duties. A Malaysian case study of Teoh and Lim (1996)
found that the formation of a corporate audit committee w a s perceived to have
a strong positive impact in enhancing auditor independence. In the UK,
Beattie's et al study (1999) supported Teoh and Lim's study.

2.7.2.6. Clients' Directors' Roles
This issue arises from the fact that the auditor is hired and fired by the clients.
In practice, for those w h o have no corporate audit committee, the client is
represented by the directors (as in fact) in dealings with the auditor. This
situation could encourage the auditor tendency to seek the directors' favour
where their position is determined by the 'keenness' of clients (directors)
therefore the auditor would be reluctant to disagree with clients' (directors')
requirements.
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In this regard, the clients' directors' roles in relation to an auditor's
appointment, remuneration and audit work is viewed as something that could
negatively affect auditor independence. Up to now, not many studies have
included this issue in their research. One study conducted by Beattie et al
(1999), however has found that clients' directors roles could impair auditor
independence.

2.7.2.7. Audit Tenure
The longer term audit engagements between audit firms and clients are
viewed as having a negative effect on auditor independence. This is because
the longer their relationship, the more the possibility of an improper
relationship between them. As reported by Shockley (1981, p. 789), the US
Senate has stated that this is a difficult situation for audit firms to remain
independent. "Long association between a corporation and an accounting
firm may lead to such close identification of the accounting firm with the
interests of its client's management that truly independent action by the
accounting firm become difficult" (the US Senate 1976, p. 21).

Studies on the issue of long association between audit firms and clients have
generated inconclusive findings. The study of Supriyono (1988) has
supported that view. On the other hand Shockley (1981) did not find
significant evidence that audit tenure could negatively affect auditor
independence. The study of Teoh and Lim (1996) found that audit firms
rotation (in order to limit long association between clients and auditors) is
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significant in affecting auditor independence. However, Teoh and Lim found
that this potential risk tended to be diminished in large audit firms that had
practised audit partners.

2.7.2.8. The Regulatory Role of Professional Body
Flint (1988) suggested that a regulatory agency should monitor the auditors'
conduct and their professional standards in order to maintain public
confidence. This is a relatively new issue to be included in research into
auditor independence. The idea is that the auditors' professionalism is
supported by the professional body through the enforcing of audit standards.
Those who violate audit standards are sanctioned by the professional body
ranging from a warning, audit license cancellation or court. The more rigorous
the law enforcement run by the professional body, the more motivated is the
auditor to comply with audit standards in performing audit tasks, so
consequently the auditor can act independently.

The study conducted by Beattie et al (1999) in the UK concluded that
regulatory factors could enhance auditor independence.

2.7.2.9. The Clients' Financial Conditions
The healthier a clients' financial condition the more likely auditors will have
good image of them and this could make auditors less motivated to resist
management pressure (Knapp, 1985; Kleinman et al, 1998), and conversely
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auditors would be more 'careful' when dealing with clients with worse financial
conditions. A study conducted by Beattie et al (1999) found that the weak
financial condition of a client was perceived by public accountants and
financial directors as a factor that could enhance auditor independence. On
the other hand, according to the study by Beattie et al (1999) financial

journalists viewed the weak financial condition of a client as a factor that coul
threaten auditor independence. In investigating the audit conflicts perceived
by financial users, Knapp (1995) found that a client in a good financial
condition was more able to achieve its preferred outcome to an audit conflict.

Figure 2

S u m m a r y of Previous Perceptual Studies

Variables Researched

Research Subjects

Findings/ Results

Shockley (1981)

1.
2.
3.
4.

I.Big Eight Partners
2. Local Auditor Partners
3. Loan Officers
4. Financial Analysts

Auditor Competition, Non
Audit Services, and Audit
Firm Size m a y impair
auditor's independence.
Tenure of audits have no
significant effect on the
auditor's independence.

Moore (1983)

1. N A S
2. Auditor Rotation
3. Peer Review

Financial Analysts from:
1. Brokerage Houses
2. Investment Banking
3. Investment Companies
4. Bank Trust Oept.
5. Private Fund and FounDation

NAS and tax planning impair auditor's independence.
Auditor rotation and Peer
Review improve auditor's
independence.

Knapp (1985)

1. Conflict Issue
2. Client's Financial Condition
3. N A S
4. Auditor Competition

Loan Officers

Subjectivity in technical
standards decreases auditor's independence.
Client in a good condition
more probable to force their
preference than client in a poor

Researchers
Single Developed
Countries

Auditor Competition
Non Audit Services (NAS)
Audit firm size
Tenure of Audits
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condition.
Bariett(1993)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Firth (1980)

Beattie et al
(1999)

Audit Fee Size
NAS
Contingent Fee
Joint Venture with client
Budget Pressure

1. Loan Officers
2. Auditors

Continuum perceived independence exists.
Significant different among
banker's and auditor's perception.
understanding of accounting
has no effect on evaluation
of independence.

1. Auditor-Client Relationship
2. Perception on the importance
of audit

1.
2.
3.
4.

Auditors
Stock Brokers
Investment Managers
Loan Officers

No conclusive findings
(in general non independence
impaired auditor independence,
but a number of respondents
in s o m e situation had a converse
view.

1.

1.
2.
3.

Financial directors
Public accountants
Financial journalists

2.

Factors relate to economic
dependence affecting auditor
independence.
Regulatory factors

Factors relate to economic
dependence and non audit
services are perceived as impairing
auditor independence. While
regulatory factors (such as audit
committee, risk of referraltothe
Financial Reporting Review Panel
and the risk to the audit firm of loss
of registered auditor status) tend to
enhance auditor independence.
All of these variables will
impair auditor's independence

Lindsay (1989)

1. Accounting issue in dispute
2. N A S
3. Auditor Competition
4. Audit firm size

1. Security Analysts
2. Bankers

Amernic and
Aranya (1981)

1. Audit firm size
2. Auditor's level in the hierarchy of the firm.

Auditors

Larger firms appear to be
more independent.
Partners appear more independent than employees.

1.
2.
3.
4.

All variables impair independence
Financial interests (78%)
Competition (48%)
Audit Fee (42%)
Audit Tenure (34%)
Smaller audit firm (27%)
Non Audit Service (8%)

Single Developing
Countries
Supriyono (1988)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Gul and Teoh
1984

Financial interest
Competition
Non Audit Services
Audit Tenure
Audit Firm Size
Audit Fee

The effect of combined audit
NAS

Managers
Auditors
Bankers
Capital Market Executive

1. Auditors
2. Bankers
3. Managers
4. Shareholders

No definite conclusion
about NAS, except for
shareholders view auditors
still remain independent.

Not possible to separate
M A S from participating in
decision making process.
Teoh and Lim
1996

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Audit Committee
NAS
Disclosure of Non-audit fees
Size of audit fees
Rotation of audit firms

1. Public Accountants
2. Corporate Accountants

large audit fees generated from
client and N A S are factors
impairing auditor independence.
Rotation of audit firm is not a
dominant factor. Audit committee
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is perceived as a factor improving
auditor independence, while impact
of disclosure of non-audit fees is
positive but not significant.
Cross Countries
(Cultural)
Agacer (1987)

Whether any consensus on the
Perception of auditor independence
Across culture

Auditors in the US,
Philippines and Germany

Different perception on
auditor's independence
existed because cultural
background.
Harmonisation is not easily brought
about, but it does not
m e a n that it won't happen.

Figure 3

S u m m a r y of Selected Archival Researches
Researchers

Variables Researched

Archives Used

Findings/Results

Scheiner and
Kiger(1982)

Type of NAS
Percentage of N A S

Clients' Financial Statement

Tax services as the largest NAS
Less traditional accounting
comprise small part of N A S

Wines (1994)

NAS

Financial Statements of
Listed Companies

Higher level of N A S will
impair auditor independence

Barkes, Simnett and Urquhart (1995)

1. The level of fee dependence
in Australia.
2. The effect of fee dependence
to the audit independence.

Financial Statements
Audit population

N o audit dependence more
than 1 5 % in Australian con
text.
No impairment auditor's independence in this regard.

Pringle and
Buchman(1996)

Effect of N A S to audit opinion

Financial Statement of public
companies

N A S does not impair auditor
independence

Financial Statement
Audit firms data

No evidence to indicate
fee dependence.

Auditor independence and fee
Craswell, Laugh
ton and Stokes
(1997)

Dependence (major clients).

Kleinman, Palmon Synthesising between theory and
and Anadarajan
empirical studies on auditor
(1998)
independence

Main previous studies related to Larger firm likely to be more
auditor independence
independence, healthier clients
negatively affect independence,
N A S are inconclusive, partners'
fee compensation negatively
affect independence, litigation
affect auditor independence,
positive association between
audit fees, client size and
complexity variables, auditors
be more flexible with larger
clients
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2.8. S u m m a r y and Conclusion
The chapter has discussed two main topics: first, the nature of auditing,
services offered by auditors, type of audits and auditors, and the need for an
independent auditor; and second, the theoretical model of auditor
independence. It has reviewed selected previous empirical studies both
perceptual and archival on auditor independence.

In the first section, auditor independence was found to be the essence of
auditing. Therefore auditors have to maintain their independence in their work
engagement in any situation and conditions, otherwise their output and
audited financial statements will be unreliable. However, auditor
independence is still a debatable issue at present.

Even though professional bodies claim that auditors should be independent,
many researchers do not agree that auditors are (can be) independent (see
Hendrickson, 1998; Jeppesen, 1998). Reiter (1997) supported Hendrickson
and Jeppesen by stating that auditor independence may not be the kind of
conflict that can be solved (p. 306).
Hendrickson (1998) for example, suggested that auditors are not independent
because of the auditor-client basic relationship. Because the client who can

pay and terminate the audit appointment is their employer, it is impossible for
the auditor to be independent. This view was also supported by The Cohen
Commission, which stated that "the independent auditor is selected and paid
by someone affected by his work. Consequently, total independence is a
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practical impossibility" (Clikeman, 1998, p.40). Auditors have a conflict of
interest, in that they have to maintain their professionalism and at the same
time they have their own economic interest to attend to.

On the other hand, some researchers have proved that auditors could still be
independent when non-audit services were offered and there was no
impairment of independence in relation to fee dependence (Barkes, Simnett
and Urquhart, 1995; Craswell, Laughton and Stokes, 1997). This opinion was
also supported by the Accounting Professional Bodies, which guide their
members to be independent and this indirectly means that being independent
is not impossible in their view.

In the second part of this chapter, the theoretical model proposed by Flint
(1988) and the behavioural model of Goldman and Barlev (1974) were
discussed. The reasons for adopting these models into this present study are
because this present study is behavioural since it takes social and cultural
values into consideration, and the completeness (comprehensiveness) of the
two models would provide a proper framework on auditor independence. The
agency and behaviour theories are inherent in these two models.

The second part of this chapter also discussed the previous empirical studies
both perceptual and archival. As can be seen most of the empirical studies
were perceptual studies while there were only a few archival studies. In the
perceptual studies, all researchers measured the perceptions, of involved
parties, of audited financial statements by sending questionnaires in a data
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collection process. All data collected were analysed through the use of
statistics to test their hypothesis. In the archival studies the researchers used
publicly available data such as financial statements or other sources of
information and then they looked for relationships between the variables.
In the literature all previous empirical studies used a quantitative approach.
All the studies researched particular or certain factors ranging from two to six
variables and there was no study involving all factors. According to the
available literature there were no previous studies of auditors' own
perceptions of their independence involving the auditors' culture, except for
Agacer (1987) who investigated auditors' perceptions from three different
countries.

Because of the lack of studies using a qualitative approach, and because no
studies investigated all the factors and because of a lack of previous studies
which involved the auditors' socio cultural values, this present study will
investigate auditors' perceptions of factors that could affect auditor
independence using a qualitative approach and involving auditors' sociocultural values. The study is concerned with auditors in Java, Indonesia.

The following chapter will discuss the research strategy and the methods
used in this study.
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CHAPTER THREE

Research Methods

The Seminar
Qualitative Researcher: "Many people these days are bored with their work and are ...."
Quantitative Researcher (interrupting): "What people, how many, when do they feel this way,
where do they work, what do they do, why are they bored, how long have they felt this way,
what are their needs, when do they feel excited, where did they c o m e from, what parts of their
work bother them most, which..."
Qualitative Researcher: "Never mind."
Van Maanen (1983, p. 7)

3.1. Introduction
Research methods are the ways by which knowledge is acquired and
constructed within a discipline (Harvey & Myers, 1995, p. 13). In general,
research methods or approaches can be categorized as: quantitative and
qualitative. The quantitative approach is heavily based on measurement and
analysis of causal relationships between variables, not processes (Denzin,

1994, p. 4). It is defined as "an inquiry into a social or human problem, based
on testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and
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analyzed with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the
predictive generalizations of the theory hold true" (Creswell 1994, p.2). This
approach normally involves laboratory experiments, sample surveys,
statistical and hypotheses testing. This approach is also frequently referred to
as mainstream, scientific or positivistic.

On the other hand qualitative research is defined by Creswell (p. 2) as "an
inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on a
building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed
views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting". Similar attributes of
qualitative research have also been addressed by Denzin (1994, p. 4), he
states that in a qualitative approach, processes and meanings are not
rigorously examined in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency.
Furthermore, he asserts that a qualitative approach stresses the socially
constructed nature of reality, the closeness between the researcher and what
is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. This approach
normally involves case study, participant observation, ethnography, and in
depth interview. This approach is frequently referred to as critical, naturalistic,
hermeneutic, interpretive, participatory or phenomenological.

This present study is an ethnographic, qualitative study. In the following parts
of this chapter, the rationale for selecting a qualitative approach will be
discussed. This is then followed by a discussion of the research site, and
including accounting development, the accounting professional body,
requirements for being an independent auditor and auditor independence
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itself in Indonesia. This is followed by the research design including data
collection methods, data analysis, and the role of the researcher. Finally the
chapter will end with a summary and conclusion.

3.2. Rationale for Selecting A Qualitative Approach
To date, most (if not all) studies concerning the perceptions of auditor
independence in the literature have been conducted by a quantitative
approach (see for examples: Shockley, 1981; Knapp, 1985; Bartlett, 1993;
Firth, 1980; Lindsay, 1989; Agacer, 1991; Supriyono, 1986 and so on). All the
studies reviewed in chapter two of this thesis have used questionnaires as a
data collection method, and analysed data by the use of statistics. The
questionnaires of most studies have used a likert scale to measure the
responses of respondents. Some of them used more simple 'yes or no'
responses. In the outcomes of this research, they try to generalize the
findings.

There are some criticisms of the quantitative approach particularly those
involving survey and experimental research. Gummesson (1988, p. 141) for
example compares eleven differences between the two approaches.
Hammersley (1992, p. 11) criticizes the quantitative approach by stating:
1. That the structured character of the data collection process involves
the imposition of the researcher's assumption about the social world
and consequently reduces the chances of discovering evidence
discrepant with those assumptions.
2. That making claims about what happens in 'natural' settings on the
basis of data produced in settings that have been especially set up
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by researcher -whether experiment or formal interview- is to engage
in a largely implicit and highly questionable form of generalization.
3. That to rely on what people say about what they believe and do,
without also observing what they do, is to neglect the complex
relationship between attitudes and behaviour; just as to rely on
observation without also talking with people in order to understand
their perspectives istorisk misinterpreting their actions.
4. That quantitative analysis reifies social phenomena by treating them
as more clearly defined and distinct than they are, and by
neglecting the processes by which they develop and change.
5. That quantitative analysis assumes that people's actions are the
mechanical products of psychological and social factors, thereby
neglecting the creative role of individual cognition and group
interaction.
A quantitative approach enables a larger number of subjects over a wider
area to be reached, but it has limitations in terms of intensity, depth and
comprehensiveness. This is because the research subjects are not able to
express their perceptions or opinions frankly and deeply, because they are
normally asked only to respond by putting a check mark on the questionnaire
sheets.

Based on the discussion above, it is obvious, that there is an urgent need in
the literature to study auditor independence by using a qualitative rather than
a quantitative approach. Therefore an in-depth interview can be a better
alternative in investigating auditors' perceptions on independence than
sending a questionnaire, because through an in-depth interview the
researcher will achieve much richer data and extensive perceptions about
independence. This is possible because the interviewee will provide more
responses, and they will talk more frankly.
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The nature of the research questions of this study also request a broader and
deeper answer. A quantitative research approach would not be sufficient to
provide these. The qualitative research approach therefore, will be a better
choice in this regard.
Creswell (1994, p. 17) argues that there are eight reasons for choosing a
qualitative approach. These are: (1) the nature of the research questions; (2)
the need to explore the topic; (3) the need to present a detailed view of the
topic; (4) the desire to study individuals in a natural setting; (5) the interest in
writing in a literary style; (6) sufficient time and resources; (7) the audiences
are receptive, and (8) to emphasize the researcher's role as an active learner
who can tell the story from the participants' view rather than as an expert w h o
passes judgment on a participant.

3.3. Research Site
This section introduces the research site to the study in order to generate an
understanding and familiarity about the case. This section therefore starts
with the location of the research, accounting development in Indonesia, then
follows a discussion of the accounting professional body, the requirements for
public accountants, and auditor independence in Indonesia.

3.3.1. Location of the Research
The people w h o are researched in this study are Indonesian auditors w h o
practice in Jakarta and Bandung. The reason for selecting Jakarta is because
Jakarta is the capital city of the country and a large multicultural city. Auditors
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in Jakarta come from a range of cultural and religious background. Major
cultures including Javanese, Sundanese, Bataknese, Padangnese,
Indonesian Chinese and Arabian exist in Jakarta, and various religions also
such as Islam, Christianity, Hindu and Buddhism and others. All big five-audit
firms are also located in Jakarta, as well as medium and small audit firms.

Bandung is a provincial city and is little different from Jakarta. It has variou
cultures and there are small and medium audit firms as well as branches
(representatives) of the big-five audit firms.

As well as the above reasons, the accessibility and availability of interviewees
in Jakarta and Bandung were important factors to be considered.

3.3.2. Accounting Development in Indonesia
Abdulkadir (1982) classified the history of accounting in Indonesia into three
phases (1) Before World War II; (2) During World War II; and (3) After
Indonesian independence. In the first phase, he asserted that accounting in
Indonesia has developed since 1642 when the Dutch Governor General of
East Indies (Indonesia) issued a regulation regarding the administration of
cash receipts, receivables and the budget for garrisons and ship-dockages in

Batavia (Jakarta) and Surabaya (p. 28), while the first public accounting office
in Indonesia was opened in 1918 by Frese and Hogeweg (p. 29).
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During the World-War II phase, the Japanese took over the occupancy of
Indonesia from the Dutch government. In this phase as reported by
Abdulkadir, many positions in the Ministry of Finance were offered to
Indonesians. This was a starting point for Indonesia people to become
involved in accounting.

After its independence, the Indonesian government sent students to the UK,
the Netherlands and the US to study accounting. However, since the 1960s
the influence of Dutch accounting was replaced by the influence of US
accounting. To date, all matters that relate to accounting and auditing
standards are mirroring the US situation.

3.3.3. Accounting Professional Body in Indonesia
There is only one accounting professional body in Indonesia namely the
Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (The Indonesian Institute of Accountants). It is
commonly abbreviated as IAI and located in Jakarta. It was established on 23
December 1957 by Prof. R. Soemardjo Tjitrosidojo and another ten
Indonesian senior accountants.

To date, according to the official website of the IAI, the membership of the IAI
numbers more than 5,000 accountants. This number can still be increased,
because the number of Indonesian accountants who hold an accountant's
certificate is about 20,000. Compared to the population of Indonesia which is
over 200 million, the number of accountants is still very small.
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Membership is compulsory for those w h o will engage as public accountants
and voluntary for the rest as regulated by the decree of the Finance Minister
No. 43/KMK.017/1997. The members are spread throughout Indonesia,
especially in the big cities. They work as internal auditors, independent
auditors, tax accountants and in top management at many business
institutions.
The Institute holds its congress every four years. In addition to this, the
Institute also conducts seminars, continuing professional education, and
training and education and it also conducts the Public Accountant Certification
Exam and produces professional publications. It's also able to look after and
provide training or advice for small business enterprises.

3.3.4. The Requirements for the Public Accountant
According to the Use of the Title of Akuntan (Accountant) Act No. 34 1954, to
be eligible to practice as a public accountant in Indonesia, they have to:

1. Hold a sarjana (equivalent to Bachelor) majoring in accounting from the
following state Universities (University of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada,
Airlangga, Diponegoro, Andalas, Syah Kuala), State College of
Accountancy, and all graduates from private universities majoring in
accounting w h o have passed the state examination and passed in the
Basic Accounting and Professional Accounting State Exams.
2. Register to the State Registration under the Finance Department and
possess a licence to use " Ak" (Akuntan/Accountant) behind their name.
3. Working as auditor by using a Public Accountant Office name, Accounting
Bureau, or other n a m e which contains n a m e of accountant or accounting
is only allowed if the office or bureau is operated under one or more
accountants.
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However, in addition to the above Act, the current decree of the Finance
Minister No: 43/KMK.017/1997 has renewed the requirement for accountants
to be able to practice as a public accountant in Indonesia as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Living in Indonesia
Pass the Public Accountant Certification E x a m
M e m b e r of Indonesian Institute of Accountants
Experience as an accountant with a good reputation for at least three
years.

3.3.5. Auditor Independence in Indonesia
In Indonesia, auditor independence was regulated for the first time in 1973 at
the lAI's congress (Supriyono, 1986, p17). Furthermore, Supriyono asserts
that the auditor code of ethics has changed twice, in 1981 and 1986.

The Professional Standards of The Indonesian Institute of Accountants
(SPAP) states that an auditor has to be independent, that means the auditor
must not easily be interfered with, because the auditor serves the public
interest (IAI, 1996, p.220.1). However, the Professional Standards do not
mention auditor independence clearly. The Institute's Code of Ethics also
does not state auditor independence completely, it only states that the auditor
must be independent in fact and in appearance. Furthermore, Mulyadi (1994,
p. 47) states that so far the Indonesian Institute of Accountants has no
complete definition and regulation. The code of ethics therefore is adopted
from the AICPA.
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3.4. Research Design

3.4.1. Why Ethnography
Ethnography has a long and distinguished history among qualitative methods
(Sanday, 1983, p. 19). There are many definitions of ethnography, and this is
still a controversy (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994, p. 248). The word
ethnography, however is formed by two words, ethno that means folk and
graphy which means description (Schoepfle, 1987, p. 42). Schoepfle,
furthermore defines ethnography as "the study of another culture and
therefore the study of the ethnocentrism of natives" (p. 42). In a short

definition, it can be stated that an ethnographic study is a study about cultu
The fundamental purpose of ethnography, therefore as stated by Spradley
(1979, p.3) is to understand from the native perspective, another way of life.

Spradley (p. 7) states that ethnographers observe behaviour, artefacts and
natural objects, but ethnographers go beyond behaviour, artefacts and natural
objects to discover the meaning assigned to them. Ethnographers therefore
not only observe and report what people say, but ethnographers also analyse
the meaning of what people say and what people do about what they say.

The main purpose of this study is to discover and learn about auditor
independence and factors affecting it as it concerns Indonesian auditors in
Jakarta and Bandung. The study, as already mentioned, will consider the
effects of auditors' local culture, religion, work environment, ages,
authority/position, sex, and the experiences of the auditors' perceptions on
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independence and related matters. This area of study needs to be
investigated thoroughly and it is obvious that cultural nuances will be inherent
to this study.

According to Hammersley (1992, p. 12) ethnography is a qualitative method
that can be applied to this study in order to answer these needs.
Furthermore, he states that ethnography can provide a theoretical analysis or
thick description. He also claims that ethnography can integrate description
and theory. From these rationales, an ethnographic qualitative method will be
suitable for this study.

3.4.2. Data Collection Method

3.4.2.1. Semi-Structured Interviews
Data collection in this study is based on interviews with twenty-nine auditors.
In terms of structure, Krathwohl (1998, p. 288) states that interviews can be
categorised as structured or relatively unstructured. The sort of interview
used in this study was selected, based on the purpose of the research.
Sarantakos (1993, p. 178) states that structured interviews are based on a
rigorous procedure and heavily structured questions. The use of this type of
interview is associated with survey research (May, 1997, p. 100). May (1997,
p. 110) furthermore, asserts that structured interviews allow the researcher to
compare between responses.
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While unstructured interviews, conversely have no strict procedures to follow
like the wording of questions, the order of questions, or the interview schedule
(Sarantakos, 1993, p. 178), by using unstructured interviews, the researcher
has an aim in mind but the interviewee can be free to talk about topic (May,
1997, p. 113).

For the purpose of this study, the researcher expected to be able to compare
the responses through the use of a confirmation survey, one of the data
collection methods proposed by LeCompte & Goetz (1984, p. 45), to verify
the issues raised with the auditors and to make a comparison between the
auditors' responses. Therefore a semi-structured interview that lies between
a structured and an unstructured interview, seems to be the best choice for
this study. As suggested by Fettennan (1998, p. 481) the "...semi-structured
interview is the most valuable when the fieldworker comprehends the
fundamental of a community from the 'insider's' perspective. At this point,
questions are more likely to conform to the native's perception of reality than
to the researcher's".

In conducting the interviews, I (the researcher) used the list of questions (ten
issues) as an interview guide and also explored 'immediate' questions
depending on the issues raised in the interview.
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3.4.2.2. Criteria for Selecting Interviewees
In order to gain information from the 'right sources' with comprehensive views,
in selecting interviewees, LeCompte & Goetz (1984, p. 46) suggested the
researcher meets the representativeness of the objects being researched. In
this research therefore, interviewees come from:
• Big five and non big-five audit firms
• Partners and non-partners
• Experienced and less experienced
• Male and Female
• Various religious and cultural backgrounds

All the interviewees from the non big-five audit firms are partners. On the
other hand, the interviewees from the big-five audit firms are partners,
managers, assistant managers and supervisors. The reason for selecting
partners in the non big-five audit firms, was because the number of
employees in this type of audit firm is normally less than fifty. Therefore the
hierarchy of audit firms is not very 'complicated'. Meanwhile, the hierarchy of
the big-five audit firms is more complicated. The number of employees (in the
Jakarta office) is also very big, normally from about three hundred to a
thousand. For of these reasons, the interviewees from the big five need not
necessarily be partners of those firms, but managers or supervisors seem to
be appropriate for this research.

To know whether culture and religion affect auditors' perceptions of
independence, cultural and religious backgrounds, are also considered in
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selecting interviewees. The interviewees consist of Moslem and non-Moslem
auditors, Javanese and other local cultural groups, and males and females.

3.4.2.3. Interviewees' Profiles
Twenty-nine auditors were interviewed for this study. This number was not
predetermined in advance. The reason for this number is because the study
deeply investigated the interviewees' responses and therefore a larger
number of interviewees was not possible due to the limitations of time, funds,
and other resources. As stated by Goetz and LeCompte (1984, p. 164) "data
collection usually ends because time, energy, funds, and forbearance have
been exhausted rather than because the sources of information have been
depleted".

The process of selecting interviewees was based on the criteria determined
above. This study interviewed twenty-nine auditors with the following
backgrounds. Sixteen of them were members of the big five (six partners,
one director, one senior manager, three managers, three assistant managers,

and two supervisors) and the rest (thirteen) were partners of non-big five audi
firms. Twenty of them were male and nine were female auditors. Twentyone auditors were Moslems and eight were Christians (6 Catholic, 1 Adventist
and 1 Protestant). Their cultural backgrounds were various: Javanese,
Chinese, Sundanese, Menado, Padangnese, and Arabic. Their ages ranged
from twenty nine to seventy six years. The length of work experience was
from five to forty years. The levels of a formal education background were
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from bachelor to doctor level, there were twenty-one bachelor degrees, six
master degrees and two doctoral degrees.

The complete profiles of

interviewees have been tabulated in Appendix A.

With the interviewees profiled above, it was expected that the interviewees
could provide complete and comprehensive responses, as LeCompte and
Goetz (1984, p. 46) suggest to meet 'representativeness' of the object being
researched.

3.4.3. Data Analysis
Brewer (2000, p. 188) defines data analysis as "the process of bringing order
to the data, organizing what is there into patterns, categories and descriptive
units, and looking for relationships between them".

There is no consensus among researchers as to the forms of analysing
qualitative data (Creswell, 1998, p. 140). Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.
152) for example, identify analytic procedures into six phases. These are: (i)
organizing the data; (ii) generating categories, themes and patterns; (iii)
coding the data; (iv) testing the emergent understandings; (v) searching for
alternative explanations; and (vi) writing the report.

On the other hand, Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 21) state that data analysis
involves three sub-processes: data reduction; data display; and conclusion
drawing/verification.

Data reduction 'refers to the process of selecting,

focusing simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the 'raw' data' (p. 21).
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They assert that data reduction is part of analysis. Data display refers to 'an
organized assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and action
taking' (p. 21). This involves assembling data into displays like matrices,
charts, graphs, and networks. This process is considered to be analytic
activities. Conclusion Drawing is 'beginning to decide what things mean,
noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal
flows and propositions' (p. 22).

Wolcott (1994b) prefers to use the term transforming rather than analysing
data. For him, transforming qualitative data involves three phases, these are:
(i) description (addresses the question 'what is going on here?); (ii) analysis
(addresses the question 'how things work?); and (iii) interpretation (addresses
the question 'what does it all mean?) (p 12).

However, if the analytic procedures above are looked at carefully, it seems
that all of the researchers have common features for analysis strategies
(Creswell, 1998, p. 140). Their common features include grouping data into
meaningful segments, analysing it to compare contrasting and identifying
patterns that shed light on the beliefs and practice of the people being studied
(Roper and Shapira, 2000, p. 94).
This study however, follows the combination of the analytic procedures
developed by Wolcott (1994b) and Miles and Huberman (1984) in analysing
qualitative data for two reasons. First, by borrowing the transforming
qualitative data of Wolcott, the researcher will be able not only to analyse
what the auditors said, but also be able to analyse the meaning of what they

69
have said. Second, by using data reduction, display and conclusion drawing
on Miles and Huberman (1984), the researcher will be able to organise and
present data in a comparable format between responses.

3.4.3.1. Organizing, Analysing and Interpreting Data
Data in this study was collected by interviews with twenty-nine auditors in the
Indonesian language. Therefore, organizing and presenting data in this study

includes the following steps: (i) transcription; (ii) translation; and (iii) data
reduction and pattern coding.

In the transcription process, twenty-nine taped interviews were transcribed
'still' into the Indonesian language. After typing all the interviews, the data
were translated from Indonesian to English. At this stage, the interviews
remain in individual (twenty-nine) question and answer formats.

The next step was data reduction. Data reduction according to Miles and
Huberman (1984, p.21) refers to the "process of selecting, focusing
simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the 'raw' data". The raw data was
selected and focused to be able to answer research questions. Therefore in
this step some data that did not relate to the research questions was not
used.

Two ways to organize and present data were taken. First, the data collected
is presented and organized based on the order the issues were raised in the
interviews, this is what Wolcott (1994b, p.18) calls the 'researcher order'.
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Second, data is presented from broader to particular issues, this is what
Wolcott (1994 b, p. 18) calls 'progressive focusing'.

To allow the researcher to be able to compare responses, data is presented
based on issue/questions in order to answer the research questions.
Therefore, data is presented based on the classification of issues raised from
interviews in 'question-answer' format.

After having classified interviews based on the issues, the next step is pattern
coding. According to Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 68) pattern coding is a
way of grouping summarised segment data into a smaller number of
overarching themes or constructs. Furthermore, they identify the importance
of pattern coding as follows:
(1) It reduces large amount of data into a smaller number of analytic units.
(2) It gets the researcher into analysis during data collection, so that later
data collection can be more focused.
(3) It helps the researcher build a cognitive map, an evolving schema for
understanding what is happening locally.
(4) When several researchers are engaged in individual case study work, it
lays the groundwork for cross-site analysis by surfacing common
themes and causal processes.
(Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 68)

In doing pattern coding, the interviewees' answers for each issue are
classified into 'key answers'. For example, on the issue of the effect of
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providing Non-Audit services to auditor independence, each answer can be
classified as 'impair independence', 'no effect on independence' or 'not sure'.
Then, after having classified twenty-nine answers into key answers for this
issue, all key answers are listed to identify pattern regularities. In accounting
and auditing studies, Beattie and Fearnley (1998) have used the pattern
coding technique for their interview study of auditor changes and tendering.
Data reduction and data display cannot be separated as an analysis process
(Miles and Huberman, 1984, p. 22). After having reduced and pattern coded,
data then be analysed on an individual issue basis. Ten main issues were
raised from the interviews. In analysing them, the researcher used the ways
to analyse data, proposed by Wolcott (1994b). Analysis according to Wolcott
(1994b) includes highlighting findings then displaying them by using charts,
diagrams and figures. Then the researcher follows and reports 'systematic'
fieldwork procedures and also searches for pattern regularities. He also
suggests the comparison of the cultural group to others, contextualising it in a
broader analytical framework, a critique of the research process, and also
proposes a redesign of the study.

Through interpreting the data, the researcher can explain or report not only
what the people said but explain the meaning of what the people said. In this
part, the researcher will relate the research findings to theory. The
relationship between personality, culture, religion, and regulation with
auditors' independence are discussed.

72
3.5. Getting Access
In order to gain access to the potential interviewees, I (the researcher) used
two approaches, formal and informal, to maximise the expected responses. I
used a formal approach to the big-five audit firms (except for one), and both
formal and informal approaches for all non-big five audit firms. This w a s
because, the big-five audit firms are big organizations and therefore it w a s not
possible to approach them on a person to person basis. They have certain
departments to handle people wanting to do research. O n the other hand, the
non-big five audit firms have small hierarchies and therefore informal
approaches in addition to formal were possible.

The first step in preparing a formal approach to gain access was to provide a
support letter from m y supervisor that explained the purpose of the research
and the intent to interview auditors. This letter w a s considered to be powerful
enough to convince the potential interviewees of m y interest and seriousness.
After having listed all the big-five and ten non-big five audit firms, I sent them
a letter requesting interviews with their partners (for the non-big five audit
firms) and with partners and managers (for the big five audit firms). In the
letter I told them of m y research proposal, and asked them for an interview of
one to two hours duration. I also asked them to indicate the time and the
preferred place for the interviews. In addition to the letter I sent, I attached
the supporting letter from m y supervisor. In addition to that, for the non-big
five audit firms I also m a d e informal approaches. In doing this, I w a s helped
by m y colleagues w h o contacted them (non big five audit partners) to ask
them to help m e .
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In terms of time of responding to m y letter, their responses were various. All
the big-five audit firm ranged from two days to a week. All their responses
were "Your letter is being circulated to those who will be able to be
interviewed. Once I have one, I will contact you again". These responses
were very understandable, since all of the big-five audit firms are big firms,
and have at least ten to thirty partners, and three hundred to about a
thousand staff.

In contrast, the ten non-big five audit firms quickly responded to my letter with
final' answers. Seven audit firms said that their partners were able to be
interviewed and they provided a time and place preferred for interviews. This
was I thought because at that time they were available and also the 'power" of
the informal approaches of my colleagues had worked. Another three non-big
five audit firms, said sorry they were not able to provide a time for interviews
because they were away from the office. At this stage, I had access to seven
non-big five audit firms.

In the following week (second week) I started to receive some good news
from the big five audit firms. At the end of the second week, I had second
responses from all big five firms. Four big five audit firms were able to be
interviewed. While one big five audit firm was not able to provide me with an
interview, because they were very busy at that time. In my opinion, interviews

with four of big five audit firms was a positive start for getting information a
understanding on auditor independence, but an interview with all big-five audit
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firm would have been better. Therefore, I tried to approach a colleague to
contact a partner from that big-five audit firm informally. Fortunately, once
again, because of the power of the informal approach, one partner from that
firm, gave me time for an interview. I then had appointments for interviews
with all big five-audit firms and seven non-big five audit firms.

However, during the interview period, some interview schedules were
cancelled. Therefore, I rearranged new schedules for those interviews.
Within two months, from the beginning of gaining access, my interviews were
completely done. Twenty-nine auditors were interviewed for about ninety
minutes on average. These twenty nine auditors were thirteen partners from
seven non big five audit firms and sixteen auditors from big five audit firms
with the following levels: six partners; one director; one senior manager; three
managers; three assistant managers; and two supervisors.

3.6. Role of the Researcher
In this research, I (the researcher) cannot be detached from the research
process. In the analysis process, I (the researcher) have used analytical,
interpretive and critical abilities to seek to understand the issues and
phenomena reported by the interviewees. Therefore, the subjectivity of the
researcher in this study is involved and I (the researcher) cannot be objective.
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3.7. Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the research methods
applied in this study. The chapter has described the purposes of the study.
This chapter has discussed the rationale for using an ethnographic, qualitative
approach since all previous studies used a quantitative approach. General
and particular research questions as interview guidelines have been
identified. The research sites including the location of the research and other
relevant issues such as accounting development and the accounting
professional body in the research site, requirements for public accountants,
and auditor independence in the research site have been discussed.

In the research, designed, semi-structured interviews have been selected to
collect data from the auditors. Criteria of potential interviewees and actual
profiles of the interviewees have been described. There are four stages in the
data analysis: first, summarising the interviews data (Miles And Huberman,
1984); second, pattern coding to classify the category (Miles and Huberman,
1984); third, making a description of data summarised and pattern coded
(Wolcott, 1994); and fourth, analysing and interpreting data (Wolcott, 1994).
The process of getting access to the research site has been described in the
chapter. The role of the researcher was also discussed.
The next five chapters will discuss the research findings.
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CHAPTER FOUR

Audit Firms' Characteristics:
Their Sizes a n d Services

4.1. Introduction
This thesis investigates the beliefs and perceptions, held by auditors, of
factors that could affect auditor independence. So this chapter and the next
three will discuss thefindingsconcerning these factors. The central theme of
this chapter is to discuss the effects of the characteristics of audit firms on
auditor independence. The findings show that characteristics such as firm
size and non-audit services offered could affect an auditor's independence.

The audit firms can be classified into big, medium and small firms. In this
study, however, audit firms have been classified as the big-five and non-big
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five audit firms. The reason for this is because there is no clear cut-off
between small and medium audit firms. On the other hand, the big-five audit
firms can easily be distinguished from the other ones.

In terms of services offered by audit firms to audit clients, audit firms can be
classified as to whether they offer non-audit services in addition to audit
services. This chapter contains two major sections dealing with audit firm size
and non-audit services. Each section contains an introduction, the effect of
the issue discussed on auditor independence, the reasons why the issue
discussed affects/does not affect auditor independence and a discussion of
the issues. Finally the chapter ends with a summary and conclusion.

4.2. Audit Firm Size
Audit firm size is considered to be one of the issues that could affect auditor
independence. This is because the larger audit firms are considered to be
more independent for at least two reasons. First, because of the firms' size,
the audit fee generated from a particular client constitutes a smaller
percentage of the audit firm's total revenue. Second, larger audit firms
normally have many divisions to provide the services needed by clients, and
therefore the person who audits the client would be different from the person
who provided non audit services. On the contrary, the situation at a small
audit firm differs as an auditor handles more varied duties and also the audit
fee generated from a particular client constitutes a larger percentage of audit
firm total revenue.
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From this situation, there is a proposition that auditors from a larger audit firm
would act more independently than auditors from a smaller audit firm.
Therefore, this study aims to investigate auditors' perceptions as to whether
audit firm size could affect auditor independence or not.

4.2.1. The Effects of Audit Firm Size
To investigate the effects of audit firm size on auditor independence, twentynine auditors were interviewed, sixteen were from the big-five audit firms
(Arthur Andersen, Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse
Coopers) and thirteen from non-big five audit firms. The sixteen auditors
from the big five included partners, directors, senior managers, managers,
assistant managers and supervisors. The thirteen auditors from small and
medium audit firms were all partners.

This configuration of interviewees is expected to give a proper representation
in terms of audit firm size, because they all come from different sized audit
firms. All the interviewees were asked about their perceptions as to whether
auditor independence was affected by audit firm size (their audit firms) or not,
using the following question, "Do you think auditor independence is affected
by audit firm size?" To aid understanding of the issue being discussed, before
asking that question they were told that there was a proposition that the
bigger the audit firm the more independent would be their auditors, and in the
smaller the audit firm the auditors would be less independent.
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From the twenty-nine auditors interviewed, there were two main answers.
Seventeen auditors did not agree with the proposition, and twelve auditors
agreed with the proposition with some 'notes'. The interviews on this issue
are summarized in Appendix 1.

4.2.1.1. Auditor Independence: A Personal Matter
Of the seventeen auditors who did not agree with the proposition that audit
firm size affected independence, nine of them worked for a big-five audit firm
and seven auditors worked for a non big-five audit firm. They did not agree
with the statement for the following three reasons.

Thefirstreason w a s that because independence is a personal matter, auditor
independence was not caused by the size of the audit firms where the
auditors work but rather it depended on the auditor's integrity and personality.
As stated by Mr. E, a big five audit partner.

I don't agree with that statement, because that statement is too
generalized about people's character. I believe that independence is
an individual matter, so where they work will not necessarily affect their
independence. I can be independent in this audit firm, not because of
this firm but because of m y integrity and personality as an auditor.
However, it doesn't m e a n that the above statement is completely
wrong. Public opinion, I think is constructed by the existence of audit
firms themselves. I m e a n the bigger the audit firms, the better their
management, the better their job description and distribution. The
smaller the audit firms, the more centralised decisions will be m a d e by
staff, which will lead to conflict of interests. Therefore, in m y opinion
that statement is a general statement that w e need to be careful of in
order to avoid misleading statements. (Mr. E)
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The second reason they argue is that there are s o m e auditors from the big
five who compromise auditor independence. It is not necessarily that the big
five auditors are always independent. It is because the big five auditors
sometimes also 'compromise' their independence, as stated by Mr. B, a non
big-five audit partner.

I don't agree with that statement, I know that some auditosr from big
audit firms s o m e times have their independence impaired. In m y
opinion the thing that can m a k e a difference between a big audit firm
and a small auditfirmis only prestige. (Mr. B)
Another reason why auditors object to the statement is because it is viewed
as a general statement, and they prefer to view the situation on a case by
case basis. However, this group of auditors does not totally disagree with the
proposition saying that the bigger the audit firm, the more independent their
staff. They view big audit firms as being better in terms of management, job
description and distribution and, this view can be seen in the statement of Mr.
E.

4.2.1.2. Large Audit Firms: Building Confidence, Less Dependence
On the other hand, there were another twelve auditors who agreed with the
opinion, that the larger the audit firms, the more independent their auditors.
These twelve auditors mentioned the following reasons for their agreement
with the statement.
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According to this group of auditors, the first reason w h y audit firm size could
affect auditor independence is because they perceive that the bigger the audit
firms the more clients they have. Therefore, big firm auditors will depend less
on individual clients compared to small firm auditors who have a lesser
number of clients. This situation would improve the confidence of big firm
auditors from the threat of losing clients, so consequently big firm auditors
would be 'more' independent compared to small firms auditors. The following
statement of Mr. A, a partner of a non-big five audit firm clarifies this situation.

I believe that auditors who work in a bigger audit firm will be more
independent than auditors w h o work in a smaller audit firm. Because
the bigger the audit firm, the more clients they have, so they will not
depend on s o m e clients. However, it does not m e a n that auditors from
the bigger audit firm will always be more independent than auditors
from smaller audit firms. (Mr. A )
From Mr. A's statements, it is obvious that Mr. A believes that small firm
auditors can still be independent as long as they are strongly self-confident as
independent auditors. Maintaining a high integrity as independent auditors,
will generate auditors with a good reputation. With a good reputation, finally a
small audit firm will be a survivor and will have no fear of losing clients.

A second reason why this group agrees with the view that the bigger the audit
firm, the more independent their auditors is because this group of auditors
believes that the bigger the audit firm, the more instruments they have to
maintain auditor independence, for example they have many divisions to
provide different services (consequently they have more appropriate experts),
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they possess more advanced technology and are internationally linked. The
following reason stated by Mr. O, a big-five audit partner reveals this clearly.

I agree with that statement but I don't totally agree. I said that I agree
because in a big audit firm, auditors have m a n y instruments to support
their independence, for example: they have different divisions, they
have more advanced technology, they have more advance audit
system, they have more confidence and so on. While in smaller audit
firms, they have less facilities compared to the bigger audit firms.
However, I don't totally agree with the above statement because even
though auditors work in smaller audit firms, they can be independent
without worrying about the above factors I mentioned as long as they
try to be a real independent auditor is their profession. (Mr. O )

In m y opinion, Mr. O's statement explicitly acknowledges the importance of
those factors mentioned. This is because auditor independence can be
constructed by both work environment (external factor) and the auditor's
personality (internal factor).

Another reason w h y they agreed with the view that the bigger the audit firm
the more independent their auditors was because small firm auditors tend to
look for clients, while big audit firms do not. This was stated by Mr. F, a non
big-five audit firm as follows:

In small audit firms w e are required to look for clients not like in big
firms. So, auditors' independence in small audit firms could be more
impaired than auditors in large firms. The above statement could be
right. But w e have to see that case by case and not generalize. (Mr.
F)
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Those twelve auditors mostly agree with the proposition. However, they do
not totally agree with the proposition saying that the bigger the audit firm the
more independent their auditors. Those auditors included some provisos
such as everything relates to auditors' integrity (Mr. A), it needs to be viewed
on a case by case basis (Mr. F), and small auditors also can be independent
(Mr. A).

4.2.2. Discussion
From the twenty-nine auditors who were interviewed, there were seventeen
auditors who disagreed with the proposition saying that the bigger the audit
firms, the more independent their auditors. Another twelve auditors agreed
with the proposition. Both groups were not absolute in their opinions but
presented a number of provisos.

The reasons put forward by those who disagreed with the proposition included
the belief that auditor independence is a personal matter, not affected by the
firm where they work. They also believed that some big firm auditors
compromised auditor independence, and they viewed the proposition as being
too general. They needed to view each case individually.

In my opinion, independence as a personal matter can be seen from their
practice. Those who have a high integrity will not compromise their
independence just to get or retain their clients. Even though they are non-big
five audit firms, those who believe that independence is a personal matter will
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gain confidence from their independence. However, it must be remembered
that the public still hold the view that the bigger the audit firm the more
independent they are able to be.

Another reason for this group of auditors not to agree with the proposition is
the belief that some big firm auditors also compromise auditor independence.
In my opinion, this could be true because some big five auditors are not
immune from compromising their independence. A story told by a big five
partner is an example of how some big-five partners "compromise" their
independence by accepting audit engagements with very low fees (compared

to audit works). This situation can be a justification for non-big five auditors f
"also compromise" their independence. In this situation therefore audit firm
size cannot be guaranteed to enhance or impair auditor independence.

The last argument for not agreeing with the proposition is that auditors must
not be viewed generally. This group of auditors prefered not to generalize
about auditors. In my opinion the view of this group could be true because I
have observed that some auditors easily accept any audit engagement and
quickly issue their opinion. In this regard I believe that proper audit
procedures were not conducted.

From the reasons provided by those who disagree, it appears that they
viewed independence as an individual matter. Any auditor can be
independent as long as they have a strong integrity and personality
regardless of where they work. This view is consistent with the first
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circumstance affecting independence introduced by Flint (1988) saying that
independence depends on the auditor's quality, which includes integrity,
objectivity and strength of character. This is also consistent with the warning
proposed by Goldman and Barlev (1974) that auditors of large firms are not
immune from client pressure.

However, this group of auditors do not totally disagree with the proposition,
they still 'understand' that the bigger the audit firms the more specialization
and better management they have and the smaller the audit firms the more
centralization of decisions and the potential for conflict of interest. It would
seem that even though they disagreed with the proposition, they could not
refuse the realities as stated by Mr. E, that big audit firms have better
instruments for being independent. Because of that this group of auditors did
not agree that auditor independence was determined merely by audit firm size
(where they work). They preferred, therefore, to see auditor independence as
an individual case, not as a generalization.

The reasons given by those who agree with the proposition saying that the
bigger the audit firm the more independent their auditors, is because they said
that the bigger audit firms had more clients. This is understandable, since the
big audit firms (the big-five) normally have hundreds to thousands of clients,
from small to big clients, compared to small audit firms who may have only
about ten (or sometimes less than ten) to fifty clients. This reason
interestingly is acknowledged not only by the big-five audit partners, but also
by the non-big five audit partners.
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This group of auditors also held the opinion that the bigger audit firms had
more instruments for being independent. Instruments like divisions for
providing different services that are not possessed by small audit firms and
this, they thought, would minimize conflicts of interest. More experts
possessed by big audit firms would improve the auditors' confidence, whereas
small audit firms have only a limited number of staff. Control from the
headquarter office of big five audit firms, also contributes to the confidence of
big five auditors.

The last reason was that small audit firms tend to look for clients, while the big
audit firms do not. Since the number of clients of small audit firms is limited, it
is not surprising that they tend to 'seek' clients or try to retain their clients
more than the big five audit firms. This second group of auditors supported
the studies of Shockley (1981), Amernic and Aranya (1981), Supriyono (1988)
and Lindsay (1989), which found that the smaller audit firm tend to be less
independent.

However, all these auditors do not totally agree with the proposition. They still
think that there is a big possibility for those who work at small audit firms to be
independent, as stated by Mr. A and Mr. O. Therefore, the generalization for
auditors in this regard, is not appropriate, it would be better to see the effect of
audit firm size on auditor independence on a case by case basis as stated by
Mr. F.
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The reasons given by auditors who agreed with the proposition are based on
audit firm sizes. While the reasons proposed by auditors who disagreed with
the proposition are based on the auditors' integrity and personality. It is
important to note that audit firm characteristics (such as separating services
by divisions, advanced technology, more expert, better management, control
from headquarter) would support auditor independence. On the other hand,
the strength of auditor integrity and personality would be very significant for
auditors.

4.3. Non-Audit Services
The rendering of non-audit services such as taxation, information system
design, human resource management and management consultancy to audit
clients will increase the question of auditor objectivity and independence
(Agacer and Doupnik 1991; Firth 1997). Once an audit firm renders non-audit
services to its particular client, its auditors' independence will be attacked by
their conflict of interest, between maintaining its independence and
professionalism and following the client's pressure to gain financial interests.
This is at least caused by two reasons, first, the audit firm does not want to
criticize the work done by its non-audit service division and second, the audit
firm doesn't want to lose profitable non-audit services, therefore the audit firm
will not be keen to disagree with management's interpretation of accounting
matters (Firth 1997). From this situation, there is a proposition that rendering
non-audit services to audit clients could impair auditor independence. This
study therefore intends to investigate auditors' perceptions as to whether
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providing non-audit services to audit clients could affect auditor independence
or not.

4.3.1. The Effects of Providing Non-Audit Services
To investigate the effects of providing non-audit services (to audit clients) on
auditor independence, the twenty-nine auditors were asked for their opinion
with the question "Can you tell me the effects of providing non-audit services
to audit clients on your independence?" Before being asked the question,
they were told that there were views and empirical studies stating that
providing non-audit services to audit clients by auditors (audit firms) can
impair auditor independence, and the question was being asked to confirm
whether it was 'true' or not according to the auditors' perceptions. Responses
on this issue are summarized in Appendix 2.

Of the twenty-nine auditors, five of them said that they never offered non-audit
services to their audit clients. Therefore, only twenty-four auditors offered
non-audit services to audit clients. Twenty auditors said that providing nonaudit services to audit clients has no effect on auditor independence. While
another four auditors said that providing non-audit services to audit clients has
an effect on auditor independence. Of those four auditors, three of them
clearly said that providing non-audit services impaired auditor independence,
and one said that it impaired independence to some degree.
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4.3.1.1. Various Divisions, Selective and Limiting Non-Audit Services
This section will explore the reasons provided by the twenty auditors who said
that providing non-audit services to audit clients has no effect (did not impair)
on auditor independence. In the interviews each auditor's answer provided
one or two reasons. For those who said that providing non-audit services
has no effect on impairing independence, their answers, however, can be
categorized into five general reasons.

First, fifteen auditors (ten from the big-five audit firms and five from non big

five firms) said they believed that providing non-audit services to their clients
would not impair auditor independence because the big five audit firms had
different divisions for different services. And those from the non big-five audit
firms said that even though they had no 'formal' divisions they sent different
staff to provide different services. The reasons given by the ten auditors from
the big five are similar to the following statements of Mr. O, a partner of a big
five firm and reasons given by the five auditors from the non big five are
similar to the answer of Mrs. M, a senior partner of a non big-five audit firm.
Well in our audit firm, we have different divisions like the audit division,
financial advisory services and so on. Based on the divisions w e have,
w e can be more professional because there wouldn't be a
responsibility overlap. By separating our services the responsibility
overlap will be minimized, so through this w a y independence in
appearance will not be impaired because the public know that w e have
separate work divisions and responsibilities. This maintains our
independence in fact automatically, because by separating the
divisions it can minimize conflicts of interest. So, in m y opinion
providing both services to the s a m e client would not result in impairing
independence. (Mr. O )
We rarely provide both services to the same clients, but if this happen
w e can still be independent, because w e assign our different assistants
w h e n w e do audit and non-audit services. By sending our different
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assistants, w e feel secure about our independence. I don't have any
responsibility to defend m y client's interest even if they are m y nonaudit clients (Mrs. M )
Second, three auditors (all from the big-five, two partners and one manager)
said that providing non-audit services will not impair auditor independence
because they were selective in offering non-audit services, not all services
were offered to clients, and only less risky non-audit services were offered to
clients. The following statement by Mr. L, a senior partner of a big five firm,
argued that selecting the NAS offered to audit clients is a way to 'maintain'
independence.
Well, this matter has guidance in audit standards. If you are an auditor
you are not allowed to be a clients' financial advisor, because those
works have a conflict of interest. But if you provide non-audit services
like tax, m a n a g e m e n t consulting, accounting compilation, it's no
problem at all. Auditors will have a conflict of interest w h e n they act as
a decision-maker for their clients or they have significant roles for their
clients. But so far, in m y case I have no problems with m y
independence as an auditor as long as w e are strict to avoid something
that could lead us into a conflict of interest. (Mr. L)

The third reason w h y providing non-audit services has no effect on auditor
independence is because non-audit services offered to clients have no
significant role in the clients' decision making process. This reason was
proposed by two auditors, both of them were partners of non-big five audit
firms. The following statement delivered by Mr. B, a partner of a non big-five
audit firm highlights this reason:
We provide both services, but not many companies are clients of both.
However, even though s o m e of them are both audit and non-audit
clients our independence is not affected, because w e provide a small
part of the non-audit services, which is not significant to the clients'
decision making process. (Mr. B)
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The fourth reason w h y providing non-audit services does not impair auditor
independence is because of the strength of the auditor's integrity and
personality, and the fifth reason is because the auditor follows audit rules and
standards. The fourth and fifth reasons were only stated by one auditor each.

4.3.1.2. Non-Audit Services: Generating Conflict of Interest
On the other hand, four auditors (three were members of big five firms, and
one of a non big-five firm) said that providing non-audit services to audit
clients would impair auditor independence. Their reasons were because they
saw a conflict of interest while performing audit tasks to their non-audit
services clients. The following paragraphs express the views of those
auditors.

Mr. J, an assistant manager of a big five firm and Mr. Y, a partner of a non
big- five firm said that providing non-audit services to the same clients will
impair auditor independence during the performance of audit tasks, but they
said that this impairment is still tolerable because it is not significant.

Mrs. T a senior manager from a big five firm says that providing non-audit
services could impair auditor independence if both services were done by the
same staff, but it would depend on the auditor's integrity if audit service and
non-audit services were conducted by different staff and a different division.
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Mr. X, a partner of a big five firm said that providing non-audit services to
audit clients probably would impair the appearance of independence because
the public would look at the services provided by the one audit firm, even
though it had different divisions. However, independence in fact according to
Mr. X, will depend on the auditor's integrity. The following statement by Mrs.
T is similar to Mr. X's, and suggests that it is obvious that the auditor's
integrity is very important in maintaining auditor independence.

In m y opinion, providing both audit and non-audit services, if conducted
by the s a m e persons, could impair auditor independence both in fact
and in appearance. If those services are conducted by different
persons from different divisions, this case is dependent on the auditors'
integrity. If they have strong integrity they wouldn't be affected, but if
they have w e a k integrity, they would be affected. So, it depends on
h o w good audit firms m a n a g e their staff and divisions, and h o w strong
the integrity of their auditors is.

4.3.1.3. Not Offering Non-Audit Services: A Safe Choice
Five auditors, all partners of non-big five audit firms prefer not to offer NonAudit Services to their audit clients at the same time, even though there is no
prohibition in offering and accepting those services. Their reason is to avoid a
conflict of interest. The following statement by Mrs. P makes more obvious
their fear of getting involved in a conflict of interest.
I have no clients that accept both of our services. If they are audit
clients, I don't offer them non-audit services. If I offer them non-audit
services, I don't want to be their auditor. Also I don't offer tax services
in m y business, because in m y opinion taxation is more negotiable. S o
I have no experience in providing both services to the s a m e clients.
Consequently, m y independence has nothing to do with that issue.
(Mrs. P)
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4.3.2. D i s c u s s i o n
The majority of the auditors (twenty) interviewed agreed that providing nonaudit services to audit client does not impair auditor independence. This view
is consistent with studies of Gul and Teoh (1984) and Knapp (1985). The
main reasons w h y auditors felt that providing non-audit services did not impair
their independence were: first, the big five audit firms had different divisions
for different services; second, they were selective in offering non-audit
services, not all services were offered to clients, and only less risky non-audit
services were offered to clients; and third, they stated that non-audit services
offered to clients had no significant role in the clients' decision making
process. Another two reasons, the strength of auditors' integrity and following
audit rules and standards, were mentioned by only a few auditors.

In my opinion, all the arguments above combined the work environments
(division/work separation/ limiting rules, selecting clients) and the auditors'
personality (integrity and following rules/standards). Their arguments of
course can be true only as long as they can maintain the situation. However,
they need to be aware that public can perceive them to have compromised
audit opinion because they earn both audit and non-audit fees from a
particular client.

Only four auditors thought that providing non-audit services to audit clients
could impair auditor independence. This study shows that only four auditors
support the studies of Shockley (1981), Moore (1983), Supriyono (1988),
Lindsay (1989), and Teoh and Lim (1996). Although not m a n y of the auditors
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could recognise their limitations, those four auditors' views about
independence impairment seem to show their honesty about their inability to
handle both audit and non-audit services, therefore, in my opinion separating
job with different staff and audit partner will have a significant positive effect
on maintaining auditor independence. This step, at least can minimise any
conflict of interest that could possibly be raised during audit work, but there is
no guaranty that public will immediately trust it.

While five auditors preferred not to offer non-audit services, in addition to
audit services, to their clients. In my opinion, the way taken by this group of
auditors is a very safe way, not to endanger themselves and the public
interests. This came from their awareness, because they knew that they were
a small audit firm and had a limited staff. It is a very wise choice for a small
audit firm not to offer both audit and non-audit services to the same clients.
Even though from a business point of view, this is not advantageous for the
auditors but it is beneficial for the public interest and auditors themselves in
the long-term.

The question on non-audit services raises three issues: auditing and nonaudit services divisions; auditor's integrity; and conflict of interest. The
existence of a non-audit services division in audit firms has been proposed as
the main reason for maintaining independence for those who said that
providing non-audit services has no effect on auditor independence. For
those who said that providing non-audit services could impair auditor
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independence, they thought that the existence of a non-audit services division
could only minimize the impairment of independence.

It is important to note, that all big-five audit firms have divisions for providing
different services. While the non-big five audit firms generally do not have
different divisions for providing these services, this study suggests that all
audit firms should have appropriate divisions to conduct different services,
otherwise it would be better not to offer non-audit services to audit clients, as
has been instituted by five auditors.

The existence of different divisions for providing different services is
important, but would be of little use if an auditor's integrity is weak. The
strength of an auditor's integrity is one reason proposed by an auditor who
thinks that providing non-audit services to audit clients has no effect on
auditor independence. Integrity can be possessed by anyone, whether they
are a member of a big-five firm or a non-big five firm.

Conflict of interest can cause auditors trouble. Their independence is
threatened when they have a conflict of interest. The best way to maintain
auditor independence is by avoiding conflict of interest. It is important that all
services offered to clients do not result in a conflict of interest for auditors.
Also, the role of non-audit services offered to clients needs to be reviewed to
see how significant they are in affecting client's decision making process.
Again, the decision taken by those who do not offer non-audit services to their
audit clients is a very good example of avoiding conflict of interest.
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4.4. S u m m a r y and Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the findings of the study relating to the effect of
two characteristics of audit firms, namely audit firm size and non-audit
services offered by audit firms to audit clients. On the audit firm size issue,
seventeen of twenty-nine auditors did not agree with the proposition that the
bigger the audit firm, the more independent their auditors. Their arguments
were that auditor independence depends on the auditor's integrity, personality
and strength of character. Therefore, some of these auditors suggest viewing
auditor independence not from the size of the audit firm but more specifically
in relation to auditor qualities.

Conversely, another twelve auditors supported the proposition with the
following two arguments. First, the bigger the audit firms, the less they
depend on individual clients. Second, the bigger the audit firms, the more
'instruments' they have for maintaining independence such as appropriate
divisions, more experts, more advanced technology and international links.
These two reasons were consistent with the view of Mautz and Sharaf (1961,
p. 213) and the study by Shockley (1981).

Even though this study did not find consensus on this issue, both groups
acknowledge that all auditors can be independent wherever they work, as
long as they have proper auditor qualities as argued by Flint (1988).
However, for illustration purpose, if there are two auditors with the same
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'quality', where one works for a big five firm and the other one works for a
small audit firm, the first auditor can be argued as being potentially more
independent than the second. This is because the characteristics of the big
audit firm are more encouraging than a small audit firm in maintaining
independence. But once again, auditors from a small audit firm can be
independent as long as they maintain integrity.

This study is unable to conclude whether audit firm size enhance or impair
auditor independence but rather concludes that for some auditors the bigger
audit firm can enhance its independence, whereas for some other auditors
audit firm size has no effect on their independence.

On the issue of providing non-audit services to audit clients this study did not
find conclusive responses from the auditors. This study found that a majority
of auditors (twenty of twenty-nine) did not agree with the proposition saying
that the provision of non-audit services by audit firms to audit clients could
impair auditor independence. Their arguments were: first, the big five audit
firms have different divisions for different services, and the non-big five audit
firms send different staff for different services; and second, they offer nonaudit services which have no impact on the clients' decision making process.
This finding is consistent with studies conducted by Gul and Teoh (1984) and
Buchman(1996).

On the other hand, four auditors believed that providing non-audit services by
audit firms to audit clients could impair auditor independence. Their reason
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was simply that this issue could generate a conflict of interest for auditors.
These four auditors supported the studies conducted by Shockley (1981),
Moore (1983), Lindsay (1999) and Wines (1994).

Meanwhile, the study found that five auditors, all of them from non-big five
audit firms do not offer non-audit services to their audit clients at all. This was
interesting, since there was no prohibition on the offer of non-audit services to
audit clients. Their decision not to offer non-audit services to their audit
clients was to avoid conflict of interest. These auditors were aware that
providing non-audit services was potential income, but they were worried that
the provision of this service would lead to the impairment of their
independence.

Although no prohibition on offering non-audit services to audit clients exists,
this study suggests that those who have no non-audit services divisions
should not offer non-audit services to their audit clients unless they have
different staff and a different partner in charge of audit and non-audit services
to minimise a conflict of interest.

The next chapter will discuss the findings concerning the effect of the clients'
characteristics on auditor independence.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Clients' Characteristics: Backgrounds/Reputations,
Audit Committees and Fees Contributions

5.1. Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the effect of the characteristics of audit firms
on auditor independence, this included audit firm size and the provision of
non-audit services. T h e central theme of this chapter is to discuss the effects
of the characteristics of clients on auditor independence. This includes the
clients' reputations, the corporate audit committee and the role of the audit fee
paid by clients.

Audit firms have various types of clients. Some audit clients have a strong
financial situation and well-recognised directors, other clients don't. S o m e
clients have audit committees and s o m e clients don't. S o m e clients pay small
audit fees and s o m e clients pay large fees. These client characteristics will
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be discussed in this chapter with a view to their effect on auditor
independence.
This chapter contains three major sections: it will discuss firstly, the effect of
clients' backgrounds/reputations; secondly, the effect of corporate audit
committees; and thirdly, the effect of the role of the audit fee paid by clients.
The chapter ends with a summary and conclusion.

5.2. Clients' Backgrounds/Reputations
Auditors, while performing audit tasks, could be affected by the
backgrounds/reputations of the clients. The study conducted by Beattie et al
(1999) found that a weak financial condition of a client, as perceived by public
accountants and financial directors, was a factor that could enhance auditor
independence. Conversely, financial journalists viewed the weak financial
condition of clients as a factor that could threaten auditor independence.
Therefore, one of the purposes of this study was to investigate the effects of
audit clients' reputations (such as client revenue, healthy ratios, well
recognized owners and managements, listed or non-listed companies) on
auditor independence. Therefore the proposition was that the worse a client's
reputation, the more independent would be the auditors in doing their work.

5.2.1. The Effect of Clients' Backgrounds/Reputations
To investigate auditors' perceptions about the effects of the clients'
backgrounds/reputations on auditor independence, the interviewees were
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asked the following question, "What is the effect of clients'
background/reputations on auditor independence during the performance of
audit tasks?" Before asking this question, the auditors were told what was
meant by clients' backgrounds/reputations. They were asked whether
conditions such as strong financial condition, healthy ratios, well recognized
owners and management, listed or non-listed companies affected auditor
independence. The interviews about this issue were summarized in Appendix
3.

Of the twenty-nine auditors interviewed, all of them stated that the clients'
backgrounds/reputations had no effect on auditor independence, but eighteen
of them believed that clients' backgrounds/reputation had other effects.
These other effects related to the scope of the audit work and differing audit
requirements, and they built the auditors' early perceptions of the client as
well as being a consideration in accepting audit engagement.

5.2.1.1. Clients' Backgrounds: No Effect on Independence and Some
Effects on Other Things
Based on the interviews, all the auditors agreed that clients'
backgrounds/reputations had no effect on auditor independence. The
reasons were because the auditors apply the same audit rules and standards
to all clients and there are no 'special' treatments for certain clients.
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However, eighteen auditors stated that the clients' backgrounds/reputations
raised some differences but not in relation to auditor independence. Those
differences include the scope of the work as mentioned by twelve auditors
and different audit requirements as stated by four auditors caused by different
clients' backgrounds as stated by Mr. E, a partner of a big five audit firm.

I never differentiate my clients by such backgrounds, because we have
to do the s a m e audit program and procedures for all clients. W h a t will
m a k e a difference for them are things such as the companies' size,
complexities and whether they are listed or non-listed companies.
These differences will m a k e a difference in terms of audit time, scope
and audit requirements, but not in the perceptions of whether they are
better or worse than others. S o in m y opinion companies' backgrounds
have nothing to do with m y independence. (Mr. E)

For Mr. F and Mr. Y, -both of them partners of non big five audit firms- the
clients' backgrounds/reputations will influence them in building their
'perceptions' or 'images' about clients, however, it doesn't mean that audit
findings will be ignored. Both Mr. F and Mr. Y will make a correction if they
find anything wrong, as stated by Mr. F "However, all of those will depend on
the audit process. This is a view just like a feeling, not a final judgment". Mr
Y clearly said "...this perception will not affect audit findings. If I find
something that needs to be adjusted or corrected I have to tell them to change
if. This situation was also acknowledged by Mrs. T, a senior manager of a
big five audit firm.

Another auditor stated that clients' backgrounds/reputations can be a
consideration in accepting engagements but once again it has no effect on
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auditor independence. Mr. F said "clients who had good reputations will be
good to audit. So, I am not in doubt in accepting that type of engagement,

because I hope that the client will have a clean opinion, or that the clients wil
have good reports to be audited". This is similar to Mr. Y's view "I think I
have a feeling that a good person should have a good report".

5.2.2. Discussion
Twenty-nine auditors were asked to comment on whether clients'
backgrounds/reputations have or have not an effect on auditor independence.
All of them believed that clients' reputations have no effect on auditor
independence. The interviewees' reasons were because in their view all
clients must be audited with the same rules and standards. This view did not
support the study by Beattie et al (1999) who found that a weak financial
condition of a client was perceived by public accountants and financial
directors as a factor that could enhance auditor independence.

On the other hand, auditors expressed the views that clients' reputations
affected the scope of audit work as mentioned by twelve auditors. While four
auditors believed that clients' background could affect audit requirements as
for instance in the case of listed or non-listed clients. Three auditors
suggested that the effects of clients' reputations would only affect auditors'
'perception' or 'images' of their clients. However, this would not endanger
auditor independence, because as Mr. F, Mr. Y and Mrs T said, everything
depends on audit findings, and their 'perceptions' are not a final judgment, but
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only an initial view. All the auditors interviewed have properly practiced
scepticism in the performance of their audit tasks, although one auditor said
that clients' background could be a consideration in accepting audit
engagement.

Even though all the interviewees acknowledged the effect of their clients'
backgrounds on the scope of the audit works, audit requirement and early
perceptions, I think auditor independence will also be affected by the clients'
backgrounds, since everything in the Indonesian culture is normally based on
background and attributes. For example, a man coming to a super market
with poor clothes, will be poorly treated by the shop assistant compared to a
man wearing nice clothes. A man with a car will more appreciated compared
to a man who travels on the bus. In this regard, I think auditors are no
different from the 'public culture', they will form a view of their clients based
their reputation/backgrounds. Early perceptions, a reputable client and good

image will lead auditors' perception in the doing of audit tasks. Auditors will be
more "cooperative" with clients who have good image and vice versa.

5.3. Corporate Audit Committee
The existence of a corporate audit committee is believed by interested parties
to enhance auditor independence. This is because the committee is
composed mainly of non-officer directors as stated by the AICPA as quoted
by Braiotta (1994, p. 4) who said that "An audit committee should be
organized as a standing committee of the board composed mainly of non
officer directors". It is felt that this could maintain auditor independence
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because there would be no conflict of interests.

The Audit committee

members, according to the committee on corporate laws of the American Bar
Association, have the following obligation:
1. To recommend the particular persons or firm to be employed by the
corporation as its independent auditors.
2. To consult with the persons so chosen to be the independent auditors
with regard to the plan of audit.
3. To review, in consultation with the independent auditors, their report of
audit, and the accompanying management letter if any, and
4. To consult with the independent auditor (periodically as appropriate,
out of the presence of management) with regard to the adequacy of
internal controls, and if need be, to consult also with the internal
auditors (since their product has a strong influence on the quality and
integrity of the resulting independent audit).
Braiotta (1994, p. 11)

From the above, the formation of an audit committee significantly helps the
confidence of the auditor. This view has led this present study to investigate
the effects of the existence of audit committee on auditor independence, with
the proposition that the existence of a corporate audit committee will enhance
auditor independence. In Indonesia, the existence of a corporate audit
committee is voluntary except for the banking industries, who are required to
have this committee.

5.3.1. The Effects of a Corporate Audit Committee
According to the interviews, only sixteen auditors have dealt with clients who
have a corporate audit committee. This is understandable because the
existence of corporate audit committees are something new in Indonesia.
These sixteen auditors were asked the following questions," Can you tell me

106
the role of the audit committee in relation to your audit work, and what is the
effect of the existence of an audit committee on your independence?"

The sixteen auditors indicated that there were four main roles for audit
committees in relation to the audit work of the auditors. These roles were
first, the audit committee was useful and cooperative to the audit work,
second, the audit committee was a source of additional information, third,
auditors can discuss findings with the audit committee and, fourth the audit
committee was perceived as a representation of commissioners and a
mediator between clients and auditors.

The sixteen auditors had different perceptions when they were asked the
question "Can you tell me what is the effect of the existence of a corporate
audit committee on auditor independence?" Thirteen said that the existence of
an audit committee had no effect on auditor independence. While the other
three auditors had different beliefs. The interviews on this issue are
summarized in Appendix 4.

5.3.1.1. Audit Committee: Useful without Effect on Independence
There were thirteen auditors interviewed who stated that a corporate audit
committee had no effect on auditor independence. There are two main
reasons for this that emerge from the interviews. First, they believe that the
existence of a corporate audit committee had no good or bad effect on auditor
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independence as long as they were aware and careful of it. They believed
that it assisted the audit work. As stated by Mr. E, a big five audit partner.

W e have audited s o m e clients with such a committee. Here, the clients
w h o have an audit committee are normally banks and large companies.
The role of this committee to our audit work is very useful. I prefer to
audit companies w h o have an audit committee, however, it won't affect
m y independence, because I believe that the committee works for them
not for us, so w e have to be careful, but as I said it is very helpful to the
audit work. (Mr. E)
The second reason w h y they think that the audit committee has no good or
bad effect on auditor independence is because they do not view the audit
committee as the only 'reference'. The following statement by Mr. G, a bigfive audit manager makes this clearer.

W e have s o m e clients with an audit committee, and their role normally
supports our work, but w e do not rely on them. W e see this committee
as our partner to support us, but w e do not treat them as our reference.
The role of this committee has no effect on m y independence. (Mr. G )
A similar view w a s also delivered by Mr. R, a big-five audit partner w h o also
said that a corporate audit committee was useful in terms of audit work, but
had no effect on auditor independence.

The audit committee is a new thing in Indonesia. But I have met them
at several clients, banking clients or big company clients. Their role is
to discuss our audit findings and the existence of an audit committee is
very helpful. However, there is no correlation between an audit
committee and our independence.
W e audit all clients with
'scepticism', so w e do not rely on them. W e treat all clients with s a m e
treatment. In m y experience, m a n y clients complain to us by stating
"why are your audit staff so suspicious of us?" D o you know what it
means? It m e a n s that in this audit firm all audit staff must be
independent, not just rely on information given by clients, but w e have
to investigate them. (Mr. R)
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5.3.1.2. Audit Committee: Enhancing Independence
There were three auditors who stated that an audit committee had an effect
on auditor independence. One auditor believed that a corporate audit
committee could enhance auditor independence. He argued that he must be
careful with that client because its audit committee consisted of non-director
members so consequently he felt that he must be more independent. Another
auditor stated that a corporate audit committee could impair or enhance
auditor independence. It depended on how auditors took advantage of this
committee and how the auditor interacted with it. If auditors tended to be
steered by the corporate audit committee, their independence would be

impaired. But if auditors followed the audit rules and standards, it wouldn't be
a problem for auditor independence. While another auditor stated that the
effect of a corporate audit committee on auditor independence is dependant
on who were members of that committee. The following opinion was put by
Mrs. T, a big-five audit senior manager regarding the effects of a corporate
audit committee on auditor independence.
Yes, I audited some clients with an audit committee. Their roles was to
assist us in providing information and assist us when w e needed s o m e
discussion, they also discussed with us our audit findings. In m y
opinion, their existence is useful to our audit tasks, but if their members
consist of management or directors, their independence should be
questioned. But if their members consist of the owners or other
independent elements, it would be independent, and w e could better
work together with them. (Mrs. T)

From these three auditors' views, it can be concluded that the existence of an
audit committee could enhance auditor independence when the members of
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the committee consists of non-director members. The reason is because in
performing their tasks the non-director members would have no conflict of
interest.

5.3.2. Discussion
From the twenty-nine auditors who were interviewed, there were only sixteen
auditors who had dealt with clients who had a corporate audit committee. The
interviews indicated four roles of a corporate audit committee that could be
investigated. These were: first, a committee is useful and cooperative to audit
work; second, it provides additional information; third, auditors discuss

findings with it; and the last, it acts as a mediator between auditors and client
in performing audit tasks. These findings are consistent with the study by
Mautz and Neumann (1970) concerning the advantages of an audit committee
for independent CPA, and the study of Marrian (1988) on audit committees
when he investigated whether or not an audit committee was worthwhile. It is

therefore not surprising that all (sixteen) auditors think that a corporate audit
committee is very beneficial to their work.

However, in terms of the effect of a corporate audit committee on auditor
independence the sixteen auditors have various views. Most of them state
that the corporate audit committee has no effect. This view is consistent with
the study of Gul (1989). And only one auditor supported the findings of Teoh
and Lim (1996) and Beattie et al (1999) who argued that the corporate audit
committee could enhance auditor independence. Another auditor said that, it
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was dependant on its members. A third auditor said that it depended on how
the auditor perceived and interacted with the corporate audit committee.

From these views, it appears that the existence of a corporate audit
committee could assist audit work. None of the interviewees said that auditor
independence was impaired by the existence of this committee. The
establishment of an audit committee would be expensive, since it is a new
thing in Indonesia, and it is still limited to the banking businesses only.
However, it is suggested that the existence of a corporate audit committee is
significant especially in assisting audit work, and it is important that members
of this committee be considered as independent to avoid conflict of interests.

In my opinion, the most important thing is the membership of the committee. If
the membesr of the committee consists of management/directors, it will not be
effective. But if the membership of the committee consists of non-directors (at
least most of them are non-directors), the committee not only will help the
audit work but also will enhance auditor independence. The reason why the
membership of the committee should be non-directors, is to avoid conflict of
interest or an unhappy feeling by the auditors about the directors. Because it
is common, in Indonesia, that someone will not openly 'fight' those who have
'helped' him/her auditors must be careful about this situation.

5.4. Major Clients
The rendering of audit services could cause economic dependence of audit
firms on their clients if these services represent a large percentage of the
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firms' total revenue. The dependence on particular clients could lead to the
impairment of auditor independence. To anticipate this circumstance, some
professional bodies such as: the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, and the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in Ireland (Barkess, et al 1995) have restricted the
percentage of revenue generated from a particular client. This situation
generates the proposition that the greater the auditor's economic dependence
on major clients, the greater the chance of independence impairment.

The findings of previous empirical studies concerning this issue were various.
Some studies (eg Supriyono, 1988; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Beattie et al, 1999)
asserted that fee size from a particular client has a significant effect on the
impairment of auditor independence, while other studies (eg Barkess et al,
1995; Craswell, 1997) did not find any significant effects. This study
investigated auditors' perceptions as to whether reliance on major clients
could impair auditor independence or not, and it also explored how and why
auditor independence could or could not be affected by major clients.

5.4.1. The Effects of Major Clients
To avoid a misunderstanding of the questions asked, the interviewees were

given a definition of the term 'major clients'. Major clients were regarded to be
audit clients who generated a significant fee compared to total firm audit
incomes. Then, all the auditors were asked the following question "Can you
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tell me your opinion about the effects of major clients on auditor
independence during audit work?"

From the twenty-nine auditors, there were three auditors who had no major
clients. Therefore, there were only twenty-six auditors who had major clients.
From twenty-six auditors who had major clients, twenty-two auditors said that
major clients had no effect on auditor independence. While four auditors said
that major clients had an effect on auditor independence. The summary of
interviews on this issue is outlined in Appendix 5.

5.4.1.1. Confidence and Matching Risks Vs Fee
In responding to the question in the interviews, each auditor provided one or
more reasons why major clients did not impair auditor independence. The
responses given by twenty-two auditors can be classified into five main
reasons.

First, nine auditors were confident with their audit quality therefore they
believed that they could retain their major clients. They believed that they
could be independent even though they had some major clients, because they
were not dependant on those clients. The following statement of Mr. CC, an
assistant manager of a big-five audit firm highlights this.

Yes we have some major clients. But our audit firm has many other
clients, so it is not a problem with our independence. W e are a big
audit firm, w e have confidence and clients will c o m e to us to be audited
(Mr. C C ) .
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Since seven of the nine auditors were members of big five audit firms, the
above statement seems to indicate the self-confidence of auditors, especially
the big-five auditors. A similar view was also stated by Mr. X, an audit
partner of a big-five audit firm when he said...

Yes we do have some major clients. As I have said that we are not
worried about losing clients, so in conducting an audit w e are confident
of our performances and therefore w e don't really care whether clients
will be coming back or leaving us. It doesn't affect m y independence
(Mr. X).

Second, five auditors argued that the bigger the clients they had, the more
work they needed to do and the more risks they had to be aware of. In other
words, they thought that the larger fee they received, the more work and risk
they would have to face. This could be compared to small clients who
generated small fees, but also had less work and risks. This was stated by
Mr. D, a non big five partner.

Yes I have some major clients, but we have to remember that the
bigger the clients the riskier and more work w e need to do. S o in m y
opinion, big or small clients are not significant, because they are
proportional in size in terms of fee and risks or work. (Mr. D)
The reasons given why auditor independence is not affected by major clients
are understandable because the auditors say that there are no actual major
clients since they also face bigger risks and more work.
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Third, four auditors said that they were not worried about losing clients. Three
of them were big-five audit partners and only one of them was a non big-five
audit partner. Their reason was that because they had so many clients even
though some of them terminate they would be replaced by new clients. It
seems that these auditors were very confident with their position and they had
strong bargaining power as previous group of auditors. The following is a
statement by Mr. R, an audit partner of a big-five firm.

You can't think that our independence is affected by major clients. W e
have more than a thousand clients, w e won't be worried if s o m e clients
leave us. W e are not dependant on individual clients. Every year
about one hundred become new clients and about thirty clients leave
us. Even though w e have s o m e major clients they cause no problems
to our independence. W e maintain our independence as tight as
possible because this is our commitment. (Mr. R )
Fourth, four auditors (two auditors were members of big-five firms and two
were members of non big-five firms) said that by following the rules and
standards, they would be independent or at least they could minimize auditor
impairment from dependence on major clients. The following is a statement
by Mrs. U, a big-five audit manager.
Yes I have some major clients. But I think when I perform audit work I
never follow what they want, but rather I refer to audit standards. A s
long as w e remain professional, major clients have no effect on our
independence. (Mrs. U )

Fifth, an auditor said that by applying religious values she could do audit tasks
independently and not be affected by major clients. She believed that clients
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were given to her by God and the only thing she does is her best by following
the audit rules and standards.

In my opinion this approach is not only applied by this auditor but also
followed by other auditors. This approach provides the auditor with a
philosophy to "do the best and let God do the rest". However, history (at least
in Indonesia) has shown us that some of those (businessmen or national

leaders) who were viewed as "religious" persons, have to spend their life in jail
for inappropriate behaviour, something that we have fo be careful of.

5.4.1.2. Major Client: Generating Dependency
Four auditors said that major clients could impair auditor independence.
These four auditors were three members of non big-five firms and only one
partner of a big-five firm. The following paragraphs contain the reasons
stated by these four auditors as to why major clients could impair auditor
independence. Mr. E, a partner of a big-five audit firm, states that there is a
tendency to fear losing major clients when performing audit work. The larger
the clients, the greater the fear will be.

Yes we have major clients among several hundreds of our clients.
W h e n w e audit those major clients to be honest there is a tendency to
fear losing them, the more extreme our major clients, the more fear of
losing clients. (Mr. E)

The key reason why major clients could impair auditor independence is
because the firms are afraid of losing income. It seems that income
dependence on certain clients can lead auditors to impair (or tend to impair)
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their independence. This experience w a s stated by Mr. A, a partner of a non
big-five audit firm:

I feel pressured because, to be honest, I am worried about losing my
major clients. But I always work to maintain standards. That is m y key
point, because maintaining independence is m y business. (Mr. A )
Mr. A was also worried about losing major clients, however he tried to follow
the rules and standards, because by doing that he could minimize the chance
of further 'wrong doing'.

Mr. B, a partner of a non-big-five firm stated that major clients could put him
into a difficult situation and consequently major clients could lead to
independence impairment.

Yes I have some, but not really extreme major clients. In my
experience this position can put us into hard situation, I think it could
lead into independence impairment. (Mr. B)
While Mr. W, a partner of a non big-five firm stated that even though major
clients sometimes could affect auditor independence it was still tolerable
because he tried to follow audit rules and standards, not to violate them.

Some times there are effects from this situation. However, I have
s o m e restrictions in doing this, I can suggest and compromise about
our audit works but those are still in the audit standards. I can be
flexible but still not violate our standards. (Mr. W )
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5.4.2. Discussion
Of the twenty-nine auditors who were interviewed, twenty-six had major
clients. From that number of auditors, most of them (twenty two) believed that
major clients had no effect on auditor independence. In other words, for
twenty-two auditors major clients did not impair auditor independence. Five
main reasons were generated from interviews to support this argument.

The first reason was that auditors believed that they generated quality audits.
They have shown that auditors (especially big five members) are highly
confident in dealing with clients and this is because they believed that they
provided a quality audit and they had a big number of clients. This would not
happen if they were not confident of their audit quality and they had only a
small number of clients. They believed that a large number of clients gave
them confidence, this is rational because they have a stronger bargaining
position when facing clients. They are not afraid of the clients leaving.
However, this group of auditors must not be over confident.

The second reason why auditors stated that major clients did not impair
auditor independence was seen to be more 'rational'. This was because the
larger the fee, the more work that needed to be done, and the riskier the
clients were. Large clients are more risky since they have a more
complicated accounting system and more business activities. This situation
needs more time and responsibility from the auditors. Therefore major clients
are not different compared to small clients because small clients generate
small fees with less work and less risks.
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The third reason is they are not worried about losing clients because they
have plenty of clients and do not depend on s o m e clients. But it must be
remembered that all the audit firms' objective is to maximise profit, therefore
there would be a tendency to accept more clients rather than to let s o m e go.

The fourth reason seems to be a 'formal' answer. The interviewees said that
major clients did not impair auditor independence because they (the auditors)
followed audit rules and standards. However, their statements (stick to the
rules) are not a guaranty that they must be independent in doing audit work, it
could be true or lip service only because talking is easier than acting.

While the fifth reason seems to be a personal and individual view, in that she
believed that by applying religious values (such as no cheating or violating
rules and standards) she could be independent with or without major clients.
In m y opinion this approach is not only applied by this auditor but also
followed by other auditors. This approach provides auditor a philosophy to "do
your best and let G o d do the rest".

There were four auditors who agreed with the proposition saying that major
clients could impair auditor independence. According to these four auditors
major clients could impair or at least could m a k e auditors tend to impair
auditor independence. Their statements were based on the reality that they
were worried about losing major clients w h o generated a large income, and
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this was realized not only by three auditors from non big-five firms, but also by
one member of a big-five firm.

Even though there were only four auditors who believed that major clients
could impair auditor independence it is important to note that in practice most,
if not all, firms are profit oriented. Consequently, they have to think that
maintaining independence could result in an opportunity cost if their major
clients left them. In this situation, they are in a difficult position to be
completely independent. Even though, there were only four auditors who said
that major clients could impair their independence, it does not mean that
major clients only had a small negative effect on auditor independence. A
patron-client relationship in Indonesian society is common, this is an alert to
auditors to be aware of this threat (major clients) because auditors probably
will take a position as the client with the major client as their patron.

5.5. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined and discussed the effect of the nature of clients on
auditor independence. This included the clients' reputations, whether there
was a corporate audit committee and the size of the audit fee paid by the
clients. On the issue of client reputation this study found that most auditors
(twenty-seven out of twenty-nine) did not agree with the proposition saying
that auditor independence was affected by the client's reputation. Their
argument was that auditors performed an audit task based on the same audit
rules and standards for all clients. They did not differentiate their clients
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based on the clients' backgrounds. Regardless of their clients good or bad
reputations this did not affect auditor independence. But, in my opinion the
clients' background will lead the auditors' perceptions of their audit work and
finally their opinion.

Conversely, two auditors believed that a client's reputation could influence the
perceptions of the auditor before the acceptance of an audit engagement and
at the beginning of the audit examination. According to their view, the better
the client's reputation then the better the audit opinion would be. This
argument is somewhat consistent with the study by Knapp (1985) and Beattie
et al (1999) stating that a better financial condition of a client could impair
auditor independence. However, these two auditors, in an audit examination
would try to go back and rely on the 'facts' they found in the audit work and
not be influenced by their clients' reputations. On this issue, auditors seem to
use professional judgments rather than emotional judgement. Even though
clients' background had no effect on twenty-seven auditors it did influence
two auditors, so this study therefore concludes that a client's background
could 'potentially' have an effect on auditor independence. The better clients'
backgrounds would 'potentially' be perceived as having a better audit opinion,
consequently auditors would potentially agree with the clients' opinion.

On the issue of corporate audit committees, this study found that they were
new in Indonesia. There is no requirement from the government for listed
companies to have a corporate audit committee except in the banking
industry. The study found that only sixteen of the twenty-nine auditors have
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dealt with clients who had an audit committee. Of the sixteen auditors,
thirteen auditors did not agree with the proposition saying that a corporate
audit committee could enhance auditor independence. They believed that the
existence of a corporate audit committee assisted audit work, but that it had
no effect on auditor independence. Whereas, three auditors agreed that a
corporate audit committee could enhance auditor independence and also
suggested that the committee could assist them in doing the audit as long as
most of the committee members were non-directors. On this issue this study
found that all auditors acknowledged the benefits of the existence of a
corporate audit committee, and some of them felt that it could enhance auditor
independence. This study therefore concludes that corporate audit
committees could assist auditors' work and it 'potentially could enhance'
auditor independence.

On the issue of audit firms' dependency on major clients, this study found that
twenty-six of twenty-nine auditors stated that they had major clients, whereas
the other three auditors did not. The majority of those who had major clients
believed that major clients did not impair auditor independence. Their
arguments were based on their confidence in their audit quality and the view
that the more fees they received the more work and risks they faced.

Conversely, this study identified that there were four auditors who supported
the proposition saying that audit firms' dependence on major clients could
impair auditor independence. Their reasons were because they feared losing
clients or incomes. Even though only four auditors of the twenty-six auditors
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who had major clients believed that major clients could impair their
independence and the other twenty-two auditors did not agree, this study
considers major clients as a 'potential factor' that could negatively affect
auditor independence. This is based on the logical reason that the larger the
clients the more audit firms would depend on them and the practice of patronclient relationship in Indonesian society would affect auditors' behaviour.

The next chapter will discuss the effect of the relationship between audit firms
and clients on auditor independence.

123

CHAPTER SIX

Audit Firms and Clients:
Effects of Their Relationships

6.1. Introduction
The previous two chapters have discussed the findings of the study
concerning the effect of audit firms and clients' characteristics on auditor
independence. This chapter will discuss the findings concerning the effect of
the relationship, first, a m o n g audit firms and second, between audit firms and
clients on auditor independence. The relationship a m o n g audit firms can be
seen from. their competition for retaining and attracting clients.

Tight

competition a m o n g audit firms could lead audit firms to tend to treat the clients
favourably.
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The relationship between audit firms and clients can be seen from two
perspectives. First, in the process of an auditor appointment and during audit
engagements, auditors interact with clients' directors (management). In this
relationship, the real role of directors could be a source of pressure on the
auditors. Second, the length of the relationship between the auditors and
particular clients could also be a source of independence impairment.

This chapter therefore starts with a discussion of the effect of competition
among audit firms on auditor independence. Then follows a discussion of the
effect of the real directors' roles and the length of audit tenure on auditor
independence. The chapter ends with a summary and conclusion.

6.2. Audit Market Competition
A relationship among audit firms that requires them to compete in order to

retain and attract their (potential) clients is one factor that could affect audit
independence. The more audit firms there are, the higher the competition
among them will be. This situation leads to the question of the impairment of
their independence, because in order to attract or to retain their clients, audit
firms have to offer a high performance with low audit fees, otherwise the client
will appoint another audit firm. In this situation, audit firms will offer a 'low
balling marketing strategy' which means they offer their engagement for very
low fees. Consequently, to maintain their best profit performance, audit firms
will cut their staff budget for audit tasks. Those who are not able to maintain

125
their independence, because of tight competition will tend to submit to a
client's pressure. From this situation there is a proposition that competition
could impair auditor independence.
This study, therefore, aims to investigate whether or not high competition in
the audit market is one of the factors affecting auditor independence,
according to the perceptions of the auditors.

6.2.1. The Effects of Competition
This section investigates the effects of competition among audit firms on
auditor independence. In this study the twenty-nine auditors were asked the
following question "Can you tell me the effects of audit market competition on
auditor independence? Before being asked this question, they were told that
the audit market was getting tighter because there were many 'new comers'
and there was a 'price/fee war" among audit firms.

Most of the interviewees (twenty-one auditors) said that competition had no
effect on their independence in accepting and doing audit tasks. Two
auditors said that their independence was impaired. Another three auditors
stated that their independence was only slightly impaired. However, there
were three auditors who were not certain whether their independence was
impaired or not. The summary of interviews on this issue is outlined in
Appendix 6.
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6.2.1.1. Various Reasons for N o Effect
In the interviews, each auditor provided one or two reasons why competition
among audit firms had, or had no effect on auditor independence. Twentyone auditors stated that competition among audit firms had no effect on
auditor independence. Their responses can be categorized into at least five
main reasons. The following reasons were raised from interviews from the
most to the least common.

First, the most common reason (stated by ten auditors) given by those who
said that competition had no bad effect on auditor independence was because
they offered a normal audit fee with good qualify work. Auditors or audit firms
never cut their audit fee to an irrational price but rather, they still offered a
normal price while improving their audit quality, enabling them to compete
with other audit firms. As stated by Mr. H a manager of a big five audit firm.
I know that our competitors sometimes cut their fee to a low rate when
proposing an audit fee. This is possibly caused by tight competition
a m o n g audit firms, but in this firm w e never cut the audit fee to an
irrational rate. W e believe that by maintaining a rational and
reasonable fee, w e can do audit work properly with high quality,
otherwise a junk opinion and a poor quality audit will be produced. (Mr.
H)
The second reason (stated by six auditors) why competition among audit firms
had no bad effect on auditor independence was because auditors were
selective in accepting clients and avoided 'risky' clients. The auditors did not
want to accept all clients, but preferred to accept only 'safe' clients. This is
the strategy for a long-term period as stated by Mr. R, a partner of a big-five
audit firm.
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In terms of fees, our audit firm is well known as an expensive firm.
This is in order to select our clients, and the worse the clients the more
expensive the fee offered to them. So the 'worse' clients will turn to
other auditfirms,as is their choice. Sometimes w e will not accept the
next audit engagement if w e consider that this client has too m a n y
troubles. Even so in the audit work process, w e can stop immediately
if w e are not happy with the clients' response or if clients tend to push
us to do something 'risky'.
W e have even refused an audit
engagement with billions of Rupiah fees because w e knew that such
companies had troubles and w e don't want to become liable. Although
w e select our clients, not all our clients bring us honey, s o m e also bring
us poison, w e have to be careful. (Mr. R)
The third reason (stated by four auditors) why competition had no bad effect
on auditor independence was because auditors considered the following
factors: the man hours in doing an engagement and the length and the scope
of the work. Even with tight competition, auditors would never tender an audit
fee without these considerations. As stated by Mr. X a partner of a big five
audit firm.

I think this situation would not impair m y independence, because when
w e charge an audit fee w e have already calculated h o w long one
assignment will be and w h o will do that job, so w e can already
calculate h o w m u c h the fee will be to our client. W e will not offer an
audit fee under our operational cost, and w e are not worried about
losing our clients, because they know w h o w e are. (Mr. X)

The fourth reason (stated by two auditors) why competition had no bad effect
on auditor independence was because of the auditors' visions in establishing
audit firms. For Mrs. K and Mrs. Q, partners from two non big-five audit
firms, their objective in establishing audit firms was not merely to seek money,
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since their security came from other sources. The following statement of
Mrs. Q is an interesting phenomenon.
We are female auditors so we don't rely on our salary as major income
for our family. Consequently, w e don't really seek as m a n y clients as
w e can. W e are more interested in maintaining our quality than our
income. W e are professional and wish to be independent, and w e do
not wish to sell or impair our independence for money. So, competition
a m o n g audit firms is not a problem for us. It can't impair our
independence. (Mrs. Q )

Thefifthreason (stated by two auditors) as to w h y competition had no bad
effect on auditor independence was because they had strong integrity. This
reason was argued by Mrs. T, a senior manager of a big-five audit firm in the
following statement.

Competition is a business issue that could impair the independence of
auditors. However, strong auditors are able to separate and
differentiate between a business decision and independence, and
competition shouldn't impair their independence. I myself can still be
independent while tight competition is taking place. (Mrs. T)
Mrs T's statement can be true, but although the auditors stated that they had
strong integrity, it does not mean that they necessarily were independent,
there were some auditors who discussed or commented very well about
integrity, but their clients could present a different view.

And finally the following reasons w h y competition had no bad effect on auditor
independence are each mentioned only once by each auditor. They include

offering a high fee to hire a qualified auditor, religious reasons and performin
audit tasks effectively and efficiently.
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In m y opinion even though they stated that competition had no bad effect on
their independence, auditors must be aware that the possibilities are that, they
must be competitive (for example by offering normal price with a quality audit)
or compromise their independence to get and retain clients. If they are
consistent with their answer above they will select the first type of survival
strategy, if not they would compromise their independence in order to
maintain their existence.

6.2.1.2. Various Arguments for Impairment
The following sections will discuss auditors' perceptions about the effects of
competition on auditor independence, as to why auditor independence is
impaired, why auditor independence is slightly impaired, and why auditor
independence is not impaired.

Two of the twenty-nine auditors clearly stated that their independence was
impaired. Both of them are partners of non big-five audit firms. The following
statement of Mr. Y points out...

I think competition among audit firms can impair auditor independence.
In m y experience, about fifty percent of m y clients are continuous
clients. I even have clients w h o have been audited for more than
seven years. The taxation office has no problems with this audit
tenure. But, for the banks' purpose they sometimes ask clients to
change their auditors. Anyway, I think the competition issue can lead
auditor independence towards impairment. (Mr. Y)
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Even though they do not state clearly their reason for the impairment of their
independence, it seems that auditors are under 'pressure', and could lose
their clients without warning.

Another three auditors said that their independence w a s slightly impaired.
These three are Mr. C a supervisor from a big-five firm, Mr. J an assistant
manager from a big-five firm and Mr. W a partner of a non big-five firm. Their
statements consecutively are as follows:

To be honest, as a staff m e m b e r in this office, I can feel that the effect
of competition a m o n g audit firms can slightly impair our independence.
But, this effect is not significant, it's still tolerable I guess. (Mr. C )
i am not a partner and in doing my job I am never involved in finding
clients. In m y opinion, I think competition could affect us as w e tend to
follow clients' expectations, but w e still meet the rules and standards, I
m e a n if these things are still tolerable and reasonable that they wish us
to do, w e can do them. But w h e n the clients' wants do not meet audit
standards w e will refuse them. In m y opinion, there is an influence of
competition but it's not dangerous. (Mr. J)
I think there will be impairment caused by tight competition, however it
can still be managed, I m e a n this effect is not so serious. Because
auditors will also not go too far in getting clients, they will also consider
therisksinvolved. (Mr. W )
From these three statements above, it 's clear that their independence is
impaired but this is not serious. They try to minimize this, however by not
offering a fee at a cheap price but at a normal price and they consider the
risks that they may have to face.

Another three auditors provide unclear views about whether competition could
or could not affect auditor independence. They prefer to say that auditor
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independence is dependant on the auditors themselves. As stated by Mr. P,
a partner of a non big-five audit firm:

It is dependant on the auditor's mental attitude. If an auditor has a
weak mental attitude as an independent auditor, his/her independence
will be impaired by that issue, because he/she will be worried about not
having clients. However, as an auditor I feel confident to be
independent while competing with other firms. In offering an audit fee,
I also offer a normal fee. It depends on the scope of the work and the
m a n hours. Competition will only impair auditor independence for
those w h o have a bad attitude. (Mr. P)

6.2.2. Discussion
Twenty-one auditors said that competition among audit firms had no bad
effects on auditor independence for attracting and retaining clients. On the
other hand, only five auditors support the research findings of Shockley
(1981), Supriyono (1988) and Lindsay (1989) that competition had a negative
effect. Two of them believed that competition impaired auditor independence.
While another three auditors stated that auditor independence was only
slightly impaired. A further three auditors provided unclear views about
whether auditor independence was impaired or not, this is consistent with the
study of Knapp (1985).

When the big five auditors said that competition had no negative effect on
auditor independence, it showed that they were confident to compete with
others. When they said that competition has no negative effect on auditor
independence, the big five auditors normally noted that "they (the clients)
know who we are", " we have many clients" or "we are an expensive audit
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firm". A statement by Mr. E, a partner of a big-five audit firm clearly shows
confidence in the big-five audit firm.

Other partners and I feel confident that our services offered to our
clients are highly respected by our clients and the public. I know that
competition a m o n g audit firms is getting tighter, but as I said w e are not
worried about this issue, even though w e offer our service with a high
rate, because w e sell quality and our clients and the public k n o w this.
(Mr. E)

Most auditors who answered that competition had no negative effect on
auditor independence were big-five auditors and gave as their reason the
view that they offered a normal price (never a cut price) with a quality audit.
This means that the big five auditors were confident that they could generate
a quality audit with a high price. Even though they offer a high price (or
normal price at least), they still believed that they can attract their clients.
They also believed that with a quality audit clients would be happy and would
not leave their audit firm. The question here to these auditors is can they
perform audit work based on audit rules and standards? Because there are
so many stories about auditors that can issue an audit report without a proper
audit examination.

Another reason why competition had no negative effect on auditor
independence was that auditors were selective in their acceptance of clients
in order to avoid 'risky' clients. This reason was stated by six auditors all of
whom were big five auditors. It is also understandable that the big five audit
firms have plenty of clients, so it is possible for them to select their clients,
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and even though some clients leave them they are always replaced by new
clients. To accept clients selectively is very hard for those who have a limited
number of clients, this is only practicable by audit firms which have too many
clients compared to their staff. But it is hard to believe a statement that "we
have not enough staff so we refuse to accept an audit engagement" because
normally they will recruit new staff to handle such works.

The third reason why tight competition had no negative effect on auditor
independence was because auditors, in calculating audit fees will consider
such matters as manhours and the scope of the work. In my opinion, even
though an audit firm may calculate working hours or a rate per hour, an audit
firm in a tight competitive situation will tend to make everything finish sooner
with a lower level of costs. Therefore, this situation will lead auditors to cut
their budget, it is not easy for auditors to work properly in this situation

In contrast the non big five auditors said that competition had no negative
effect on auditor independence, and they relied more on 'individuality' such as
their vision for establishing their audit firms, and the auditor's integrity and
religious convictions. It is understandable that Mrs. K and Mrs. Q, who did
not depend on their firms for their livelihoods, established audit firms not
simply to seek money. Their vision was to accommodate their interests in
audit practices, applying and practising their knowledge.

I believe, that a firm will continue to be an independent auditor as long as their
vision is not only to seek money, they will be more able to be independent
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compared to those who view money as everything. A tight competition among
auditors will not impair their independence as experienced by Mrs. K, Mrs. Q,
and the following statements of Mrs. M and Mrs. Z.

The reason why auditor independence is not impaired by tight competition is

because of their vision (objective) in establishing an audit firm. This argument
was stated by two female auditors who regarded their status to be house
wives. These two female auditor's opinion can be true since there is a
common phenomenon in Indonesian society that seeking money is a
husband's responsibility, a wife can work but only to support her husband, or
even sometimes a wife is not allowed to work for religious or cultural reasons.
However, not all female auditors are like these two auditors, many female
auditors work for money so they can earn a larger amount of money
compared to their husbands.

Mrs. M, a partner of a non big-five audit firm, expressed the view that auditor
independence was not impaired by competition among audit firms, because
she served the public interest more than her client's. She offered a
reasonable price with a high quality audit. Mrs. M's statement will be true as
long as she can maintain her independence from her vested interest or she
can handle any other pressure. If she fails to do that, she will be the same as
other auditors who have a weak integrity.

A religious approach in running an audit firm was also a reason for auditor
Mrs. Z, a partner of a non big-five audit firm. In her view, by applying a
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religious approach, competition would not have a negative effect, because
she believed that clients (or 'wealth') came from God, so she did not need to
be 'greedy' or to compromise her independence. Although this argument was
stated by only one auditor, I believe that other auditors also practise this
reason in maintaining auditor independence.

On the other hand eight auditors had different opinion about the effect of a
tight competition on auditor independence. Two auditors who said that
competition could impair auditor independence were both non-big-five
partners. While three auditors who said that competition could slightly impair
auditor independence consisted of one non-big five audit partner, and two big
five auditors (supervisor and assistant manager).

Three non-big five partners did not provide a clear view as to whether
competition could or could not impair auditor independence. They preferred
fo say that the effect of a fight competition on auditor independence is
dependant on the integrity of each individual auditor.

In my opinion, these three auditors' views can be classed as saying that
competition has a negative effect on auditor independence, because they
think that auditor independence can be threatened by competition where the
auditors' integrity is weak. Therefore, 1 conclude that those eight who viewed
that competition could affect (impair, slightly impair and not sure) auditor
independence were mainly (6) non-big-five partners.
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Even though only eight auditors who stated that a tight competition can lead
to auditor independence impairment, it must be an alert for other auditors. It
is understandable that competition could impair auditor independence
especially for those who have a small number of clients. However, in line with
Mr. P's statement, in my opinion the important thing is not only their situation
(such as lack of clients or no competitive advantage) but the more important
thing is the auditors' attitude. The better their mental attitude as an
independent auditor, the more independent they will be in doing audit work,
and vice versa. In other words, there is still a chance for small auditors to be
independent in a tight competition arena as long as they have strong mental
attitude as independent auditors.

6.3. Roles of the Clients' Directors
Commonly, in public companies, the appointment and remuneration of
auditors is carried out by shareholders, but in small companies, in which the
owners are also the management of the company, the appointment and
remuneration of the auditor is made by the management as the owners.

In fact however, even in public companies, the directors involve themselves in
the appointment of the auditor and this situation could lead to the impairing of
auditor independence. Beattie et al (1999) considered this as a research
variable. In their research findings, the directors' real control of the
appointment of the auditor and the auditors remuneration was found to be
variable in that it could impair auditor independence. In this present study, the
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real control of directors in the appointment of the auditor and their real control
in the determination of the remuneration of the auditor was investigated.

6.3.1. The Effects of Clients' Directors' Roles
All the auditors participating in the study were asked by the following question,
"Can you tell me the effects of directors' roles on auditor independence?"
Before asking that question, all the auditors were told about the directors'
roles in selecting the auditor and determining the audit remuneration.

Most of the interviewees (twenty five) said that the roles of directors had no
effect on auditor independence. On the other hand, three auditors said that
directors' roles have bad effects (impair) on auditor independence. And
another auditor said that directors' roles had a small negative effect on auditor
independence. The interviews on this issue are summarized in Appendix 7.

6.3.1.1. The Quality of the Auditor Removes Clients' Pressure
According to twenty-five auditors, the directors' roles in auditor appointment
and remuneration had no effect on auditor independence. Their arguments
were based on the following reasons. First, according to them, auditor
independence is not affected by the directors' roles because they follow audit
rules and standards and avoid wrong doing. The following statement of Mr.
E, a big-five audit partner shows that he was aware of this threat but that he
always tried to stick to the rules.
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Well, the shareholders annual general meeting normally delegate to
the management to arrange about their auditor. S o w e are involved
with management in dealings about audit appointment and
remuneration. Even though this procedure could lead both auditor and
management to 'mutual advantage' but as I said that in doing audit
works I try to be always independent, and not to retain our clients by
compromising our independence. Because in m y opinion, once I m a k e
mistakes by compromising m y independence, for example, the public
will not rely on m e or this audit firm. Because a client w h o has m a d e
deal with m e will tell others that I can be bribed. (Mr. E)
Second, reliance on a quality audit could maintain auditor independence from
the threats of the directors. Mr. X, a big-five audit partner has made it clear
that his philosophy is to do his best as an auditor to maintain auditor
independence from this hazard.

M y philosophy is do our best, do our audit work as ruled by standards.
I believe that if w e maintain our quality the public will know what w e
have done. S o I don't care whether management are proposing us or
not for the next engagement. I won't 'negotiate' our independence to
be selected as the next auditor for them. (Mr. X)
The third reason w h y auditor independence is not impaired by the directors is
because they limit their relations with the client to a professional relationship
only. The fourth reason is because the auditors do not expect to be selected
as the auditor for the next engagement. The third and the fourth reasons can
be seen in the following statement by Mrs. M, a non big-five audit partner.

I know that the board of directors propose audit firms in the annual
meeting and also the board has authority to negotiate the audit fee and
remuneration with the auditor. But you have to know that our staff try
not to be too close with our clients, even though for example w e have a
close relationship with our clients, our relationship is limited to a
professional relationship. And w e are still able to maintain our
objectivity. I don't really worry whether I will be selected as the next
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auditor or not, I don't expect our client to assign us to the next audit
engagement by negotiating our professionalism. (Mrs. M )

6.3.1.2.Raising Interdependence and Conflict of Interest
There were four auditors who said that the directors' roles could impair auditor
independence. Their arguments were based on the following reasons. First,
according to them the position of auditors and clients are interdependent.
They each need one another as stated by Mr. B, a non big-five audit partner.

Even though m y clients are shareholders, s o m e times our relationship
with management could lead to independence impairment, because
the auditor and management are interdependent. (Mr. B)
The second reason is because their clients are normally small companies
where the owners are also management. In this case, the directors' roles can
significantly affect auditor independence as stated by Mr. W and Mr. AA,
both non-big-five audit partners.

Yes, m y independence s o m e times can be compromised because of
force from the directors. In m y case it is hard to avoid it because, the
directors are also the owners of the company w h o appoint us to do the
audit. What I can do is to maintain that I do audit works and still follow
the rules and standards. (Mr. W )
I think this situation could lead an auditor to the impairment of his
independence, especially in m y case. Because our clients are the
owner of the companies, so w e deal with them in the audit
appointment, w e have to choose whether w e will solely be professional
or also would be a businessman. If w e will be professional, w e will
have no problem with independence, but if w e will be both professional
and businessmen, w e might impair our independence. It's a critical
situation for me. (Mr. A A )
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From the four auditors w h o said that directors' roles could impair auditor
independence, three of them were non big-five auditors, and only one was a
member of the big five. Mr. C, a big-five audit supervisor states that auditor
independence can be impaired by the directors' roles because of the
closeness with clients, but he states that this impairment still can be managed
and is not dangerous.

I think that situation could lead to an independence impairment, but
that is not significant. Because w e do audit works still within the rules
and standards. If w e face a material risk, w e will refuse to do that, but
if it is still tolerable, w e could do that. (Mr. C )

6.3.2. Discussion
Twenty-nine auditors were interviewed to investigate the effects of the real
roles of directors on auditor independence. Twenty-five auditors said that
auditor independence was not impaired by the directors' roles. This group of
auditors argued that auditor independence was not impaired because the
auditors followed audit rules and standards to avoid wrong-doing. They also
relied on the quality of the audit. They minimized their relationship with the
clients and they did not expect to be selected for the next engagement.

It seems that the reasons proposed by this group were based more on the
strength of an auditor's integrity (internal factor) than external factors. The
confidence of auditors in their audit quality leads them to be confident of their
independence for the next audit engagement, they were ready not to be
appointed should there be any attempt to compromise their independence.
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Those twenty-five auditors were members of both big and small audit firms. It
seems that the characteristics of audit firms are not valued in maintaining
independence from this threat. Because the directors' roles were very strong
and could affect audit work, only those who had strong integrity could remain
independent.

The process of selecting an auditor is also an important thing in this regard.
For big companies, where their managements are not the owners, the
process of auditor selection is much better than small companies where their
managements are also the owners. With the big clients, the owners
(shareholders) appoint auditors in their Annual General Meeting. While for
clients where their managements are also the owners, they will face hardship
in the process of separating their functions as management and owner. This
situation will affect auditor independence differently. The former situation will
not usually affect auditor independence, while the latter situation could be
more of a threat.

Even though this group of auditors believed that the roles of the clients'
directors had no bad effect on their independence, it must be remembered
that Indonesian auditors (who normally find it hard to have a different
perception especially when there is a seniority or superiority relationship)
could keep silent about their unsolved problems and they (for those who have
no strong bargaining position) will finally compromise their independence
under pressure from the clients' directors. However, this is only a warning to
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be considered by those auditors doing audit works, there are many auditors
who have a strong enough integrity not to be dictated to by clients.

On the other hand, there were four auditors who said that the real roles of
directors could impair auditor independence. Their arguments were based on
the following reasons. According to them, auditors and clients are
interdependent, and particularly for small audit firms, their clients mostly are
small companies where the owners are also management, also clients and
auditors can develop a closeness.

It cannot be denied that many audit firms, especially small audit firms, look for
clients in order to survive. Many small companies (clients) also look for audit
firms who can serve them 'better". For small companies, their financial
statements are audited in order to fulfil credit requirements. Therefore, some
companies (clients) look for audit firms who can help them make their
financial statement look good. In some cases (as stated by Mr. Y) some
bankers could interfere with an auditor's decision or opinion. Bankers have a
financial interest, because once the clients' proposal is approved by the
banks, bankers will have financial benefits. This is like a triangle between
clients, auditors and bankers in that they work 'together' for their mutual
benefit. This situation is only possible when audit firms have a lack of clients,
they have a close relationship with their clients, and they have weak integrity
as auditors. Even though only four auditors stated that the roles of the clients'
directors had a negative effect on their independence, it does not mean that
the effect of the roles of the clients' directors is small especially in relation
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the auditors' culture where (Indonesian) auditors are normally not keen to
have different views from their senior or boss. This 'culture' is dangerous
when clients force auditors to be in line with them. Only those who have a
strong personality will be remained independent.

6.4. Audit Tenure
The length of an audit engagement with an auditor by a particular client is
viewed as a factor that could impair the auditor's independence. A longer
period of audit engagement to a given client could easily affect this
independence. The view of the US Senate (1976, p. 21) as cited by
Shockley (1981, p. 789) concerning audit tenure is as follows:
Long association between a corporation and an accounting firm may
lead to such close identification of the accounting firm with the interests
of its client's management that truly independent action by the
accounting firm becomes difficult.
However research findings in this regard have produced varying results. For
instance, a study conducted by Shockley (1981) found no significant impact
by audit tenure on auditor independence, while a study done by Supriyono
(1988) supports the statement of the US Senate above. By the limitation of
audit engagement to a certain period, auditors are expected to be more
independent, because their economic dependence on the clients will be
limited to only a short period of time. However, this is not easily practised
because it will necessitate additional costs in the changing of an audit firm.
The inconsistency of these research findings has led to the inclusion of this

issue in this present study. This study therefore, will investigate whether audit
tenure could impair auditor independence or not.
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6.4.1. The Effects of Audit Tenure
Audit tenure or the length of audit engagement has become a threat to auditor
independence. The auditors were asked the following question "Can you tell
me the effects of audit tenure on auditor independence?" Before asking this
question, the interviewees were told of the possibility of auditor independence
being impaired owing to the length of an audit engagement. From the
interviews, there were three categories of answers. First, twenty-one auditors
stated that audit tenure had no effect on auditor independence. Second, six
auditors said that audit tenure could affect auditor independence, four of them
believed that audit tenure did impair auditor independence, and two of them
said that audit tenure only slightly impairs auditor independence. Third, two
auditors said that they were not sure whether audit tenure had an effect on
auditor independence or not. The summary of these interviews is in Appendix
8.

6.4.1.1. Arguments for no Impairment: Staff Rotation, Change of
Directors and Professional Relationships.
Of the twenty-nine auditors, most (twenty one) said that audit tenure did not
impair auditor independence. Their arguments were based on the following
reasons. First, this group of auditors believed that by applying staff rotation,
audit tenure had no effect on auditor independence. The following statements
of Mr. E, a big-five audit partner and Mrs. M, a non big-five audit partner
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clarify the situation that auditor rotation w a s practised at both big and small
audit firms to avoid the bad effect of audit tenure.

In m y case I have a close relation with m y clients, but it is limited to a
professional relationship only.
In m y opinion, having a close
relationship with clients m a k e s our work easier. However, this will also
be viewed negatively by the public. People have to know that even
though w e have audited a certain client for several years, our audit
staff changes from year to year and also our clients' staff, changes
from time to time. S o there is no reason for fearing 'collusion' between
the two. (Mr. E)

In doing an audit I always send m y manager and m y staff to our clients.
And I also rotate our manager and staff. In m y case the rotation takes
place about every four years, so our relations with clients is not too
close. By rotating our manager and staff w e can maintain our
professionalism, and besides that after several years there is a
possibility that the board of directors will have changed. S o according
to m y experience, audit tenure does not affect our independence. (Mr.
M)
The second reason argued by this group is that because the clients'
management also changes from time to time there is no opportunity to create
an improper relationship between them. The third reason is that auditors try
to only keep a professional relationship with their clients, no more than that.
They don't want to go too far, because they know the risk. The statement of
Mr. K, a big-five audit partner makes it clear that the clients' management is
also rotated and they could still 'manage' their relationship with the 'old'
management members while maintaining a professional relation.

I have s o m e clients w h o have been audited for several years. But I
have no special relationship with them. I keep m y relationship to a
business relationship, no more than that. Their directors and staff have
changed from year to year, so it is not possible to have a special
relationship. Every year w e meet the n e w directors and staff, even
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though for example there are s o m e old directors, I can manage m y
distance from m y clients. M y independence is not a problem. (Mr. K)
The last reason proposed by this group is that auditors follow audit rules and
standards. Therefore, according to them by following these rules and
standards, they have to treat new and old clients equally. As pointed out by
Mr. O, a big five audit partner.

To me, old or new clients are not different. They have to be treated as
professionally as possible. Even though I a m more familiar with m y old
clients compared fo the new, in m y opinion this is not a reason to
loosen m y independence, because I have to follow the rules and
standards. (Mr. O )

6.4.1.2. Long Engagement: Generating Mutual Interest, Conflict of
Interest and Pressure
On the other hand, there were six auditors who believed that audit tenure
could affect auditor independence. Four of them said that audit tenure could
impair auditor independence and two of them believed that audit tenure could
do this to a lesser degree.

Four auditors stated that audit tenure could impair auditor independence
because they believed the following arguments. First, a long engagement
could impair auditor independence because there would be some mutual
interests, as stated by Mr. B, a non big-five audit partner.
I don't doubt that through this client, auditor independence could be
impaired, because there are s o m e 'mutual interests' between the two.
(Mr. B)
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Second, this group of auditors believed that auditors will find it hard to
separate their position as independent auditors from their relationship with old
clients as they will face a conflict of interests. This was discussed by Mr. AA,
a non big-five audit partner.

In m y opinion, it can obviously affect m y independence, because w e
have maintained our relationship for several years. I, as an auditor
must be independent, but I a m a h u m a n being and it's hard to separate
m y position as an auditor from m y relation with old clients. (Mr. A A )
The last reason is because auditors feel hard pressed to refuse clients'
'orders'. This is because they have a close relationship caused by a long
audit engagement, as stated by Mr. Y, a non big five audit partner.

Yes this relationship could sometimes impair m y independence,
because I know m u c h about them so w h e n they ask m e something,
sometimes it's hard to refuse them. However, I try not to go too far
with m y clients' 'expectations'. If I think that what I will do will get m e
into trouble, I'd rather refuse them. (Mr. Y )
Two auditors said that audit tenure could slightly impair auditor independence.
Their arguments are based on the following reasons. First, one auditor
believed that a long relationship could lead to an improper relationship.
Second, the other auditor believed that audit tenure could lead him to become
more 'flexible' in performing audit tasks. The following statement of Mr. C, a
big five audit supervisor states...

I think closeness with clients could lead us to b e c o m e more flexible, I
m e a n in this regard there is a little impairment. But once again all
things should be based on standards and if they are very risky, w e will
not do that. (Mr. C )
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Two other auditors said that they are not sure whether audit tenure could
impair auditor independence or not. They believed that the longer they audit
clients, the easier their audit tasks become, and they are not sure whether
auditor independence is affected or not, because although they are in a close
relationship they also follow audit rules and standards. The following
statement of Mr. A, a non big-five audit partner indicated this...

I feel the longer I audit the client, the easier the audit process will be.
For most clients the longer they interact with auditors, the better things
are in terms of a financial statement. It makes it easier for m e to audit.
It's hard to say whether m y independence is affected or not, but the
feeling I possess w h e n I audit such clients is I do the audit more easily.
I can't answer and say I a m affected or not, because as long as I do
the audit and follow the standards whatever the feeling, it will be all
right. (Mr. A )

6.4.2. Discussion
To investigate the effect of audit tenure on auditor independence, twenty-nine
auditors were interviewed. From the interviews, twenty-one auditors believed
that audit tenure did not affect auditor independence. Four auditors believed
that audit tenure could impair auditor independence, two auditors said that
audit tenure could slightly impair auditor independence and another two
auditors were not sure whether auditor independence was affected by audit
tenure or not.

The reasons given by those who stated that audit tenure did not affect auditor
independence were that they rotated their auditors, clients' management
changed from time to time, auditors followed audit rules and standards and
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auditors managed their relationship on a professional basis only. These
reasons imply that auditor integrity (following rules and standards and
managing a professional relationship), audit firm policy (staff rotation) and
external factors (clients' management changes) support auditor independence
from the threat of audit tenure.

Even though this group of auditors believed that a long engagement will not
impair their independence they must be careful in the following situations.
While they rotate their audit staff, they normally do not rotate their audit
partner (someone who responsible for the audit opinion). Therefore the

partner will have a long relationship with the clients, this situation could lead to
the impairment of the partner's independence.

Established clients (big clients), normally have a certain period for changing
their board of directors, but it must be remembered that directors can be
appointed more than once, therefore this situation also can lead to a long
relationship with the auditors. Also in small companies, the directors are the
owners, therefore the auditors will normally have long engagement with the
clients.

From a cultural point of view, auditors also must be aware that the Indonesian
culture especially the Javanese culture is a 'soft' culture where someone will
hardly have a different view from those who are respected (boss, senior etc).
This 'culture' does not support auditor independence, therefore auditors must
be aware of it.
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On the other hand, four auditors believed that audit tenure could impair
auditor independence. Their arguments were based on the following reasons.
Auditors and clients had mutual interests, auditors had a conflict of interests,
auditors faced the difficulty of refusing the clients' order, while two auditors
believed that audit tenure could slightly impair auditor independence because
an engagement could lead to an improper relationship and a more 'flexible'
treatment. In my opinion, the longer the audit tenure, the closer a relationship
could develop and therefore the harder it would be for auditors to maintain
auditor independence. This is easy to understand because a characteristic of
most Indonesians (auditors are no exceptions) is the reluctance to have a
different point of view from anyone in a close relationship.

Of six auditors, five of them were members of non big-five audit firms, and
only one was from the big five firm. The arguments of the six auditors can be
categorized into financial factors (mutual and conflict of interests) and a social
factor, (the close relation with clients).

Another two auditors were not sure whether audit tenure could affect auditor
independence or not. As stated by them, they faced a hardship because they
had a close relationship with their clients built on a long engagement, but they
also tried to follow audit rules and standards.

In my opinion the way for all auditors to maintain auditor independence or to
reduce the threat of audit tenure is by adhering to the following important
points. Auditors need to be confident with their position as independent
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auditors even with old clients. They have to maintain a professional
relationship with their client and not a 'personal' relationship. Auditors must
not expect to be appointed for the next engagement. Finally, from an
organizational (audit firms) approach, the big-five and non big-five audit firms
must rotate auditors and partners for a certain period.

6.5. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has investigated and discussed findings related to audit market
competition, directors' real roles and audit tenure. On the competition among
audit firms issue, this study found that most auditors (twenty-one of twentynine) believed that competition did not impair auditor independence. Their
arguments are: first, because they offer normal fees with a quality audit;

second, they are selective in accepting clients to avoid risky clients; third, they
considered man hours, length and scope of works; fourth, their vision in
establishing an audit firm could avoid independence impairment; and, fifth,
strength of integrity. Interestingly, two female auditors from non-big five audit
firms stated that their vision in establishing audit firms was not only for making
money, but rather for accommodating their professionalism as auditors.
These two auditors had no overwhelming reason to seek money since they
have income from other sources, therefore competition among audit firms had
no effect on these auditors.

According to the above arguments the auditors considered that a tight
competition between audit firms did not impair their independence, but it must
be noted that auditors still need to compete with others in order to exist and
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get clients. In this effort, off course, auditors will do "their best". It is
unarguable that clients also will appoint auditors who are "in favour" with
them.

Whereas, five auditors stated that competition among audit firms could impair
auditor independence. They (especially auditors from small audit firms)
believed that they were under clients' pressure where clients could change
their auditors if they want to at any time. From the facts that for some auditors
competition could impair auditor independence, this study concludes that
competition among audit firms is a potential factor that could negatively affect
auditor independence. The tighter the competition among audit firms,
potentially had the worse effect on auditor independence. However, it must
be remembered that auditors' integrity and their state of professionalism will
also determine the effect of competition on auditor independence.

On the issue of clients' directors' real roles in auditor appointment and
remuneration, this study found that twenty-five of twenty-nine auditors
believed that this issue did not impair auditor independence for three reasons.
First, they argued that they work by following audit rules and standards and
avoid wrong doings; second, they relied on a quality audit free from the threat
of directors' interventions; and third, they limited their relations to a
professional one only. These arguments however must be tempered because
the auditors are influenced by the Indonesian culture. In the Indonesian
culture, being apart from those who have contributed a beneficial thing is not
something that is easy to do. Normally, if they have such a relationship, they
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will have a "closer" and "further" relationship between them. Can these
auditors be different from most people in Indonesia?

On the other hand, four auditors stated that clients' directors' roles in auditor
appointment and remuneration could impair auditor independence for two
reasons. First, they viewed that auditor and clients are interdependent, they
need one each other. Auditors would hardly be able to audit independently,
because the auditors are under the clients' (directors') pressure. Second,
especially for small clients, their owners are also directors. In this case,
auditors face a harder situation, because of the owners' conflict of interests,
and therefore clients would easily 'dictate' to auditors.

Even though this study did not find consensus among auditors on this issue,
the facts showed that it is a dangerous situation for some auditors. Therefore,
this study concludes that clients' directors' real roles in auditor appointment
and remuneration could potentially impair auditor independence.

On the issue of the length of the audit engagement (audit tenure), this study
found that the majority of auditors (twenty-one of twenty-nine) interviewed
argued that audit tenure did not impair auditor independence. They believed
that staff rotations, a change of clients' directors and limiting of their contact
with the client to a professional relationship only could avoid independence
impairment. However, it must be noted that all those changes are not all
applicable, for example, although audit firms rotated their staff not all audit
firms rotated their partners. Many clients' directors were appointed as
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directors for more than one period and so there will be a potential long
relationship between clients and auditors.

On the contrary, eight auditors stated that a long audit engagement could
impair auditor independence. The longer the audit tenure, the worse was the
potential for independence impairment. This argument is based on the
following reasons. First, a long relationship could generate mutual interests
between auditors and clients. Because they have mutual interests, auditors
would tend to follow the clients' favour in performing audit tasks. Second, as
human beings, after a long relationship, they would hardly have different
arguments. Particularly for the local culture, people would tend not to have
different views (arguments) with those who have maintained a long
relationship. This study therefore concludes that the longer the audit
engagement, the greater the potential for auditor independence impairment.

The next chapter will discuss the auditors' obedience to regulations and
religion as factors that could affect auditor independence.

155

CHAPTER SEVEN
Sanctions, State of Professional Ethics
and Religion: Motivation Sources for Independence
Individual behaviour may be influenced by a variety of factors: environmental,
organizational, physiological, psychological, and background.
(Ferris and Dillard, 1988, p. 282)

7.1. Introduction
The previous three chapters have discussed the findings related to audit
firms, their clients and the relationship between them. This chapter discusses
sources of motivation for independence. This chapter therefore will discuss,
first, the effect of sanctions, as the punishment for those who violate audit
regulations, on auditor independence and second, the effect of the auditor's
religious beliefs (since all the interviewees believe in God and embrace a
religion) on their perception of auditor independence.
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This chapter will discuss and argue that sanctions become an external factor
that could enhance auditor independence. Furthermore, this chapter will also
argue that the professionalism of auditors and the auditors' religious values
are internal sources of independence. Finally, the chapter ends with a
summary and conclusion.

7.2. Sanctions
The presence of audit regulation is to support the practice of the audit
profession. According to Mitnick (1980, p. 20), regulation is defined as "...the

intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity, by an entity not directl
party to or involved in that activity". The purpose of regulation, therefore, is to
detect fraud, misinterpretation and unfair practices. As stated by Turley &
Serer(1991, p. 45) audit regulation is needed by the audit profession in order
to promote and sustain certain desirable characteristics, such as cost
effectiveness, independence, and appropriate education and training. It also
helps the involved parties protect their interests. The source of regulations in
this regard, could be government, accounting professional bodies, and other
relevant institutions (Corporate Law).

This study will investigate the effects of sanctions and punishments given by
an accounting professional body on auditor independence and whether
auditor independence is affected by sanctions or not.
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7.2.1. The Effect of Sanctions
To investigate the effects of sanctions on auditor independence, the twentynine auditors were asked the following question "Can you tell me what is the
effect of sanctions (given by an accounting professional body) on auditor
independence, and what is your opinion regarding the role of the Institute and
your expectations of the Institute to its members? Before asking this question,
they were told that the existence of an Accounting Professional Body is to
educate, protect and regulate its members. Therefore, those who produce a
poor audit or violate audit rules and standards will be sanctioned by the
professional body. All the interviewees agreed that sanctions could enhance
auditor independence with various reasons. The summary of the interviews
on this issue is outlined in Appendix 9.

7.2.1.1. Sanctions Enhancing Auditor Independence
All of the twenty-nine auditors agreed that sanctions or punishments could
maintain or even enhance auditor independence because of the auditors' fear
of sanctions. Their answers however can be grouped into three specific
areas. First, sanctions meant that auditors would become more careful in
accepting clients and performing audit tasks. This was the reason given by
most of the interviewees. Because they would know the consequences of
sanctions, they would therefore practice as independent auditors more
carefully, as stated by Mr. AA, a non big-five audit partner.

I agree that those who produced poor audit quality should be given
sanctions or punishments by the institute or government because this
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would teach auditors to do audit work more carefully and they would
accordingly be more independent. However, as far as I know, the law
enforcement conducted by the government and the audit profession
still needs to be implemented. (Mr. A A )
The second reason given by the auditors was that sanctions could enhance
auditor independence because auditors would be forced to be independent.
Whether they agreed or not, auditors would have to follow audit rules and
standards set up by a professional body. The consequences of violating the
rules could be very heavy. As stated by Mr. X, a big-five audit partner, he
believed that sanctions could force auditors to be independent for otherwise
they would face hardship.

Yes, punishment would lead auditors to maintain their independence or
otherwise they would be in trouble. Here, I see that the role of the
Institute is very significant in that it forces its members to follow the
rules and standards...(Mr. X)
The last reason why sanctions could maintain or even enhance auditor
independence was because sanctions would tend to make auditors avoid
trouble and that's because auditors would fear sanctions. Auditors would not
want to get themselves into trouble because they would understand the risks
involved, from threats such as warnings and license cancellation. The
following statement by Mr. M, a non big-five audit partner, took a more
obvious view.

The Institute has rules that have to be followed by its members. If
there is a m e m b e r w h o violates the rules the Institute can punish its
members, from a warning to membership cancellation. It is dependant
on the seriousness of the mistake. If you ask m e about the effect of
punishment, I think it is obvious that punishment can maintain and
improve auditor independence. (Mr. M )
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These sanctions will only be effective in enhancing auditor independence
when the professional body can force its members to obey the audit rules and
standards. A weak monitoring or weak law enforcement will induce auditors
to break the audit rules and standards.

7.2.2. Law Enforcement and Members' Suggestions for the Professional
Body
Concerning the effects of sanctions (given by a professional body) on auditor
independence, the auditors agreed that sanctions could maintain or even
improve auditor independence. In particular, in relation to the role of the
Indonesian Institute of Accountants, the auditors had various views and
expectations. This section, therefore will discuss these views and the
auditors' expectations about what the Institute should do in order to improve
its role, particularly concerning the question of auditor independence.

Most auditors think that the Institute plays an important role in maintaining
audit quality, especially as it relates to auditor independence. However the
institute's role, according to the auditors, still needs to be improved. The
following suggestions came from the interviews on how to enhance the role of
the Institute for its members.

First, most auditors suggested that the Institute still needed to enforce its laws
on its members, because the auditors believed that by improving law
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enforcement, auditors would be more independent as stated by Mr. F, a non
big five audit partner.

I think punishment or law enforcement can improve auditor
independence. Whatever the reasons, being independent is a must for
auditors. So, I agree with that. But I see that the Indonesian Institute
of accountants' role in this, still needs to be improved. (Mr. F)
Second, the auditors suggested that the Institute be more active in monitoring
its members' activities, because at the present time, the Institute seems to be
inactive. The Institute will only take legal action (investigate its members'
mistakes) when its members are sued by other parties. If there is no
impeachment of its members, there will be no action taken. Therefore, many
auditors want the Institute to monitor its members' activities in a more active
manner, as stated by Mrs. V, a non big-five audit partner.

So far, the Institute doesn't actively monitor a m e m b e r w h o produces a
poor quality audit. However, the Institute will do something if
somebody or an institution reports on its members' misconduct. I
agree if the roles of the Institute could be more activated, auditors
would be more aware of their profession and that it needs to be
independent... (Mrs. V )

Third, the auditors also suggested the Institute apply equal sanctions to its
members. There were some cases where the auditors viewed decisions as
'not fair1 and that the Institute should be fair and equal to all its members as
stated by Mrs. S, a big-five audit director.

... I see that the roles of the institute still need to be improved. They
have to apply rules to all m e m b e r s equally. (Mrs. S)
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7.2.3. Discussion
The twenty-nine auditors had the same view concerning the effects of
sanctions (given by the professional body to those who generated a poor
audit) for auditor independence. All of them agreed that sanctions could
maintain or even enhance auditor independence. Their reasons were that

auditors are fearful of sanctions and therefore auditors would try to follow the
audit rules and standards. This finding is consistent with the study of Shafer,
Mom's and Ketchand (1999) who investigated the effects of formal sanctions
on auditor independence.

Although auditors believed that sanctions could enhance their independence,
it must be realised that some auditors still tried to avoid sanctions when they
broke the rules and standards. Therefore monitoring conducted by public and
professional bodies is necessary to force auditors to be independent through
law enforcement. In this case, the role of the Accounting Professional Body
as a watch-dog will be more important to watch and monitor its members'
activities. Complaints delivered by some interviewees mentioned unequal
treatment by The Accounting Professional Body of auditors' misconduct.
Some auditors think that some audit misconduct was not given an appropriate
sanction by the Professional Body while other cases were treated differently.
This unfair practice must be evaluated to enforce the audit rules and
standards in order to enhance auditor independence.

From the interviews, it could be surmised that not all auditors become
independent because of their professionalism, but some of them, become
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independent because they have no other choice or because they are fearful of
sanctions given out by the professional body.

However, whatever the

reasons, as long as independence is maintained, there will be no problems for
financial statement users.

The important thing that needs to be done by the accounting professional
body is to m a k e itself more active in monitoring its members' activities. That
is a professional standards requirement that its members suggested and
expected.

7.3. Auditors' Religious Values
Religions provide for h u m a n beings a guidance for life. Religion guides
people on h o w to interact as h u m a n beings with G o d (as the Creator), a m o n g
human beings and with other creatures. The Islamic religion, for instance,
has a set of rules for operating business transactions (what kind of
businesses are allowed or prohibited), banking systems (interest free and
profit sharing system), Islamic accounting and the share market.

Most people believe that religious values (regardless of the kind of religion)
affect h u m a n behaviour. A s argued by Preston (1996, p. 24) religion serves
as a most powerful sanction and motivation for people to behave morally. It is
expected therefore, that the more religious a person is the more ethical they
are. Auditors as h u m a n beings are no exception in this regard. Their actions
and decisions in doing their job are affected by the religious values they
possess.
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Therefore, this present study investigated the religious values possessed by
auditors as a factor that could affect auditor independence. This is a n e w
issue to be investigated, because up until n o w there have been no previous
studies that have investigated religious values as a factor affecting auditor
independence.

7.3.1. The Effect of Religious Values
The interviewees w h o all embrace different religions, were interviewed in
order to investigate the effects of religious values on auditor independence.
Twenty-one of the auditors were Muslim, six were Catholic, one w a s an
Adventist and one w a s a Protestant. They were asked the following question
"Do your religious values affect your independence during the performing of
audit tasks?" Before being asked this question, the relationship of faith
(religious values) to daily activities and particularly to the work ethic and spirit
was discussed.

Eight auditors said that religious values had no effect on auditor
independence. O n the other hand, twenty auditors believed that religious
values had a positive effect on auditor independence. O n e auditor said that
religious values had a slightly positive effect. A s u m m a r y of these interviews
is in Appendix 10.
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7.3.1.1. Religious Values: Irrelevant to Independence
Eight auditors believed that religious values had no effect on auditor
independence. In responding to the question, each auditor provided one or
two reasons why religious values had no effect on auditor independence.
Two main reasons emerged from the interviews as to why religious values
had no effect on independence. First, seven auditors said that, there was no
relevancy between religious values and their independence. Secondly, five
auditors believed that auditors could be independent without involving
religious values as long as they followed audit rules and standards.

The following is a statement of Mr. E a partner in a big-five firm, his view
clearly said that religious values had no relevancy on auditor independence.

In my experience, I never incorporate religious matters in my business
life. A s an auditor, I base m y work on rules and standards, so religious
values don't affect m y independence. I believe that religion teaches us
to be a good person in relation to God, not to the audit profession. (Mr.
E)
The following argument, stated by Mr. Y a partner of a non big-five firm, says
that to be independent, he just needed to follow rules and standards not
religious values.

In my experience, I think my religious values have no effect on my
independence. Because in doing audit work, I follow clear rules and
standards. (Mr. Y )
From the eight auditors who believed that religious values had no effect on
independence, four of them were Muslim, three were Catholic and one was
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Protestant. In my opinion, this group of auditors show that they see religious
values as being separate from daily life and so they believe that religious
values are not relevant to auditor independence. Mrs. V, a non big-five audit
partner also stated that religion had a certain place, but not at the work place.

Religion teaches about the relationship between h u m a n s and God.
While auditor independence is ruled by the audit profession. So, in m y
opinion there is no relation between the two. Auditors, w h o are not
independent o w e their responsibility to the profession and not to God.
In other words they are not professional. In m y opinion, religion has a
certain place but not in the work place. (Mrs. V )

7.3.1.2. Religious Values: Enhancing Auditor Independence.
Twenty auditors believed that religious values enhanced auditor
independence. In answering the question, each auditor provided one or two
answers. According to these twenty auditors there were five reasons raised
from interviews, concerning why religious values do have a positive effect on
auditors. First, seven auditors stated that as auditors they are responsible
both to the public and to God. This was stated by Mrs. W, a non big-five
audit partner as follows:
In my experience, religious values have significantly contributed to my
daily life. This includes what I've been doing as an independent
auditor. In other words, religious values positively affect m y work
especially m y independence, because I believe that an auditor has
responsibility to serve the public interest and also to G o d in doing the
right thing. (Mrs. W )
Second, six auditors believed that being independent is a kind of obedience to
God. Third, four auditors believed that religious values could build peoples'
characters. Fourth, three auditors believed that professional and religious
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matters were an essential element of mental attitudes. Two auditors believed
that in doing anything (including audit tasks) they were being supervised by
God.

While another auditor said that religious values had only a slightly positive
effect on auditor independence. Her reason was:

In my experience, religious values have no strong effects on my audit
work, especially m y independence. W h a t makes m e independent is
m y professional values as an independent auditor. However, religious
values have only a small contribution in building m y independence.
(Mrs. U )
From this answer, it can be seen that she put her professional values first as
her 'motivation' to be independent. However, she still recognized, even a
little, the effects of religious values on her 'practice'.

7.3.2. Discussion
Twenty-one of the auditors believed that religious values could enhance
auditor independence. There were only eight auditors who believed that
religious values had no effect on auditor independence. Of those who
believed that religious values could enhance auditor independence, it seems
that these auditors practise religious values in their daily life, including their
attitude to work. They do not separate religious values as their background
from their daily life. It is no wonder when Mr. D conducts a weekly religion
course for their audit staff in order to support and maintain auditor
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independence from a religious aspect. This program, I think, is an alternative
way to improve auditor independence since most Indonesians (including
auditors) believed in God regardless of their religion. As stated by Mr. D, a
weekly lecture on religious issues can assist him and his staff to always
remember that they have to be responsible for any engagement, not only to
the public but also to God. This is consistent with behavioural theory argued
by Ferrish and Dillard (1988, p. 282) that individual behaviour could be
affected by a variety of factors: environmental, organizational, psychological
and background. Particularly, this view is consistent with Preston (1996)
stating that religion becomes a most powerful force to behave morally.

On the other hand, those who believed that religious values had no effect on
auditor independence, in my opinion seem to view religious values as ritual
matters. They did not attach them into their daily life, particularly into their
work ethic.

It is important to note that, the auditors' perceptions about the effects of
religious values on auditor independence were not dependent on the religion
they embrace, but depended on how they viewed religious values. Because
from the eight auditors who believed that religious values had no effect on
auditor independence, four of them were Moslems and the other four
Christian. Therefore, it can be concluded that for those who perceived

religion as a ritual, where they did not practise religious values in daily life (but
they still practiced their religious duties), they believed that religious values
had no effect on auditor independence. In contrast, for those who perceived
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that religious values were to be practised in daily life, along with other ritual
matters, they believed that religious values could enhance

auditor

independence.

7.4. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has investigated and discussed the findings related to the effect
of sanctions and auditors' religious values on auditor independence. Each
auditor agrees to abide by a set of professional ethics on joining the
profession. This study therefore conclude that each auditor has state of
professional ethics, but their strengths are different from one auditor to other,
and it is dependent on an auditor's commitment to the profession.

On the sanctions issue, the study found that sanctions become an external
source for motivation to be independent. All auditors believed that sanctions
could enhance auditor independence. This consensus w a s based on the
following reasons; first, auditors are frightened of sanctions, therefore they
have to follow and apply audit rules and standards; second, auditors are
forced to be independent otherwise formal or informal sanctions would have
to be faced.

From this fact, it can be stated that sanctions are one of the external sources
of motivation to be independent. Whatever the motivation to be independent,
the most important thing is to be independent. The study also found that all
auditors suggested the Indonesian Institute of Accountants should be more
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active in monitoring and controlling its member's practices in order to improve
their professionalism.

On the religious values possessed by auditors issue, the study identified that
all the auditors believed in G o d and embraced religions such as Islam,
Catholic, Advent and Protestantism. Most of them (twenty-one of twenty nine)
believed that their religious values could enhance auditor independence in
performing audit tasks. This argument is based on the following reasons: first,
auditors are responsible to the public and God; second, being independent is
a kind of obedience to God; and third, the auditors' character and mental
attitude are affected by their religious values.

On the other hand, eight auditors argued that religious values did not have
any effect on auditor independence. Their argument w a s based on the
following reasons:first,there w a s no relevancy between religious values and
auditor independence; and second, auditors could be independent without
religious values as long as they followed audit rules and standards.

In respect to religious values, the first group of auditors who believed that
religious values could enhance auditor independence can be categorised as
professional 'religious' auditors, whereas the second group of auditors w h o
believed that religious values have little, if any, effect on auditor independence
can be classified as professional auditors. Their different views c o m e from
their understanding and perceptions of religion, no matter what religion they
embrace. Auditors w h o practise religious values in their daily life and thus
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applied these values to their audit work would fall into the first group of
auditors and auditors who separated their daily life from religious values and
practised them only at the mosque or the church would fall into second group
of auditors. However, in terms of independence both groups can be
independent with only the motivation to be independent being different.

For the first group of auditors, the internal sources of independence are their
professionalism (state of professional ethics) and their religious values. As
auditors, they are committed to comply with audit standards and professional
ethics. In addition, their behaviour is also guided by their religious values to
do the right things and more away from wrong doing. For this group of
auditors, impairing independence is a violation not only from a professional
point of view but also from a religious standpoint.

For the second group of auditors the internal source for independence is only
their professionalism, and the state of professional ethics that comes from
complying with the audit standards. From this point of view, the study
concludes that internal sources of independence are the auditors' state of
professional ethics and the auditors' religious values. While sanctions are
one of the external sources for being independent, the better the law is
enforced the more independent auditors would be.

The next chapter will discuss the findings on the meanings of independence,
major threats to independence, major factors enhancing independence,
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possibilities whether or not auditors become totally independent and their
efforts to maintain independence.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

Independence:
Meanings, Threats, Motivations,
Possibilities and Efforts

As an attitude of mind, independence is a psychological state. That state remains
undefined. Indeed, accountants have ...[stated]... overtly that it is undefinable.
(Wolnizer1987,p. 124)

8.1. Introduction
The previous four chapters have discussed factors that could affect auditor
independence. In this chapter, the meanings of independence perceived by
auditors will be discussed.

This is to evaluate h o w well the auditors

interviewed understood the meaning of independence compared to the
Professional Body's definition.

This Chapter will also discuss major factors that could impair auditor
independence. The purpose istorecognise these threats and therefore look
at ways to minimise them. The major factors that could enhance auditor
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independence are also discussed in this Chapter with a view to maximising
them. The question of whether auditors can be totally independent or not is
also discussed in this chapter, and finally the auditors' efforts in maintaining
their independence will be discussed. The chapter ends with a summary and
conclusion.

8.2. Meanings of Independence
The most distinctive feature of a professional body is its ability to regulate its
members. The Indonesian Institute of Accountants as a professional body
aims to regulate its members by setting up standards and professional ethics.
The performance of its members in practising their profession therefore has to
comply with what the Institute has regulated.

The central purpose of this section is to seek to understand the meanings of
independence as perceived by the auditors that were interviewed. Despite,
the definition of independence stated by the Indonesian Institute of
Accountants, this study intends to observe, first, the auditors' perceptions of
the meanings of independence as they practise and second, to observe how
close the auditors' perceptions of independence (as they practise) compare to
the definition or meanings of independence as stated by the Indonesian
Institute of Accountants.

This section therefore consists of the following parts. First, it contains the
definition and guidelines of independence set by the Indonesian Institute of
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Accountants. Second, it provides the findings from the interviews, as to how
the auditors defined independence, and how they perceived independence.
The last section is a discussion of the auditors' perceptions compared to the
'theory' set by the Institute.

8.2.1. The Institute's Definition
The Indonesian Institute of Accountants has defined auditor independence as
a mental attitude in which "an auditor must not easily be interfered with by
other parties because the auditor must serve all parties" (IAI, 1996, p.220.1).
On the other hand, the Indonesian Institute of Accountants' Professional Code
of Ethics provides guidelines on how to be independent. The following
paragraphs are quoted from the Indonesian Institute of Accountants' Code of
Professional Ethics (translated from the Indonesian Language) to provide an
idea as to how the Institute perceives independence and its rules for its
members.

Subchapter 12
A public accountant must be independent.
Sub chapter 13
1. A public accountant in performing audit tasks must be free of any
interests which can lead into independence and objectivity
impairment, therefore he is able to state his opinion without being
committed to any interests.
2. If a public accountant is not independent from any interest as stated
on verse (1) of this sub chapter, he must refuse or give up such an
engagement.
3. A public accountant must refuse or give up an engagement as
stated on verse (1) of this sub chapter, if he is in the situation,
where other people will suspect his independence and objectivity.
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Sub chapter 14
A public accountant, who performs audit tasks on behalf of clients,
must be independent by explaining that he is on duty on behalf of
clients with certain limitations, authorities and responsibilities.

The above definition and guidelines are set by the Institute for its members
with the expectation that its members would be able to transfer independence
to their practices. However, in reality auditors might have different
perceptions of independence from that definition and code of professional
ethics, as stated by Amernic and Aranya (1981) that different people will have
different definitions of independence. This study aims to investigate what
auditors understand about auditor independence. Do they for instance have a
proper understanding of auditor independence as envisioned by the
professional body? It is important to observe how good auditors understand
the idea of auditor independence compared to the 'theory' that must be
followed by them. The following section therefore will discuss auditors'
perceptions of independence raised from the interviews.

8.2.2. Auditors' Understanding
In order to observe auditors' perceptions of independence, the twenty-nine
auditors were asked the following question "Can you tell me what you
understand about auditor independence?" Before asking the question, the
meaning of auditor independence as stated by the Indonesian Institute of
Accountants was not discussed. Rather they were asked to reply from their
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own understanding, to say and determine what auditors really understand
about their profession.

From the twenty-nine auditors interviewed there were fourteen views
(meanings) of independence put forward, where each auditor provided one or
more views. However, after having categorized those meanings they can now
be classified into five main categories. The interview summary on this issue is
in Appendix 11.

First, ten auditors thought that auditors could be stated as being independent
where they had a mental attitude of being neutral and serving the public
interest. They argued that as auditors they had to put the public interest as
the number one consideration. They did not defend their clients' interests, but
the public's. This was as stated by Mr. M, a non big five audit partner when
he said...

...In my opinion and understanding, independence means that in doing
audit works w e should stand in the middle not to tend to defend certain
parties' interests, but rather to serve public interests. The important
thing in here is w e should maintain our integrity as an independent
auditor. (Mr. M )

Second, nine auditors believed that independent auditors must not be
interfered with by other parties (clients' managements, companies' owners,
bankers etc). This group of auditors believed that auditors must stand
independently, based on audit rules and standards. Auditors must be
resistant to any pressures. In other words, once auditors submit to or tend to
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submit to pressures by others they can no longer be regarded as being
independent. Mr. X, a big five audit partner put forward this view of
independence.

In my opinion independence is a situation that we as auditors can
freely express our findings and opinion, and independence also can be
stated w h e n there is no intervention from other parties to auditors. (Mr.
X)

Third, eight auditors stated that auditors can be regarded as independent
when they are free from any interests. Auditors must not have a vested
interest or financial interests, as stated by Mr. D, a non big-five audit partner.

In my opinion independence is similar to pillars which protect auditors
from wrong doings. Auditors must be free in stating their opinion, and
the auditor must be free from any interests. (Mr. D)

Fourth, seven auditors viewed independence as an objective action. This
means that auditors have to see clients' financial statements as they are. If
the auditors find something that needs to be corrected or adjusted in the
financial statements then the auditors have to inform the clients, otherwise the
auditors will report on the financial statements as they are. This view was put
forward by Mr. L and Mrs. U, a big-five audit partner and manager
respectively.
Well, as an auditor our duty is to do the attest function. It means that
w e have to see everything as it is... (Mr. L)
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In m y opinion independence m e a n s that an auditor presents audited
financial statements as they are, without taking any advantages.
Independence m e a n s also that auditors can be fair to all parties (Mrs
U)
The last view, stated by seven auditors, indicates that auditors can be
regarded as independent if the auditors follow audit rules and standards in
performing the audit tasks, as Mr. H, a big five audit manager, said...

In my opinion an auditor can be said to be independent if he does audit
works and meet audit rules and standards. (Mr. H)

In short, from all auditors' responses, their answers can be condensed into
five meanings. These five views on the meanings of independence are that
auditors must serve the public interest, must not be interfered with by others,
must be free of any interest, must be objective and must follow audit rules and
standards.

8.2.3. Discussion
The twenty-nine auditors were asked the same question concerning the
meaning of independence. All responses had various meanings, there were
no answers that were exactly the same. Interestingly, no one auditor referred
to the Institute's definition and guidelines of professional ethics in a direct
way. Even though, the essence of their answers is similar to what the
Institute defines and rules.

179
The auditors' responses were merely based on their understanding, and their
answers are practical, therefore their answers better represent what and how
they practice independence rather than what the Institute 'says'.

The differences among the auditors' answers reflect that they have a range of
understandings of independence. Based on the investigation of the auditors'
understanding of independence, it seems that auditors have a proper
understanding of the role of their profession. All these views are similar in
spirit to the independence guidelines of the Indonesian Institute of
Accountants. The thing needed by auditors in their practice is an
implementation of their understandings of auditor independence, then there
will be a harmonization between understanding of concept and practice.

8.3. Revealed Major Factors Impairing Auditor Independence
Besides investigating the factors affecting auditor independence, this study
also aimed to investigate the major factors that could impair auditor
independence. To investigate these major factors, the twenty-nine auditors
were interviewed about this. The auditors were asked the following question
"Can you tell me what major factors could impair auditor independence?"
Before being asked this question, they were told that all of the questions they
had previously been asked related to factors that could impair auditor
independence and they were asked to pick one or two major factors. The
interview summary can be seen in Appendix 12.
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Twenty-seven auditors replied with one or two major factors, and two auditors
said that there was no major factor impairing auditor independence. Twentyseven auditors generated thirteen distinctive answers. However, from these
answers only three major factors could be discovered that could impair auditor
independence because the remaining answers were mentioned by only one
or two auditors. These three major factors were, first, a close (improper)
relationship with clients, second, major clients, and the third was the
weakness of the auditor's integrity.

It was mentioned by eight auditors, that a close (improper) relationship with
clients was perceived as the most dangerous factor that could threaten
auditor independence. Of these eight auditors six of them were non big-five
audit partners and only two were members of the big five. From this it follows,
in my opinion, that auditors from small audit firms face stronger pressure from
clients than auditors from big firms. The following statement by Mr. B, a non
big-five audit partner, indicates that they face a difficult situation when they
have a close relationship with their clients.

I think the major factors that can impair auditor independence are first,
a close relationship with clients or management. With old clients
normally w e have good relations and it m a k e s it hard to be
independent... (Mr. B)
A close (improper) relationship with clients is normally generated from a long
audit engagement. Therefore besides the fact that auditors have to maintain
a professional relationship with their clients, a limitation of the audit period
must be considered in an effort to minimise this risk.
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Major clients were perceived to be the second major factor that could impair
auditor independence as stated by six auditors. Of these six auditors, three of
them were members of the big five, and another three were members of non
big-five audit firms. They said that auditors will tend to retain their major
clients because these clients generate a significant amount of fees,
consequently the auditors would be reluctant to have a different opinion from
or an argument with the clients because of the fear of losing these clients.
The following statement by a big-five audit manager asserts that auditors will
tend to retain their large clients.
I think major clients who generate significant fees could affect auditor
independence, because auditors will try to retain such clients to run
their business (Mr. G ) .
It is very natural, especially for a small audit firm, that they have major clients
who contribute significant fees to the firm. An effort can be made to obtain
fees from a greater number of clients, so they are not dependent on a few
major clients. Other efforts also can be made to improve their state of
professionalism as independent auditors.

Weak integrity is the third major factor in impairing auditor independence, as
mentioned by five auditors. This is because auditors who have weak integrity
will be easily interfered with or affected by other parties' interests. The
following statement by Mr. H, a big-five audit manager makes it clear that
auditor integrity is vital.
The major threat in impairing auditor independence comes from
auditors' integrity and personality. Those w h o have a w e a k personality
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and integrity will be easily affected by any other force and temptation.
Their attitude can change because they have w e a k integrity (Mr. H).
The weakness of auditor integrity is the most difficult to solve because it
comes from auditors themselves. It depends on auditors' motivation whether
they will be independent or not. Therefore rules and standards must be
enforced to minimise any misconduct.

Only one or two auditors mentioned the following factors. Factors such as
lack of knowledge, fee dependence, superiority of partner, conflict of interest,
audit firm size, lack of confidence, non audit-services, competition,
intervention from clients' bankers, and early stages of audit firm
establishment.

The last two factors are interesting. Intervention by the clients' bankers with
the auditor is a common practice (according to Mr. M) in small audit firms.
They (auditors, clients and bankers) are like a triangle, they need one
another. The auditor needs clients, clients need a 'good' audited financial
statement to obtain credit from the banks, and bankers ask auditors to
'approve' clients' financial statements as 'good' audited financial statements.
Even though this was only mentioned by one auditor, in my opinion auditors
(especially small audit firms) need to be aware of this threat.

The early stages of an audit firm's existence, according to two auditors, is the
hardest phase in running an audit firm. Because, at the beginning of the audit
firm's business, they have few clients and they have to look for clients. If they
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conduct an audit task very 'severely', they will hardly attract clients. This
stage, according to two auditors, is the hardest stage in maintaining auditor
independence. It is important to note that those w h o would establish an audit
firm, must be aware of this situation.

8.4. Revealed Major Factors Enhancing Auditor Independence
This study also aimed to investigate the major factors that could enhance
auditor independence. T h e interviewees were asked the following question,
"Can you tell m e what the major factors are that could enhance auditor
independence?" Before asking this question, the auditors were asked to pick
from a list of factors.

In responding to the question, each auditor provided one or two answers as
major factors that could enhance auditor independence. From the interviews,
the auditors provided seven different answers. However, there were four
major answers that were mentioned by at least three auditors. A summary of
the interviews can be seen in Appendix 13.

First, thirteen auditors stated that auditor integrity, or professionalism as an
auditor, can be the most important factor in maintaining and enhancing auditor
independence. T o those auditors, auditor integrity is everything, wherever
they work, whoever their clients are, whatever the characteristics of their
relationship and if auditors have strong integrity then auditor independence
will not be impaired.

The following statement by Mr. R, m a k e s it more
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obvious

how

important

auditor

integrity

is in

maintaining

auditor

independence.
To me building character to be independent is very important. It must
be started from the early stages from the university for example
students have to try to be independent. Therefore, if this attitude is
possessed by auditors, they will be always independent no matter
where they work, in big five audit firms or in small audit firms. N o
matter whether they audit big clients or small clients, once again
independence is an individual matter that has to be owned by auditors.
(Mr. R )
Second, for at least ten auditors, sanctions can become a major factor in
maintaining and enhancing auditor independence. This is understandable
because auditors must face sanctions imposed by the professional body when
they violate audit rules and standards. This is viewed by those auditors as
quite an effective way to maintain and improve auditor independence,
because they are afraid of the consequences, especially in relation to their
future business. This was explained by Mr. N a supervisor with a big-five
firm:
In my experience, sanctions and punishments can make me more
independent. Because, once w e violate the rules and standards, w e
will be punished and we'll finish (Mr. N).
Third, religious values were surprisingly mentioned by five auditors as a major
factor in maintaining and improving auditor independence. Four of them were
Moslems and one was a Christian. In my opinion, those five auditors have a
religious spirit in the performance of their daily tasks, including audit tasks.

Therefore, their religious spirit could affect their work attitude particularly their
independence.
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Fourth, the level of auditors' education, was mentioned by three auditors as a
major factor that could maintain and enhance auditor independence.
According to these three auditors, the higher the level of education of auditors
(including knowledge, training and skills) the more independent they are.

The following factors were only mentioned by one to two auditors; audit firm
internal policy, building independence from an early stage, and mission and
vision of auditors.

From those major factors mentioned that could enhance auditor
independence, it seems that the auditors themselves are a key point in
maintaining and enhancing auditor independence, except for external factors
such as audit firm policy and sanctions.

It is normal in a profession such as the auditing profession, that the state of
professionalism becomes a major factor in motivating auditor independence.
Because a real professional is someone whose actions are based on
professional values, this is not an exception for Indonesian auditors. As in
other professions or organizations it is not surprising when sanctions enforced
by the profession can become a major factor to motivate auditor
independence. Whereas religious values as a motivation to be independent is
a reflection of those auditors who conduct audit work by following audit rules
and standards and follow the values of their religion.
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8.5. Auditors: Total or Partial Independence?
Although the factors that could affect auditor independence have been
discussed, this study aims to investigate whether auditors can be totally
independent or not and to know how badly these factors affect auditor
independence. The twenty-nine auditors were asked the following question,
"In performing audit tasks can you become totally independent?" Before
being asked this question, they were told that some factors could affect
auditor independence, and they were asked whether they could be resistant
to or affected by those threats. A summary of the interviews is in Appendix
14.

From the interviews, their answers can be categorized into two. First, the
answers of fifteen auditors can be classified as 'try to be independent as
much as they can'. Second, fourteen auditors answered directly that they
could be totally independent. For those who answered that they tried to be
independent, some of them felt that it was hard to answer this question. The
following answers of this group of auditors are cited as follows:

As a human being, it's hard to answer that question. What I do is try to
be independent as much as I can, by following the rules and standards
(Mr. D).
I am a human being, it is hard to say that I can be totally independent,
because to be honest s o m e times there is a feeling to 'help' clients as
long as it is within the rules and standards (Mr. Y).
It seems that auditors, however, try to be independent as much as they can,
because they are aware of their profession. However, in my opinion, this
group of auditors, faced some threats (as stated in the previous questions in
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the interviews) caused by possibly weak integrity, conflicts of interest, or other
related things.

On the other hand, fourteen auditors directly answered that they could
become totally independent. Their reason was that because their profession
requires them to be independent there is no reason not to be independent.
What they do is perform audit tasks as set by the audit rules and standards,
as stated by the following auditors.
I can be totally independent because my profession is as an
independent auditor, I have enough salary, I work independently, there
are no reasons not to be independent (Mr. G ) .
As an auditor I have to be independent as set by the audit standards
and the code of ethics. I never compromise m y independence with
clients, what I do is I do m y best try to audit and stick as m u c h as
possible to the rules. I never violate the rules and standards (Mr. Q ) .
Interestingly most of this group of auditors (eleven of fourteen) were members
of the big five audit firms. On the other hand, another three auditors from this
group were all female auditors of non-big five audit firms. This is because big
five auditors may have strong integrity and are supported by the confidence of
their firms. While for three female non big five auditors, it seems that they
may have strong integrity and are supported by their conditions of work such
as establishing audit firms not merely for seeking money, but also to
accommodate theory into practice. Consequently, they have less conflict of
interests during the performance of audit tasks.

While the first group of auditors who stated that they tried to be independent,
ten of the fifteen are members of non-big five audit firms. This phenomenon
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is interesting, because there is a tendency that non-big five auditors tend to
answer, "try to be independent", and conversely big five auditors tend to
answer, "can be totally independent".

This is because of the two reasons relating to auditor integrity and their
individual condition. Both big five and non-big five auditors may have the
same strong integrity, but their integrity is influenced by their individual
condition (individual firms, or auditors). For non-big five auditors,
unfortunately the threats they face in maintaining independence are 'stronger"
than the big five auditors'. Therefore they tend to answer, "try to be
independent" as much as they can. But, there is an exception with the three
female non-big five auditors, because they experience 'different conditions'.

8.6. Maintaining Independence: Some Practical Efforts by Auditors
This study aimed to investigate the key success factors practised by auditors
in maintaining auditor independence. It is important that this be researched
because auditors could have a different experience from each other.

To investigate the auditors' key success factors in maintaining auditor
independence, the twenty-nine auditors were interviewed by asking them the
question, "Can you tell me your key factors in maintaining auditor
independence from any impairment?" A summary of interviews can be seen
in Appendix 15.
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From the interviews each auditor provided one to two keys factors in
responding to the question. Following the audit rules and standards, as
stated by thirteen auditors has become the most frequent answer in
maintaining auditor independence. According to this group of auditors, in
performing audit tasks auditors will only be independent if they follow the audit
rules and standards. This was stated by the following auditor.

To maintain my independence, I always try to be a good independent
auditor. G o o d auditor m e a n s that the auditor must follow the audit
rules and standards. H e must have a strong personality and integrity
w h e n facing any situation and conditions, so the rules and standards
can be done properly (Mr. H).
Then, the second most popular formula to maintain auditor independence is
by strengthening auditor integrity. This was indicated by ten auditors. By
doing this, according to this group of auditors, auditors will be always
independent in all situations and conditions, as asserted by the following
auditor.
In my experience, I think the integrity of the auditor has a very
important role in maintaining and enhancing auditor independence (Mr.
B)...
Surprisingly, six auditors believed that religious values not only had a positive
impact in performing audit tasks, but religious values played a significant role
in maintaining auditor independence. The following statement of an auditor
makes it more obvious that the religious approach for some auditors has a
place in maintaining auditor independence.
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In maintaining m y independence, I do use a religious approach. I
maintain and improve m y faith not to fall d o w n because it will affect our
mental attitude and professional skills. In m y opinion, it is very
important because without faith, auditors will be easily affected by bad
impacts (Mr. P).
The next key success factors for maintaining auditor independence, as
mentioned by two auditors, are the selection of clients. According to these
auditors, it would be better to refuse (potential) clients who have bad
intentions, such as violating rules and standards. Accepting such clients
would put auditors at risk and consequently it would be hard to be
independent.

Two auditors proposed another formula for independence. They believed that
by managing a proper relationship with their clients they would be able to be
independent. The next three key success factors to maintain auditor
independence were mentioned by one auditor each. These were the auditors'
ability including skill and knowledge, job satisfaction as auditors including
salary and their vision and mission to be auditors.

The key success factors practised by auditors to maintain auditor
independence that were raised from the interviews therefore were; first,
following audit rules and standards; second, strengthening auditor integrity;
third, applying religious values; fourth, selecting clients; fifth, maintaining a
proper relationship with clients; sixth, improving auditor ability; seventh,
auditor job satisfaction; and last the vision and mission of auditors.
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From these key success factors, it seems that the most important thing in
maintaining auditor independence are the auditors themselves, and not
external factors such as the audit firm size. Another thing that needs to noted
is the role of the religious values of auditors in maintaining independence.
Previous studies did not take religious values into account as a determinant of
auditor independence. This study, therefore could argue that the religious
values possessed by auditors could be one source that helps maintain auditor
independence, because six auditors acknowledged this.

8.7. Summary and Conclusion
The chapter has investigated and discussed the findings concerning the
meanings of independence as perceived by the auditors. The chapter also
discussed the findings about the major factors that could impair and enhance
auditor independence. The chapter also discussed the auditors' perception
as to whether they can be totally or partially independent, and the auditors'
efforts in maintaining their independence.

The study found that the auditors have a similar understanding and perception
of independence as written in the Institute's definition of independence. This
means that the auditors have a proper understanding, and they seem to be
familiar with this issue as professional auditors. In this study, the auditors
stated that being independent they must serve the public interest, not be

interfered with by others, be free of any interests, be objective and follow audit
rules and standards. Even though auditors understand very well about
independence, it is important to monitor their activities and practices. The
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Professional body and public must watch them in order to ensure they
maintain their independence as they stated.

This study also investigated major factors that could impair auditor
independence as perceived by auditors. The study found that most auditors
(twenty-seven of twenty-nine) acknowledged that their independence was
potentially impaired by the following major factors: first, improper relations
between auditors and clients caused by long association; second, fee
dependence on major clients; third, the weakness of the auditor's personal
qualities. On the other hand, two auditors argued that there was no major
factor in impairing auditor independence.

A long association between auditors and clients was acknowledged to be a
major factor that potentially could impair auditor independence. To reduce
this threat therefore, a limitation of audit engagement should be considered by
the professional body (or government agent) through rotation of audit firms
and audit partners. Not only for the banking industry, but also for all clients,
particularly listed clients. Dependence on certain clients should be avoided
through distributing potential income by seeking other potential clients. The
weakness of an auditor's personality could be overcome through continuous
educational/training and forced through law enforcement by the professional
body.

On the issue of major factors that could enhance auditor independence, the
auditors believed that the following were important: first, the auditor's personal
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quality (integrity, objectivity and strength of character); second, sanctions; and
third, religious values. It is obvious that the major factors are heavily
dependant on the internal factors of auditors (auditor quality and religious
values) and the law enforcement conducted by the professional body.

On the issue of whether auditors are able to be totally or partially
independent, the study found that fifteen auditors believed that being totally
independent is impossible, however they preferred to say that they should "try
to be as independent as much as they could". This answer is based on the
reality that auditors are professional persons but they are also human beings
who can be affected by internal and external factors. However, they try to be
independent as much as they can.

On the contrary, fourteen auditors directly stated that they could be totally
independent. They argued that being totally independent was a must for
auditors; they just follow the audit rules and standards in doing audit work. It
is obvious that there was no agreement on this issue as to whether they could
be totally or partially independent. One lesson that can be taken from the
auditors' statements is that being independent is possible but they must be
careful and resistant to potential factors that could impair their independence
and that their independence is a continuum and not dichotomous. This range
extends from less independent to more independent, as it depends on how
well the auditors can resist negative external factors.
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This study also investigated auditors' experiences in maintaining auditor
independence. The study identified the following processes conducted by the
auditors. Following audit rules and standards was the most common answer
for auditors, followed by strengthening auditor' quality and significantly
applying religious values to the audit work was the third ranked answer, and
the last formula was to be selective in seeking and accepting clients. From
this chapter, it can be seen that auditors' religious values have an important
place in maintaining auditor independence.

The next chapter is a discussion of the research findings and a conclusion of
the study.
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Chapter Nine

Summary and Conclusion

9.1. Introduction
The primary purpose of this study w a s to investigate factors that could affect
auditor independence. This study w a s based on the auditor behavioural
model of Goldman and Barlev (1974) which explained that an auditor and
client have a balance of power. This study w a s also inspired by the 'material
circumstances' affecting auditor independence proposed by Flint (1988). Flint
recognised

five

material

circumstances

that

could

affect

auditor

independence.

Based on the review of the previous empirical research and the models
above, this study investigated nine propositions, with the extension of
religious values, that effect auditor independence. These propositions were
not truths to be proven, rather they were used as a working guide (Thomas,
1993, p. 35 in Creswell, 1994). The inclusion of religious values into the
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research guide is based on two reasons: first, individual behaviour as argued
by Ferris and Dillard (1988) is affected by environmental, organisational,
physiological, psychological and background; and second, religion serves as
a most powerful sanction and motivation for people to behave morally
(Preston, 1996). Therefore the ten propositions were the main guides for this
research. In addition, the auditors were also asked to identify the meaning of
independence, as well as the major threats and motivations to be
independent. The probability of auditors being totally or partially independent
was also identified. Finally the auditors were asked to explain their efforts in
maintaining auditor independence.

The central theme of this chapter is to summarise and conclude research
methods used in this study, its findings as well as to discuss the implications
of the study, the limitations of the study and to make suggestions for future
research.

9.2. Research Methods
This was a perceptual study of auditor independence by applying an
ethnographic, qualitative approach. This study tried to investigate the
auditors' perceptions of their independence, therefore semi-structured
interviews with twenty-nine Indonesian auditors were conducted to collect
data. The use of semi-structured interviews followed a suggestion by
Fetterman (1998, p. 481) because a "...semi-structured interview is the most
valuable when the fieldworker comprehends the fundamental of a community
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from the insider's perspective. At this point, questions are more likely to
conform to the native's perception of reality than the researcher's". The
following section discusses how the researcher related to the interviewees,
the validity of the study and data analysis.

9.2.1. Relation Between the Researcher and the Interviewees
Since the 'objective' of the research was to understand auditors' perceptions,
interviews were selected as the way of collecting data from the twenty-nine
auditors. The research used an ethnographic approach where cultural values
are inherent in the study. Some researchers go to research sites as
strangers/foreigners and some are a part of the culture they wish to
investigate. This research was the latter type of research site selection. This
section will outline my experiences as an Indonesian accountant during the
interviews with the auditors.

As a member of the interviewees' culture, I had a number of advantages, such
as understanding the language, concepts, categories, rules, belief, and so
forth during data collection and analysis (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 13). The
interviewees were friendly, since they regarded the interviewer as a
colleague. They welcomed me warmly and were willing to be interviewed. In
interviewing the auditors, I took a position as an active learner rather than as
an expert, as suggested by Creswell (1994, p. 17). As an Indonesian, I had no
language barrier as outsiders would normally have to face, I was able to
understand the interviewees' tones, expressions, intonations and meanings
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during interviews. With these advantages, the interviewees enthusiastically
answered all questions frankly. They did not feel as if they were being
investigated but felt as if they were helping me to understand. With a the
familiarity of language and culture, I was also able to know and understand
whether their answers were true or 'lip service'.

9.2.2. Validity of the Study
The main findings of this study concern ten potential factors that could affect
auditor independence, the auditors' understanding of their independence,
major factors that could potentially impair and enhance their independence
and the possibility of being totally or partially independent. The findings were
based on the auditors' perceptions. Since the objective of this study was to
investigate auditors' perceptions, this study used an interactive, confirmation
interview as a way of gathering ethnographic data, as suggested by Le
Compte and Goetz (1984, p.45). There were twenty nine auditorinterviewees in this study. They were partners of non big five audit firms and
partners, directors, managers and supervisors of big five audit firms. They
had from five to forty-five years experience in the profession. They were both
male and female auditors and they had various cultural and religious
backgrounds (see Appendix A).

The profiles of the interviewees, as suggested by Le Compte and Goetz
(1984, p. 46) were expected to be 'right sources' to meet the
'representativeness' of -sexes, experiences, cultures, religions and level of
positions- of the object being studied to provide valid data. Through the 'right
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sources' of data, this study therefore was expected to represent an accurate
evaluation of the auditors' perceptions to be regarded as valid or true
(Hammersley, 1992, p. 69).

As suggested by Goetz and Le Compte (1984, p. 22) in order to maintain the

validity of the study, I (the researcher) tried to explain the research question
as clearly as possible during the interviews. Moreover, this study claims to be
valid for three reasons: first, the researcher is closer to the 'object' being
studied; and second, the researcher was able to monitor the research activity
through continual questions and reevaluation (Goetz and Le Compte, 1984, p.
221); and third, the data given by the interviewees was checked and
compared with that of the other interviewees (Dobbert, 1982, p. 265).
However, it must be remembered as Dobbert (1982) states that in a social
situation there is always more than one valid view, as for example a person
who may have many ways to explain an elephant each according to the angle
from which it is viewed.

9.2.3. Data Analysis
An ethnographic qualitative approach has been used in this study in order to
analyse and interpret data collected. In analysing data, this study applied the
combination of analytic procedures developed by Wolcott (1994b) and Miles
and Huberman (1984). The interview data are summarised and pattern coded
as proposed by Miles and Huberman (1984) and then analysed through
description, analysis and interpretation as suggested by Wolcott (1994). The

200
use of pattern coding allows the researcher to classify answers and compare
responses. Whereas the analysis introduced by Wolcott allows the
researcher not only to analyse what auditors say but also interpret beyond
what they say.

There were four stages in the data analysis: first, summarising the interviews
data (Miles And Huberman, 1984); second, pattern coding to classify the
category (Miles and Huberman, 1984); third, making a description of data
summarised and pattern coded (Wolcott, 1994); and fourth, analysing and
interpreting the data (Wolcott, 1994). Because the researcher was so
involved with the research process it was impossible to be objective.

9.3. Summary of Findings
This section summarises and concludes the findings of the study, which
include potential external and internal factors that could affect auditor
independence. All factors investigated in this study are summarised in Figure
4. The summary of findings are organised as follows: first, the eleven factors
investigated in the study will be classified into four subsections; second, the
major factors that could impair and enhance auditor independence; third, the
meaning of independence, the possibility to be totally independent, and the
auditors' effort in maintaining their independence.
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Figure 4
Potential Factors that Could Affect Auditor Independence

External Factors:
Audit Firms' Characteristics:
• Audit Firm Size
• Services Offered
Clients' Characteristics:
• Backgrounds/Reputations
• Corporate Audit Committee
• Audit Fee Contributed by Clients
Relationship Between Audit Firms and Clients: " ~^_ Auditor Independence
• Competition a m o n g Audit Firms
• Clients' Director Roles
• Audit Tenure
Law Enforcement
• Sanctions
Internal Factors:
Auditors' Personal Quality:
• State of Professional Ethics
• Religion

9.3.1. Audit Firms' Characteristics
The study classified an audit firm's characteristics into audit firm size and
services rendered to clients. The study found no agreement among auditors
on the audit firm size as a factor that could affect auditor independence.
Seventeen of twenty-nine auditors did not agree with the proposition saying
that the bigger the audit firms, the more independent their auditors. Their
arguments were that auditor independence depends on the auditor's integrity,
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personality and strength of character. Therefore, some of these auditors
suggested viewing auditor independence not from the size of audit firm but
more specifically from the auditor's personal qualities.

Auditors who have a high integrity will not compromise their independence
just to get or retain their clients. Those who believe that independence is a
personal matter they be confident to be independent even though they are
non- big five auditors, this is considered practicable by everyone as long as
they have a high integrity as an independent auditor. But it must be
remembered that the public still have a view that the bigger the audit firm is
the more independent they are.

The phenomenon that some big five auditors also compromised their
independence by accepting an audit appointment with very low fees can be
an argument for those who not agree with the proposition that the bigger the
audit firm the more independent they will be, because in practice, both small
and big five auditors potentially compromise their independence. This
phenomena can be a justification for non-big five auditors to "also
compromise" their independence. In this situation therefore audit firm size
cannot guarantee to enhance or impair auditor independence.

The last reason for not agreeing with the proposition is that auditors must not
be judged generally. This group of auditors prefer not to generalize about
auditors. In my opinion, this is a valid observation because I have observed
that some auditors easily accept any audit engagement and quickly issue their
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opinion. In this case I believe that proper audit procedures were not
conducted. On the other hand, other auditors perform audit work properly.
Therefore, we cannot generalize about those auditors.

Twelve auditors supported the proposition with the following two arguments.
First, the bigger the audit firm, the less their dependency on clients. Second,
the bigger the audit firm, the more 'instruments' they have for maintaining
independence such as appropriate divisions, more experts, more advanced
technology and international links. These twelve auditors were consistent
with the previous Indonesian study conducted by Supriyono (1988). Even
though this study did not find consensus on this issue, both groups
acknowledged that all auditors can be independent wherever they work, at big
five audit firms or small audit firms as long as they have proper auditor
qualities as argued by Flint (1988). However, if there are two auditors with
same 'quality, where one works at a big-five firm and the other one works at a
small audit firm, it can be argued that the first auditor can be more
independent than the second, because the characteristics of the big audit firm
are better than those of a small audit firm in maintaining independence. But
once again, auditors from a small audit firm can be independent as long as
they have proper personal characteristics.

On the non-audit services issue, this study found that a majority of auditors
(twenty of twenty-nine) did not agree with the proposition saying that providing
non-audit services by audit firms to audit clients could impair auditor
independence. Their arguments were: first, big five audit firms have different
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divisions for different services, and non-big-five audit firms send different staff
to provide different services; and second, they offer non-audit services which
have no impact on the clients' decision making processes.

According to these auditors, having different divisions and sending different
staff for different services, means that they will be independent since they can
separate their authority and responsibility and there will be no conflict of
interest. Limiting their services so as not to affect the clients' decision making
process will make auditors independent from any interests.

However, in my opinion, all their arguments above are related to a
combination of their work environments (division/work separation/ limiting
rules, selecting clients) and personality (integrity and following
rules/standards). Their arguments of course can be true. However, they
must be aware that the public view is that such arrangements can prejudice
them to compromise audit opinion because they earn both audit and non-audit
fees from a certain client.

On the other hand, four auditors believed that the provision of non-audit
services by audit firms to audit clients could impair auditor independence.
These four auditors support the study by Supriyono (1988). Their reason was
simply because this issue could generate a conflict of interest for auditors.
Even though only four auditors could recognise their limitations, arguments
about conflict of interests that can impair their independence have showed
their honesty about their inability to handle both audit and non-audit services.
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In my opinion separating jobs with different staff and audit partners will have
significant positive effect in maintaining auditor independence. This program,
at least, can minimise any conflict of interest that can possibly be raised
during audit work, but there is no guaranty that the public will immediately
trust them.

Meanwhile, the study found that five auditors from non-big five audit firms did
not offer non-audit services to their audit clients. This is interesting, since
there is no prohibition on offering non-audit services to audit clients. Their
decision not to offer non-audit services was to avoid a conflict of interest.

Even though there is no prohibition on offering non-audit services to audit
clients, this study suggests that for those who have no non-audit services
divisions they should not offer non-audit services to their audit clients unless
they have different staff and a different partner in charge for audit and nonaudit services to minimise a conflict of interest. In my opinion, the way taken
by these auditors is a very safe way, not to endanger themselves and the
public interest. This decision has come from their awareness, because they
know that they are small audit firms and have limited partners and staff. If is a
very wise choice for a small audit firm not to offer both audit and non-audit
services to the same clients. Even though from short-term business point of
view, this is not advantageous for the auditors it is beneficial for the public
interest and auditors themselves in the long-term.
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9.3.2. Clients' Characteristics
The chapter examined and discussed the effect of the clients' characteristics
on auditor independence. This included the clients' backgrounds/reputations,
the existence of a corporate audit committee and the role of the audit fee paid
by clients (major clients). On the issue of client's backgrounds/reputations
this study found that all auditors did not agree with the proposition saying that
auditor independence is affected by the client's reputation. Their argument
was that auditors perform audit tasks based on the same audit rules and
standards for all clients. Whoever their clients, good or bad clients'
backgrounds/reputations do not affect auditor independence.

On the other hand, auditors still acknowledged the effects of the clients'
backgrounds/reputations on the following things: first, scope of work; second,
different audit requirements; third, their early perceptions/images; and fourth,
as a consideration in accepting an audit engagement. It is understandable
that different clients' backgrounds such as small and big companies, listed
and non-listed companies, could generate a different scope of work,
complexities and audit requirements. Also clients with good reputations could
influence auditors' images and consideration in accepting audit appointments.
They had the view that the better the client's reputation the better the audit
opinion would be. However, those auditors in an audit examination will rely
on the 'facts' they found in the audit work and not on a client's reputation. On
this issue, auditors seem to have a professional rather than an emotional
judgments.
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However, the auditors' statements above sound more normative than realistic.
In my opinion, even though all the interviewees acknowledged the effect of
the clients' backgrounds in relation to the scope of the audit works, the audit
requirement and their early perceptions, I think the cultural dimension needs
to be considered. Auditor independence will also be affected by clients'
backgrounds, since everything in the Indonesian culture is normally influenced
by background and attributes. I think auditors are no different from the 'public
culture', their view of their clients will be influenced by their
reputation/backgrounds. Early perceptions, a reputable client and a good
image will lead auditors' perception in doing audit tasks. Auditors will be more
"cooperative" with clients who have a good image and conversely auditors will
be "more careful" when facing clients with a bad image.

On the issue of corporate audit committees, this study found that corporate
audit committees are a new thing in Indonesia. Only sixteen of the twentynine auditors had dealt with clients who had audit committees. Of the sixteen
auditors, thirteen did not agree with the proposition saying that a corporate
audit committee could enhance auditor independence. They believed that the
existence of a corporate audit committee could assist audit work, but it had no
effect on auditor independence.

Another three auditors agreed that a corporate audit committee could
enhance auditor independence and also the committee could assist them in
doing audit tasks but only as long as most of the committee members
consisted of non-directors. On this issue this study found that all auditors
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acknowledge the benefits of the existence of a corporate audit committee, and
some of them felt that it could enhance auditor independence. In order to
enhance auditor independence, in my opinion, the most important thing is the
selection of the members of the committee. If the member of the committee
consists of directors, it will not be effective. But if the members consist mainly
of non-directors, the committee not only will help the audit work but also will
enhance auditor independence. The reason behind this is the avoidance of
conflict of interest and pressure felt by auditors. It is a widespread Indonesian
habit, that someone will not be keen to have a different opinion from those
who have 'helped' him/her. As someone apart from society, auditors must be
careful of this phenomenon.

On the issue of the role of the audit fee paid by the client (major clients), this
study found that twenty-six of twenty-nine auditors stated that they had major
clients, while the other three auditors did not. The majority of those who had
major clients (twenty-two of twenty-six) argued that major clients did not
impair auditor independence. Their arguments were mainly based on the
following reasons: first, quality audit; second, a large number of clients; and
third, the larger the fees the more work and responsibilities. The big five
auditors normally claim that their work is highly reputable. Therefore they
argue that they have a strong position in the eye of their clients, even with
their major clients. However, in this situation auditors must remember that
major clients can also choose other big five audit firms.
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A plentiful number of clients is the reason why auditors can be independent in
dealing with major clients. These auditors are not afraid of losing clients so
they will be confident to be independent. The other reason for being
independent in dealing with major clients is because the bigger client implies
bigger work and responsibilities, therefore such clients will generate the same
fees compared to a number of small clients.

All of the above reasons are understandable if these arguments are stated by
those who do a high quality audit and have a plentiful number of clients. But
questions arise to those whose audit quality is still to be determined and have
only an average number of clients. Can such auditors be consistent with the
arguments stated above?

On the other hand, this study identified that only four auditors supported the
proposition saying that major clients could impair auditor independence. Their
reasons were because they were frightened of losing clients, however, they
tried to minimise auditor impairment by following the audit rules and standards
in doing audit work. Although only four auditors said that major clients could
impair their independence, it does not mean that major clients only had a
small negative effect on auditor independence. A patron-client relationship in
Indonesian society is common, those who are dependent on the other will not

be keen to have different views, this situation is likely to be similar for auditors
who are dependant on major clients. This phenomenon therefore becomes
an alert to auditors to be aware of this threat because auditors probably will
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take the s a m e position as the client, where they regard the major clients as
their patron.

9.3.3. Relationship Between Audit Firms and Clients
The relationship a m o n g audit firms is competitive, however, the relationship
between audit firms and clients could generate improper relations. The study
investigated the effect of competition a m o n g audit firm, real roles of directors
and audit tenure. O n the competition issue, this study found that most
auditors (twenty-one of twenty-nine) argued that competition a m o n g audit
firms did not impair auditor independence. Their reasons were: first, they
offered normal fees with a quality audit. This m e a n s that the big five auditors
were confident that they could generate a quality audit with a high price. They
also believed that with a quality audit clients would be happy and would not
leave their audit firm. T h e question raised here is can the auditors perform
audit work based on audit rules and standards? Because there are so m a n y
stories that auditors can issue an audit report without a proper audit
examination, they must beware of it.

The second reason was that they were selective in accepting clients and
aimed to avoid risky clients. This is understandable since the big five audit
firms have a large number of clients, so it is possible for them to select their
clients, and even though s o m e clients leave them, they are always replaced
by n e w ones. T o accept clients selectively is not easy for those w h o have a
limited number of clients, this can only be practiced by an audit firm which has
too m a n y clients compared to their staff. But it is rare to hear a statement by
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an auditor that "we have not enough staff so we refuse to accept audit
engagement" because normally they will recruit new staff to handle such
works.

Third, in negotiating their fee they considered man hours and the length and
scope of the work, in my opinion, even though an audit firm may calculate

working hours, if it is in a tight competitive situation they will tend to complete
their work with as small amount of costs as possible. Therefore, this situation

will lead auditors to cut their budget, it is not easy for auditors to work proper
in this situation

The fourth reason was that independence was part of their vision in
establishing their audit. This argument was stated by two female auditors,
who regarded their status to be that of housewives. These two female
auditors could disregard the economic imperative since there is a common
phenomenon in Indonesian society that the seeking of money is a husband's
responsibility, a wife can work but only to support her husband, or even
sometimes a wife is not allowed to work for religious or cultural reasons.
Therefore, these two female auditors did not seek money as would male
auditors, so they could maintain their idealism more compared to others.
However, not all female auditors are like these two auditors, many female
auditors work for money so they can earn a larger amount of money
compared to their husbands.
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The fifth reason was because they felt that they had a strong integrity and
applied religious values. In Mrs. Z's view, by applying a religious approach,
competition would not have a negative effect, because she believed that
clients (or 'wealth') came from God, so she did not need to be 'greedy' or to
compromise her independence. Even though this argument was stated by
only one auditor, I believe that other auditors also believed this as a reason
for independence.

On the other hand eight auditors had a different opinion about the effect of
tight competition on auditor independence. The two auditors who said that
competition could impair auditor independence were both non-big-five
partners. While the three auditors who said that competition could slightly
impair auditor independence consisted of one non-big five audit partner, and
two big five auditors.

Three non-big five partners did not provide a clear view as to whether
competition could or could not impair auditor independence. They preferred
fo say that the effect of a tight competition on auditor independence is
dependant on the integrity of each individual auditor.

Even though only eight auditors stated that a tight competitive situation could
lead to auditor independence impairment, it must be an alert for other
auditors. It is understandable that competition could impair auditor
independence especially for those who have a small number of clients.
However, in line with Mr. P's statement, in my opinion the important thing is
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not only their situation (such as lack of clients or no competitive advantage)
but the more important thing is the auditors' attitude. The better their mental
attitude as an independent auditor, the more independent the audit work, and
vice versa. In other words, there is possibility for small auditors to be
independent in a tight competition arena as long as they have a strong mental
attitude.

On the real role of directors issue (where directors de facto could control
auditors' appointment and remuneration), this study found that most auditors
(twenty-five of twenty-nine) argued that this issue did not impair auditor
independence for three reasons. First, they believed that they followed audit
rules and standards and avoided wrong-doing. Second, they relied on a
quality audit as a protection from the threat of directors' intervention. Third,
they limited their relations to a professional basis only.

It seems that the reasons proposed by this group were based more on the
strength of an auditor's integrity (internal factor) than external factors. The
confidence of auditors in their audit quality leads them to be confident of their
independence for the next audit engagement, they were ready not to be
appointed should there be any attempt to compromise their independence.
The process of selecting an auditor is also an important thing in this regard.
With the big clients, the owners (shareholders) appoint auditors in their
Annual General Meeting. While for clients where their managements are also
the owners, they will face hardship in the process of separating their functions
as management and owner. This situation will affect auditor independence
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differently. The former situation will not usually affect auditor independence,
while the latter situation could be more of a threat.

Even though this group of auditors believed that the roles of the clients'
directors had no bad effect in their independence, it must be noted that as
Indonesian auditors (who normally find it hard to have a different perception
especially when they have a seniority or superiority relationship) could keep
silent about their unsolved problems and they (for those who have no strong
bargaining position) finally will compromise their independence under
pressure from clients' directors. However, this is a warning to be considered
by those auditors in doing audit works, but there are still many other auditors
who have a strong enough integrity not to compromise under clients'
pressure.

On the contrary, four auditors believed that director's real roles could impair
auditor independence for two reasons. First, they thought that auditors and
clients were interdependent, that they needed one another. Second,
especially for small clients, their owners were also directors. In this case, the
auditors faced a harder situation, because of the owners' conflict of interests.

Undoubtedly many audit firms, especially small audit firms, look for clients in
order to survive. Many small companies (clients) also look for audit firms who
can serve them 'better". For small companies, their financial statements are
audited in order to fulfil credit requirements. This is like a triangle between
clients, auditors and bankers in that they work 'together" for their mutual
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benefit. This situation is only possible when audit firms have a lack of clients,
they have a close relationship with their clients, and they have weak integrity
as auditors. Even though only four auditors stated that the roles of the clients'
directors had negative effect on their independence, it must be a warning to
the other auditors. This does not mean that the effect of the roles of the
clients' directors is small especially in relation to the auditors' culture where
(Indonesian) auditors are normally not keen to have views different to their
senior or boss. This 'culture' is harmful when clients force auditors to be in
line with them.

On the issue of audit tenure, this study found that the majority of auditors
(twenty- one of twenty-nine) argued that audit tenure did not impair auditor
independence. They believed that staff rotations, will avoid independence
impairment, because through staff rotation they will have no long association.
They also believed that the change of clients' directors will limit their
relationship. The last argument put forward by these auditors is by limiting
contact with the clients to a professional relationship only could independence
impairment be avoided.

Although this group of auditors believed that a long engagement would not
impair their independence, they must be careful in the following situations.
Audit firms rotated their audit staff, but they normally did not rotate their audit
partner. Therefore it is possible that the partner will have a long relationship
with the clients, this situation could lead to the impairment of the partner's
independence.
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Big clients normally have a certain period for changing their board of directors,
but directors can be appointed more than once, therefore this situation also
can lead to a long relation with auditors. Also in small companies, the
directors are the owners, so auditors will normally have a long relation with
clients.

Auditors also must recognise that Indonesian culture especially Javanese
culture has a 'soft' culture where someone will hardly have a different view
from those w h o are respected.

This 'culture' does not support auditor

independence therefore auditors must be aware of it.

In contrast, eight auditors believed that a long audit engagement (audit
tenure) could impair auditor independence. The longer the audit tenure, the
worse the possibility of independence impairment. This argument w a s based
on the following reasons. First, a long relationship could generate mutual
interests between the auditors and the clients. Second, as h u m a n beings,
after a long relationship, they could support each other. These two reasons
are c o m m o n since they can further recognise and more "understand" one
another. However as independent auditors, they must keep away from this
threat otherwise the auditing profession as a respected group will be
damaged by this practice.
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9.3.4. Sanctions, State of Professional Ethics and Religion: Sources of
Motivation
The study investigated the effect of sanctions and the auditors' religious
values on auditor independence. The study showed that sanctions become a
source of motivation to be independent.

All the auditors believed that

sanctions could enhance auditor independence. This consensus w a s based
on the following reasons; first, auditors were frightened of sanctions, therefore
they had to follow and apply audit rules and standards; second, auditors were
forced to be independent otherwise formal or informal sanctions would be
applied.

From this finding, it can be argued that sanctions are one source of motivation
to be independent. From the interviews, it could be surmised that not all
auditors become independent because of their professionalism, but s o m e of
them, become independent because they have no other choice or because
they are fearful of sanctions given out by the professional body. However,
whatever the reasons, as long as independence is maintained, there will be
no problems for financial statement users. The important thing that needs to
be done by the accounting professional body is to m a k e itself more active in
monitoring its members' activities and avoid unequal treatment to those w h o
break the audit rules/standards just because they are close friends, as stated
by s o m e interviewees. This misconduct can diminish the public's trust.

On the religious values issue, the study found that all the auditors believed in
God and embraced a religion, such as Islam, Catholicism, Adventism and
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Protestantism. Most of them (twenty-one of twenty nine) believed that their
religious values enhanced their independence in performing audit tasks. This
view was based on the following reasons: first, auditors were responsible to
the public and to God; second, being independent is a kind of obedience to
God; and third, the auditors' character and mental attitude were affected by
their religious values.

In contrast, eight auditors believed that religious values did not have any
effect on auditor independence. Their argument was based on the following
reasons: first, there was no relevancy between religious values and auditor
independence; and second, auditors could be independent without religious
values as long as they followed the audit rules and standards.

In regard to religious values, the first group of auditors who believed that
religious values could enhance auditor independence could be classified as
religious professional auditors, on the other hand the second group of auditors
who believed that religious values had no effect on auditor independence
could be categorised as professional auditors. Their different views were
caused by their understanding and perception of religion, no matter what
religion they embraced. Auditors who incorporated their religious values into
their daily life fell into the first group of auditors and auditors who separated
their daily life from religious values and practised them only at the mosque or
the church, fell into second group of auditors. However, in terms of
independence both groups were independent and only the motivation to be
independent was different.
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For thefirstgroup of auditors, the internal sources of independence were their
professionalism and their religious values. As auditors, they were committed
to comply with audit standards and professional ethics. In addition, their
behaviour was also affected by their religious values. Whereas for the second
group of auditors the internal source for independence was only their
professionalism, and state of professional ethics from complying with audit
standards. From this point of view, it can be concluded that the internal
sources of independence are the auditors' professional ethics and the
auditors' religious values. Sanctions are one of the external sources of
independence. It is important to note that, the auditors' perceptions about the
effects of religious values on auditor independence were not dependent on
the religion they embrace, but depended on how they viewed religious values.

9.3.5. Independence: Meanings, Major threats and Motivations, Total or
Partial and Efforts for Independence
The study found that the auditors have understandings and perceptions that
are similar to the Institute's definition of independence. This means that the
auditors exhibited a proper understanding, and they seemed to be familiar
with this issue as professional auditors. In summary, from all of the auditors'
responses, their answers can be condensed into five views. These five views
on the meanings of independence are that auditors must serve the public
interest, must not be interfered with by others, must be free of any interest,
must be objective and must follow audit rules and standards.
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This study also investigated the major factors that could impair auditor
independence as perceived by auditors. The study found that two auditors
stated that there was no major factor that impaired auditor independence and
on the other hand, twenty-seven auditors identified the following major factors:
first, an improper relationship between auditors and clients; second, major
clients; and, third, a weakness of the auditor's integrity.

It is easy to understand, since cultural values where people will be reluctant to
have different views from those with whom they a have close relationship,
contribute to auditors' characters. Improper relationships between auditors
and clients therefore can become a major threat. A major client from a
business view-point is very important, but being too ambitious to attract profit
and relying on major clients will endanger auditor independence. A weak
integrity can be suffered by any one, including both small and big five
auditors. They have to ask themselves who they are and whether they are
professional?

The major factors that could enhance auditor independence were: first,
auditor quality (integrity, objectivity and strength of character); second,
sanctions; and third, religious values. These three major factors both internal
(integrity and religious values) and external (sanctions) can enhance auditor
independence. In my opinion it seems that auditor independence is depended
on the auditors themselves and supported by law enforcement.
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This study also investigated the possibility of auditors being totally or partially
independent. The study found that fourteen auditors believed that being
totally independent was impossible, however they preferred to say that they
"tried to be independent as much as they could". This answer was based on
a 'reality' that auditors were professional persons but they were also human
beings who could be affected by internal and external factors. However, they
were trying to be as independent as they could. In contrast, another fourteen
auditors directly stated that they could be totally independent. They argued
that being totally independent was a must for auditors; they just followed the
audit rules and standards in doing audit work. This indicated that auditor
independence was on a scale from less independent to more independent,
depending on the auditors' personal qualities and on their ability to resist
potential external factors.

This study also investigated auditors' experience in maintaining auditor
independence. The study identified the following actions taken by auditors to
maintain their independence. Following audit rules and standards was the
most common answer for auditors, then strengthening auditor' quality was the
second, and significantly applying religious values to audit work was the third
favoured answer, and the fourth action was to be selective in seeking and
accepting clients. These actions were practised by auditors in an effort to
maintain auditor independence. This study clearly shows that religious values
have a significant place as an internal factor, in maintaining auditor
independence.
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9.4. Conclusion
The study indicated that the independence concept as set by the Indonesian
Institute of Accountants was well understood by the professional members.
However, the application of independence to the audit profession was more
important. The study classified two potential groups of factors that could
affect auditor independence, namely external and internal. Potential external

factors were the audit firm characteristics, the client characteristics, the natur
of the relationship between auditors and clients and sanctions. Potential
internal factors includes the auditor's state of professional ethics and the
auditors' religious values.

This study prefers to use the term 'potential factors' rather than the term
'factors'. The reason is because the study found no conclusive agreement
among auditors on the issues investigated except for sanctions. Therefore,
these issues could have effects on auditor independence for some auditors,
but may not have any effect on others. Although there was only one
agreement among the auditors and various views on the other issues, each of
the issues investigated was acknowledged by at least three auditors that
these issues potentially affected auditor independence.

This study therefore concludes that these issues potentially affect auditor
independence. The strength of auditor quality is different between auditors
and depends on how committed each auditor is to being professional, and so
the effect of these potential factors on auditor independence is also different.
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From this argument, auditor independence can be stated as being a
continuum rather than as being dichotomous. As illustrated in Figure 5 the
range of auditor independence is potentially affected by external and internal
factors. The Figure identified that there are eleven potential factors that could
affect auditor independence in a range. It is important to note, that religious
values potentially could enhance auditor independence, since religion is one
factor that motivates moral behaviour. However, on the Figure, there is no
right side (less independent) for the effect of religious values and this is
because without applying religious values auditors can still be independent.
But the application of religious values for those who believe does give
auditors more motivation to be independent.

This study therefore concludes that independence depends on the quality of
the auditors themselves. This quality relates to how well they resist potential
negative effects and their commitment to strengthen their independence
through applying the potential factors that can enhance auditor independence.
The study has identified major potential threats and motivations for
independence. An improper relationship between auditors and clients as a
consequence of a long audit engagement has been acknowledged by most
auditors as the most dangerous potential factor. There is a rule set by the
Capital Market Supervisory Board in Indonesia, for listed companies to
change their auditors after a certain period. But there are no rules requiring
auditor change for non-listed companies. This situation requires auditors to
take care of this situation, especially when they deal with non-listed clients.
Having major clients is believed to be the second most dangerous potential
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factor that could impair auditor independence. The main problem of having
major clients is fee dependence. Auditors in this situation potentially tend to
retain such clients. Consequently auditors can be tempted in their wish to
retain the clients' favour. The third major potential threat that could affect
auditor independence is the weakness of auditors' personal qualities. Weak
auditors could be easily influenced by other parties to accept favours from
clients. Weak auditor quality can be strengthened by enforcing laws and
tightening sanctions.

The study found that the first major potential motivation to be independent
was the personal quality of auditors. Wherever they worked, whatever clients
they had, if they had strong personal qualities, the auditors would be
independent. Auditors with strong personal qualities could resist any potential
threats that could affect auditor independence. The second major potential
factor that could enhance auditor independence is sanctions. Obviously
through sanctions, auditors are motivated to do the right thing, ie. complying
with audit standards. The auditors' religious values were acknowledged to be
the third major potential factor that could enhance auditor independence.

The study identified the possibility of auditors being totally or absolutely
independent. More than half of the interviewees said that they tried to be
independent. This answer implicitly states that independence is a continuum
and is not dichotomous. Auditor independence is not black and white but
within a range.
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Auditors therefore said that they tried to maintain their independence by
following the audit rules and standards, by strengthening their personal
qualities, applying religious values to their behaviour, to do the right thing and
to follow the rules and lastly to be selective in seeking and accepting clients.
These actions were oriented to the auditors themselves.

9.5. Research Contributions
The research contributions of this study include theoretical and practical
contributions. The study of Goldman and Barlev's (1974) behavioural model
of independence and Flint's (1988) material circumstances to independence
inspired this present study. The findings of this study relates to those models.
Also, this study relates its findings to the study of Kleinman, Palmon and
Anadarajan(1998).

In relation to the Indonesian context, this study supports five of six findings
found by Supriyono (1988) with some extensions. These five factors that
could potentially affect auditor independence are competition among audit
firms, audit fee size, audit tenure, audit firm size and provision of non-audit
services. While for another finding stated by Supriyono (1988) concerning
financial interest in the clients' company, this study did not find auditors who

had a financial interest in their clients, auditors should certainly refuse to audit
such clients.
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S o m e n e w evidence found in this study is as follows: first, the existence of a
corporate audit committee is useful for audit work and potentially could
enhance auditor independence as long as the committee consist of nondirectors; second, another finding is the more clients' directors have roles in
dealings with auditors, the greater the potential threat to auditor
independence; third, this study found that sanctions enforced by the
professional body could enhance auditor independence; and the last and n e w
finding in this study is that religious values could become a source of
independence for auditors.

From a practical point of view, this study can provide some recommendations
to the Institute of Indonesian Accountants, the Indonesian Government, and
relevant parties w h o use audited financial statements.

9.5.1. Theoretical Models of Independence
Two theoretical models of auditor independence were used to explore and
identify the issues to be investigated in this study.

These were the

behavioural auditor independence model of Goldman and Barlev (1974) and
Flint's (1988) material circumstances.

Goldman and Barlev (1974) explained that auditors are potentially involved in
three conflicts of interest: first, the auditor-firm conflict of interests; second, the
shareholder-management conflict of interest; and third, the auditor's self
interest-professional standards conflict.

The model also identified that

227
auditors and clients have the potential to influence one another. The firm's
(client's) sources of power were the ability to hire and fire the auditor, the
ability to determine the auditor's fee and the ability to determine work
conditions. On the other hand, the auditor's sources of power were the nature
of the problem solved (routine and non-routine) and the beneficiaries from the
services and the state of professional ethics. In this model, the auditor's
ability to withstand pressure is based on the amount of the firm's power and
the amount of the auditor's power.

Flint (1988) identified five material circumstances that could affect auditor
independence. These five circumstances were the personal qualities (probity
and strength of character of auditors), personal relationship, financial interest
or dependence, investigative and reporting freedom, and organisational
status. These two models of independence were used to identify and explore
the issues investigated in this study for two reasons.

First, Goldman and Barlev's (1974) model provided a behavioural approach to
auditors and clients, and their interaction and influence on one another.
Second, Flint (1988) provided more comprehensive issues/circumstances
(from an auditor's viewpoint) that could affect auditor independence.
Therefore these two models were applied to this study to identify and explore
the issues to be investigated, since this study investigated auditors'
perceptions which inherently involves culture and behaviour and requires a
broader perspective.
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9.5.2. Theoretical Contributions
This study provides some theoretical contributions. It argues that auditor
independence is a continuum, not black and white and it is potentially affected
by internal and external factors. The study proposes a model of auditor
independence in a range (see Figure 5) which is affected by potential external
and internal factors. The left side circumstances potentially lead the auditors
to be more independent, conversely the right side conditions potentially
influence the auditors to be less dependent.

With respect to this, this study is consistent with those two models which state
that auditor independence is affected by internal and external factors. This
present study also proposes new potential factors that could affect auditor
independence.

For potential internal factors this study found the religious values of the
auditors to be a new source of motivation to be independent. Barlev and
Goldman, and Flint recognised that the personal quality of auditors would
depend on strength of character or a state of professional ethics. In addition
to auditor professionalism, this study found evidence that the religious values
of auditors could become a source of motivation to be independent.

For the external potential factors this study found some circumstances that
could potentially affect auditor independence, such as audit firm size, clients'

229
reputations/backgrounds, committee, tight competition among audit firms and
sanctions enforced by a professional body.

This study is also consistent with the study of Kleinman, Palmon and
Anandarajan (1998) with some extensions. In their study, Kleinman, Palmon
and Anandarajan suggested that there were three factors that could influence
auditor independence, these were: audit firm's characteristics, client's
characteristics and the nature of auditor-client relationship. The extensions of
this present study have shown that sanctions, religious values and the state of
professional ethics were new potential factors that could affect auditor
independence.

This study therefore proposes a model of auditor independence as a
continuum that potentially could be affected by external and internal factors
(see Figure 5). All potential factors have 'better' and 'worse' circumstances
except for religious values. This is because an auditor can be independent as
long as s/he has a strong state of professional ethics.
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Figure 5
Range of Independence
and Potential Factors/Circumstances

More Independent Less Independent
<

•

External Factors
Bigger Audit Firms

Smaller Audit Firms

Not Offering Non-audit Services

Offering Non-audit Services

Existence of Audit Committee

Absence of Audit Committee

Average Clients' Fee Size
Normal Competition A m o n g Audit Firms
Less Clients' Director Intervention
Shorter Audit Engagement
More law/sanctions enforcement

Having Major Clients
Tight Competition
More Clients' Directors Intervention
Longer Audit Engagement
Less law/sanctions enforcement

Internal Factors
Stronger State of Professional Ethics

Weaker State of Professional Ethics

Applying Religious Values

9.5.3. Practical Recommendations
The study generates s o m e suggestions and recommendation for the following
parties:first,the Indonesian Institute of Accountants: second, the Indonesian
Government; and third, the relevant parties fo audited financial statements.
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Suggestions

for The Institute of Indonesian

Accountants

The study found that the interviewees were familiar with the concept of
independence. The auditors felt that the Institute had a significant role in
maintaining auditor independence. However, the study identifies and
suggests ways for the Institute to improve its role for its members. First, it is
suggested that the Institute enforce audit standards (law enforcement). Since
sanctions have become a source of motivation for auditors, law enforcement
on its members would appear to enhance auditor independence. Second, it is
recommended that the Institute becomes more active in monitoring its
members' activities. At present, the Institute seems to wait until other parties
sue its members, then the Institute takes action. Third, the Institute has to
apply equal sanctions to those who violate the rules and standards of
professionalism whether or not they be big five or non-big five auditors,
friends or not, or the same audit firm. Fourth, non-audit services provision is
beneficial for auditors and clients, and there is no prohibition to offer such
services, so it is suggested that they be monitored and limited to avoid a
conflict of interest between the two parties. Fifth, a long audit engagement
(relationship) between auditors and clients, which could generate an improper
relationship, is acknowledged to be the most dangerous potential threat to
auditor independence. The limitation of audit tenure for listed companies is
limited by the Capital Market Supervisory Board, but not for other clients (nonlisted clients) and therefore it is suggested that the Institute devises rules to
deal with this situation to avoid a bad effect from this potential factor.
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Suggestions for the Government
The existence of corporate audit committees are useful for the work of
auditors, and particularly for some auditors, this committee could enhance
their independence. The requirement for establishing a corporate audit
committee in Indonesia at present is addressed to the banking industry only.
It is recommended that the government to further investigates the
effectiveness of this committee (which consists of non-director members) in
other industries, especially in regard to listed companies.

Suggestions for Relevant Parties to Financial Statements
The study found that auditor independence is affected by external and internal
factors. External factors include the characteristics of audit firms, the
characteristics of clients, and the nature of their relationship and sanctions.
On the other hand, internal factors such as the auditors' qualities play a
significant role in influencing their independence. These two factors should
be considered by the relevant parties to audited financial statements. The
external factors could impair or enhance auditor independence, but the
auditors' qualities would play a more significant role in relation to
independence. It is important to note that smaller and larger auditors can be
independent as long as they have the right personal qualities.

9.6. Limitation of the Research
There are some limitations to this study. First, since all previous studies
concerning auditor independence were conducted by a quantitative approach,
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this study has no previous qualitative model on the issue of auditor
independence to with which to compare. However, this study provides an
introduction to the use of a qualitative approach in the field.

Second, due to limitations and difficulty of access to the interviewees, this
study is cross sectional in the nature of collecting data process and therefore
the study has not been able to identify or trace the auditors' consistency with
their perceptions. The relevant parties to audited financial statements other
than auditors are directors, shareholders and bankers. This study has
focused only on the perceptions of Indonesian auditors.

9.7. Suggestions for Future Research
There are some suggestions for future research on auditor independence. It
is suggested that the case be narrowed, for example a study conducted within
one big-five audit firm. By narrowing the case, it more detailed variables and
circumstances could be explored.

Since there is a lack of a qualitative approach in this field of research, there is
a great opportunity for development in this area. A participating,
observational and longitudinal study would probably generate a greater
experience than the mere interviewing of auditors. Observation and a
longitudinal study could identify the consistency of auditors' perceptions.
Research on other sites could enrich the literature.
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Appendix A
List of Interviewees
No As

Names

Position
s
KBS
Partner
RA Z
Partner
PwC
Sup.
Visor
KBS
Partner
PwC
Partner
Djoemar
m Partner

ExpeAges rience Sex

Religion

Culture

Education

37

11

M

Islam

Javanese

Master

55

28

M

Islam

Javanese

Master

29

5

M

Islam

Padangnese

Bachelor

48

22

M

Islam

Sundanese

Bachelor

52

25

M

Catholic

Chinese

Bachelor

45

6

M

Islam

Sundanese

Master

10

M

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

13

M

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

10

M

Catholic

Chinese

Bachelor

6

M

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

16

F

Islam

Javanese

Doctor

53

28

M

Islam

Javanese

Master

75

35

F

Islam

Javanese

Doctor

30

6

M

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

45

23

M

Catholic

Manado

Bachelor

57

35

M

Islam

Sundanese

Master

45

23

F

Advent

Javanese

Bachelor

51

25

M

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

37

14

F

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

32

9

F

Catholic

Chinese

Bachelor

33

10

F

Catholic

Chinese

Bachelor

37

14

F

Islam

Sundanese

Master

37

8

F

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

53

27

M

Catholic

Chinese

Bachelor

1

Mr. A

Agung Praptapa

2

Mr. B

Andiek

3

Mr. C

Arief Jauhari

4

Mr. D

Beddy Samsi

5

Mr. E

Boentaran

6

Mr. F

Djoemarma

7

Mr. G

8

Mr. H

Donny
Suwardhono
Dwi Dharyoto

AA
36
Manager
PwC
36
Manager

9

Mr. I

Erwin

KPMG
34
Ast. Mgr
PwC Ast. 30
Mgr
llya
41
Partner

10 Mr. J

Heriyanto

11 Mrs. K

llya Avianti

12 Mr. L

I man Sarwoko

13 Mrs. M

Koesbandijah

14 Mr. N

Laksyito

15 Mr.O

Leonard
Mamaahit
Mansyur

16 Mr. P
17 Mrs. Q
18 Mr. R

Medina
Soepangat
Mustofa

19 Mrs.S

Myrnie

20 Mrs.T

Nita Ruslim

21

Mrs. U

22

Mrs.V

Patricia
Dharmatuti
Poppy Sofia

23

Mrs.W

Ririen

24 Mr.X

RonnyWDharma

E&Y
Partner
KBS
Partner
PwC
Sup.
Visor

E&Y
Partner
Mansyur
Parner
EkaA
Partner
DTM
Partner
PwC
Director
PwC
Senior
Mgr
PwC
Manager
llya
Partner
RA Z
Partner

E&Y
Partner
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25 Mr. Y

Sanusi

26 Mrs. Z

Tia Adityasih

27 Mr.AA

Wahono

28 Mr. BB

Yusuf Wibisana

29 Mr. C C

Zainal Abidin

Sanusi
Partner
EkaA
Partner
RAZ
Partner
KPMG
Partner
A A Ast.
Mgr

61

28

M

Protestan Chinese

Bachelor

46

20

F

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

64

40

M

Islam

Javanese

Bachelor

40

9

M

Islam

Javanese

Master

31

6

M

Islam

Arab

Bachelor

Appendix B
Guidelines on Semi Structured Interviews
Part I General
1. The length of working experience in audit
2. What the current position is
3. The length of current position
4. The size of audit firm
5. Client size
6. Professional certification possessed
7. Highest formal degree achieved
Part II Auditor Independence
1. Definition of auditor independence
2. The reasons for being independent
3. The effect (impair or enhance) of the following variables on auditor
independence:
• Non Audit Services, w h y or why not
• Audit Market Competition, why or why not
• Major Client, w h y or why not
• Audit Firm Size, w h y or why not
• Corporate Audit Committee, why or why not
• The Real Directors' Roles, why or why not
• Audit tenure, w h y or w h y not
• Regulation/Law Enforcement, why or why not
• Client's Reputation, why or why not
• Auditor's Religious Values, why or why not
4. Other variables than above that affect auditor independence, why or
not
5. Please rank the most four variables that could impair auditor
independence
6. What the reasons for that
7. Please rank the most four variables that could enhance auditor
independence
8. What the reasons for that
9. Can auditors to be total independent? W h y or why not?
10. Efforts taken to maintain auditor independence?
11 .Any other things that you want to be noted?
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Appendix 1
The effects of audit firm size on auditor independence.
I believe that auditors w h o work in a
bigger auditfirmwill be more independent
Agree in general, but need
than auditors w h o work in a smaller audit
to see case by case
firm. Because the bigger audit firm, the
more clients they have, so they will not Reasons:
depend on s o m e clients. However, it does • The bigger audit firms, the
more clients they have
not m e a n that auditors from he bigger
audit firm will always be more
independent than auditors from smaller
audit firms.
B

I don't agree with that statement, I know • Don't agree
that s o m e auditor from big audit firms
s o m e times their independence can be Reasons:
impaired. In m y opinion the thing that can • S o m e auditors from big firm
make a difference between big audit firm
compromise their indeand small auditfirmis only prestige.
pendence
I think that statement can be true. • Agree
Because in m y experience in this office all
staff are encouraged to be professional Reasons:
and enforce to respect and apply rules • Big audit firms have more
and standards in doing audit works. I
level of position (staff)
don't know with small audit firms. In the • Big audit firms have more
big audit firms, they have m a n y levels of
clients
staff position from junior accountants to
partners, while in small audit firm they
have less level of staff. Also in term of
number of clients, small audit firms have
less clients compared to the big ones.
Those situations could support above
statement. But in m y opinion, there are
still auditors from small auditors w h o can
be independent, and conversely those
from big audit firms could be less
independent from the small firms, it's
depend on the persons.
I agree with that statement, because the Agree
more staff and clients w e have the more
confidence w e have. In big audit firms R e a s o n s .
they are not depended on s o m e clients,
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because they have enough number of
clients. In small audit firms they have
limited number of clients, so indication to
compromise or impair their independence
would be more exists. However, it doesn't
m e a n that opinion as absolutely true, in
s o m e cases it could be false.
I don't agree with that statement, because
that statement is too generalized about
people
character. I believe that
independence is an individual matter, so
where they work will not necessarily
affect their independence. I can be
independent in this audit firm, not
because of this firm but because of m y
integrity and personality as an auditor.
However, it doesn't m e a n that above
statement is completely wrong. That
public opinion, I think is constructed by
the existence of audit firms themselves. I
m e a n the bigger audit firms, the better
their management, the better their job
description and distribution. The smaller
audit firms, the more centralize about
decision will be m a d e by staff, in which
this situation will lead to conflict of
interests. Therefore, in m y opinion that
statement is a general statement that w e
need to be careful of it to avoid mislead
statement.
In small audit firms w e are required to
look for clients not like in big firms. So,
auditors' independence in small audit
firms could be more impaired than
auditors in large firms. Above statement
could be right. But w e have to see that
case by case not to generalize that.

Big audit firms have more
staff
Big audit firms have more
clients

Don't agree
Reasons:
. Too general
Independence is personal
and integrity matters

•

Agree

Reasons:
• Small audit firms have to
look for clients
• But still need to be viewed
as case by case

I think this audit firm has policy to control
• Don't agree
its staff independence. For example every
year w e have to fill the form consisting Reasons:
about our investment or shares, if w e • Depends
have s o m e investment w e have to tell
themselves
where do w e invest them. This is done to
avoid conflict of interest in audit works. I
don't know in the small audit firms
whether they do this policy or not.
However, independence is personal

on

auditors
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matter, it backs to auditor himself.
I don't agree with that issue. Because in
m y experience, auditor independence is
not affected by their firm size, but depend
on auditors' moral and integrity. I can see
s o m e auditors from big audit firms are not
independent and s o m e auditors from
smallfirms,they can be independent. So,
in m y opinion it is depend on auditors
moral and integrity, not their audit firms
size. W e can see also, from their out puts
I m e a n w e can see from their audited
financial statements.
I don't believe with that statement. I know
that s o m e auditors from small audit firms
also have a good integrity and
personality. And s o m e auditors from the
big audit firms give clean opinion and
after while, their clients get into
bankruptcy, do you know w h y ? In m y
opinion, independence more relates to
auditors themselves rather than audit firm
size.
A s far as I know, that statement is true,
however it is not a hundred percent.
W h e n I discuss with m y friends from
small audit firms, they normally said that
the important thing is they can receive
fees, and then they can issue audit
reports. In this case, I see that their
integrity as auditors are weak. This might
because they have no control from their
audit firm affiliation like in the big firms. In
the big firm like here, our audit works are
reviewed by our international office, so
w e have to be careful in doing audit
works.
I don't agree because independence is an
individual matter, not audit firm size.
Independence is depended on auditor's
integrity and personality. M a n y auditors
from small audit firms can be independent
as long as they can maintain their
professionalism. Not all auditors from the
big audit firms are independent, s o m e of
them are not.

•

Don't agree

Reasons:
• Depend
integrity

•

on

auditors'

on

auditors'

Don't agree

Reasons:
• Depend
integrity

Agree but
percent

not

hundred

Reasons:
• Big audit firms have more
control

•

Don't agree

Reasons:
• Depend
on
auditors'
integrity and personality
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I don't agree with that opinion, which is
too general. Independence is personal
Don't agree
and individual matter. Even though their
audit firm is small, they can be Reasons:
independent as long as they are • Depend
on
auditors'
professional. In contrast, even though
integrity and personality
auditors w h o work in a big audit firm, • Need to see case by case
s o m e of them could be not independent if
they are not professional. I don't agree
with generalization, I prefer to see case
by case.
Yes, it may happen. I said it may be true,
because auditors from small audit firms • Agree, but not hundred
are more depended on their clients
percent
compared to auditors from bigger firms. In
contrast to that, auditors from bigger firms Reasons:
not always "better" than auditors from • Small audit firms are more
small audit firms, it will be depended on
dependent on clients
their integrity as auditors. However, in m y • However, it depends on
auditors' integrity
opinion that statement consist more trues
than false.
I think that's possibly true. Because I see
that in the small auditfirms,they normally • Possibly true (agree)
have limited number of clients. It could
cause auditors from small audit firms Reasons:
could more easily affected by other • Small audit firm have less
parties. While in the big audit firms, they
clients, they are more
have stronger independence resistance
dependent on clients
because they have more clients. • But, not all small audit firm
However, this situation is only general
like that
opinion, in certain case, auditors from
small audit firms can be more
independent than those from big audit
firms.
I agree with that statement but not totally
agree. I said that I agree because in a big • Agree but not hundred
audit firm, auditors have
many
percent
instruments to support their independent
for examples: they have different division, Reasons:
they have more advanced technology, • Big audit firms have m a n y
they have more advance audit system,
instruments to maintain
they have more confidence and so on.
independence
While in smaller audit firms, they have • However, it depends on
less facilities compared to the bigger
auditors' integrity
audit firms. However, I don't totally agree
with above statement because even
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though auditors work in smaller audit
firms, they can be independent without
worrying about above factors I mentioned
as long as they try to be a real
independent auditor as their profession.
I don't agree with that statement. Some
auditors from big audit firms they are
s o m e times not professional, because
they don't disclose their report in
appropriate ways. In other words, I can
state that s o m e auditors from big audit
firms s o m e times are not independent.
However, I also realize that m a n y small
audit firms could compromise their
independence. So, in m y opinion,
independence is not depended on audit
firm size, but it is depended auditors'
mental attitude.
I don't agree with that statement.
Because I can see that m a n y auditors
from big audit firms are not independent. I
can say that m a n y banks with a clean
opinion (unqualified) have collapsed
recently, w h o are the auditors? They are
big auditfirms.From this w e probably can
see that there is an indication of
independence impairment. Conversely,
not all auditors from small audit firms are
not independent, m a n y of them can be
independent too. It depended on the
auditors not on the firms.

•

Don't agree

Reasons:
• Independence depends on
auditors' mental attitude

•

Don't agree

Reasons:
• Independence depends on
auditors not audit firm size

I don't agree with that. In m y opinion,
independence is individual matter, not • Don't agree
affected by where they work or size of
audit firm. Yes, auditor w h o work in Reasons:
smaller audit firm, their independence will • Independence depends on
be easier to be affected, but I think m a n y
auditors' personality and
auditors w h o work in small audit firm have
integrity
strong integrity and they still be able to be
independent. Even they c o m e from big
five audit firms, not all of them are
independent, s o m e of them I think could
be not independent. So, I want to tell you
I don't
like generalization.
that
Independence is individual matter, it
depend on the personal integrity.
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I don't agree with that opinion. Because • Don't agree
independent auditor must be independent
wherever and whenever they are. In m y Reasons:
opinion independence is not affected by • Independence depends on
size of audit firms but rather to be
auditors' integrity
affected by integrity and professionalism
of auditors themselves. And I can see
that s o m e auditors from small audit firms
can be independent and professional in
doing audit works. And s o m e auditors
from big audit firms s o m e times they
compromise their independence. So, it's
hard to conclude that independence is
affected by audit firm size.
It would depend on audit firms' and • Don't agree
auditors' philosophy, because big or small
audit firms they follow the s a m e audit Reasons:
rules and standards, it shouldn't be • Independence depends on
different. If auditors think that their duty is
auditors' integrity
to seek m o n e y or business only, whoever
they are, their independence will be easily
interfered by their interests. While for
those w h o think business and audit
profession, they would be independent,
no matter where they work, small or big
audit firms. So, it's depend on the
auditors' integrity.
That statement contents truth, but not for
Agree but not hundred
all cases. S o m e cases have shown that
percent
above statement is not true. For example,
auditors from the big audit firm can Reasons:
mislead in giving audit opinion, or there • Still need to see case by
are s o m e auditors from small audit firm
case
who
can
be
professional
and • Independence depends on
independent. It is depend on the person.
auditors' integrity
I don't agree with that statement. It is • Don't agree
depend on the auditor itself not to the size
of audit firm. This firm w a s established Reasons:
not to seek m o n e y but to accommodate • Independence depends on
our needs in professional practices. I a m
auditors' integrity
basically a lecturer, and partner in this
firm is not m y main job. S o m y vision and
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develop our knowledge and theory into
practices. By establishing audit firm, I can
ask m y student to practice as an auditor,
you can see that m y staffs turnover in
this firm is very high. I a m happy if m y
staff got experience here, and then get a
better job somewhere else.
I don't agree with that statement, because
it is depended on audit partners not audit • Don't agree
firms. Even though big auditfirms,if their
partners have poor mental attitude they Reasons:
can be not independent. Conversely, for • Independence depends on
those partners from small audit firms,
auditors not audit firm size
they can be independent as long as they
have strong integrity and mental attitude.
So, in m y opinion it is depended on the
person not on the firms.
I don't agree with that statement, auditors
w h o work in a bigger audit firm do not
Don't agree
m e a n that they are more independent
than auditors w h o work in a smaller firm. Reasons:
According to m y opinion and observation, • Independence depends on
independence is not depended on audit
auditors' personality , not
firm size, but depended on auditors
audit firm size
themselves, auditors' personality. There
won't be small audit firms, if they are not
independent, the Institute will cancel their
audit license.
That is a general issue. In m y opinion, for
small audit firms their independence is • Agree but not hundred
more negotiable, but that is depended on
percent
the person. However, m y audit firm is
medium size so in dealing with clients I Reasons:
have a good bargain position, not dictated • Independence depends on
by clients. If they ask m e to do something
the persons (auditors)
"too risky", I will refuse that appointment. I
rather to look for less-risk works.
It s e e m s to be a general statement.
Personally, I don't agree with that
statement, because I see auditors' • Don't agree
character whether he has strong or weak
character or integrity. Not only auditors Reasons:
from small audit firms, even auditors from • Independence depends on
the big audit firms they can be not
auditors' integrity
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integrity are weak. If those auditors can
view for long
term benefits, being
independent is a must whoever they are,
from small or big audit firms.
I don't agree with that statement. I think
not all big audit firms will be independent
in doing audit, it is depended on their • Don't agree
auditors' mental attitude and integrity. I
also can't say that auditors from small Reasons:
audit firms must be not independent, it is • Independence depends on
also depended on their auditors' mental
auditors' mental attitude
attitude and integrity, s o m e of them are
independent and s o m e of them are not.
O n c e again, the size of audit firms in m y
opinion is not significant, the most
important thing is auditors' mental attitude
and integrity.
I agree with that statement but not
hundred percent because that statement
is too general. That statement I think • Agree but not hundred
consists the truth but not as a whole.
percent
Because I think not all auditors from big
firms they're independent, s o m e auditors Reasons:
from big firms also s o m e times they are • Small audit firms are harder
to be independent because
not independent. And conversely not all
their characteristics
auditors from small audit firm can't be
independence
independent, auditors from small firm • However,
depends on the auditors'
they still can be independent as long as
integrity
they have strong integrity. But I can see
that auditors from small audit firms are
harder to be independent because of the
characteristics of the small audit firms.
So, I tend to be more agree with that
statement because the reality tend to be
like that.
I think that opinion could be true.
Agree
Because big audit firms normally have
stronger bargain positions, and small Reasonsaudit firms have less strong bargain
# S m a | | audjt fjrms are
positions. Auditors from small audit firm
m o r e d e p e n d o n c|ients
are more depend on their clients than the
big ones.
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S u m m a r y of the Proposition saying that the bigger audit firm the more
independent their staff, the smaller the audit firms, the less independent
their staff.
Do not Agree (17 Auditors)
Reasons for not agreeing:
• Independence is personal matter
• S o m e bigfiveauditors compromise auditor independence
• D o not like generalization
Agree (12 Auditors)
Reasons for agreeing:
• The bigger auditfirms,the more clients they have
• The bigger audit firms, the more instruments (divisions, experts,
advanced technology, international links) they have to be independent.
• Small firms look for clients, big ones do not
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Appendix 2

mlp^nc^
A

P r V i d i n 9 n n a U d i t S6rViCeS (t audit C,ients on auditor

°

° '

°

>

In m y case, most of client are non-audit
N o effect
clients. This is m y business secret
actually, that w h e n I provide accounting
system or other non-audit services I send
m y consulting assistants, and w h e n I Reasons:
provide audit service, I send m y different • Send different staff for
audit assistants. So, I can check and
different services
cross-check m y assistants works, and I
can still maintain m y independence. The
important thing for m e is do the job as
ruled by the audit standards.

B We provide both service, but not many
N o effect
companies to be both clients. However,
even though s o m e of them to be both
clients our Reasons:
audit and non-audit
independence is not affected by them, • Small part of N A S and not
because w e provide small part of nonsignificant roles
audit service, and not significant to
clients' decision making process.
C I think if audit firm can separate those
N o effect
services by different persons and
divisions, I think it wouldn't be problems. Reasons:
But if audit firms, do those audit and non- • Have different staff and
audit services by s a m e person, it seems
divisions
to impair auditor independence. In this
office, w e have s o m e division and
different persons to conduct those
services.
This audit firm has several division and
N o effect
w e send our staff depend on what w e
need, audit or non-audit service. S o w e
never, put our staff into conflict of Reasons:
interests. I can ensure that even though • Have different staff and
our firm provide both audit and non-audit
divisions
services to the s a m e clients, w e can
maintain our independence.
E

In m y experience I have no problem with
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m y independence to audit client that also • N o effect
accept other services from this audit firm.
Because w e believe that what w e do is on Reasons:
therighttrack, w e do not breach the rules • Follow rules and standards
in doing audit
and standards as long as w e can
maintain independence and not to
compromise it with clients. I m y self is
committed to be stick to the profession
that requires us to be independent.
As long as non-audit services do not
N o effect
generate conflict of interests like
accounting
compilation
service, it
wouldn't be problems. In m y office I have
no certain division, but I place s o m e Reasons:
different staff to do different works. A s a • N A S has no significant role
partner I know w h e n I a m as an auditor • Different staff for different
services
w h e n I a m as a consultant. I have no
problem with m y independence.
This audit firm can provide both services
to the s a m e clients, but one staff never
N o effect
involved in both services. In this firm w e
have well established division based on Reasons:
services offered to clients. If one person • Have different staff and
divisions
involve in both services, it would result a
bad image, so w e avoid this matter. By
doing this, m y independence can be
maintained.
In this office, we are very strict in
selecting
clients
and
kind
of
engagements. If w e accept audit
engagement, w e will refuse other
services like financial advisory, but w e
can still accept taxation. This is an
internal
policy
to
maintain
our
independence. Because once w e accept
those services at the s a m e time, w e
would not be independent, because w e
have conflict of interests. S o in this audit
firm, w e are selective in accepting
engagements.
In this audit firm, we have some different
divisions. So, audit and non audit
services will be handled by different
person, audit person will only involve with
audit matters. This is done to avoid
conflict of interest and any other bad

•

N o effect

Reasons:
• Selective in offering N A S

N o effect
Reasons:
• Have different staff and
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image from external view. I think by doing
this w e can protect ourselves from
unnecessary things and I believe that by
doing this our independence can be
properly maintained.

divisions

I have experienced to provide audit and
non audit services to the s a m e clients.
Other staff provided non audit services • Small impairment
and m y self did audit service. W h e n I
audited it, I think there w a s an influence Reasons:
from providing non-audit services, but this • Dependence on clients
w a s not significant. In m y experience, this
feeling existed in m y mind, but I think this
is not material, so I decided that the effect
of providing non-audit service still
tolerable.
I have no any clients w h o accept m y audit
and non-audit services at the s a m e time.
S o far I can divide and maintain m y Never offer both service to the
clients like that. Because I don't want s a m e clients
have any conflict of interest. S o in this
issue I have no problem with m y • Avoid conflict of interests
independence.
Well, this matter has guidance in audit
standards. If you are an auditor you are
not allowed to be clients' financial
advisor, because those works have
conflict of interest. But if you provide nonaudit services like tax, m a n a g e m e n t
consulting, accounting compilation, it's no
problem at all. Auditors will have conflict
of interest w h e n they act as decisionmaker at their clients or they have
significant roles at their clients. But so far,
in m y case I have no problems with m y
independence as an auditor as long as
w e are strict to avoid something that
could lead us into conflict of interest.
W e rarely provide both services to the
s a m e clients, but if this happen w e can
still be independent, because w e assign
our different assistants w h e n w e do audit
and non audit services. By sending our
different assistants, w e feel secure about

•

N o effect

Reasons:
• Selective in offering N A S

•

N o effect

Reasons:
• Send different staff for
different services
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responsibility to defend m y client interest
even they are m y non audit clients.
N I don't think my independence is impaired
by providing both audit and non-audit
services to the s a m e clients. Because • N o effect
those services are conducted by different
staff from different divisions. S o I have no Reasons:
conflict of interests in doing audit, . Have different
divisions
because I also care about in fact
independence.
0 Well in our audit firm, we have some
different divisions like audit division,
financial advisory services and so on.
Based on the division w e have, w e can
work more professional because there
wouldn't be responsibility overlap. By
separating our services, responsibility
overlap will be minimized, so through this
w a y independence in appearance will not
be impaired because public know that w e
have separate work division and
responsibility. This also support
to
maintain our independence in fact
automatically, because by separating
division it can minimize our conflict of
interests. So, in m y opinion providing both
services to the s a m e client would no
result in impairing independence.
P I more concentrate in audit services, but I
still accept s o m e non-audit service. I have
no problems with m y independence in
this issue, because I have integrity and
personality, this is again depended on
auditor mental attitude. However, I also
sent different staff in doing different
services.

• N 0 effect
Reasons:
. H a v e ' different staff and
divisions

•

N o effect

Reasons:
• Send different staff
• Auditors'
integrity
personality

Q You must now that in this audit firm, we
have audit and non-audit division. They
have different partner manager and staff. • N o effect
So, person w h o are in charged as an
auditor will not involve in providing non- Reasons:
audit services. So, w e
can
be • Have different
independent because w e have no conflict
divisions
of interests.
R Well, in our audit firm, we have several

staff and

and

staff and
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divisions, w e have audit division, and also
non audit divisions like management
N o effect
consulting, tax and others, so it is
impossible to engage in one client with
audit and non-audit services. Therefore, Reasons:
our independence here, even w e provide • Have different staff and
divisions
non audit services to our audit client, it
will not affect our independence. Even,
for instance I have to provide both audit
and non audit services to the s a m e client,
m y independence will not be impaired by
this. But as I stated that in this audit firm
w e have different division and different
persons in providing different services.
In this audit firm, we have some different
divisions to handle various of services.
So, audit staff will only involve in audit • N o effect
assignments, and non audit services will
be conducted by other staff. By doing Reasons:
this, it can be avoided the conflict of • Send different staff for
different services
interest caused by providing both audit
and non-audit services, because those
services handled by different staff. In m y
opinion, this issue can not impair our
independence, because w e treat this by
dividing works and responsibilities.
In m y opinion, providing both audit and
non-audit services if conducted by the
s a m e persons could impair auditor • Impair
independence both in fact and in
appearance. If those services conducted Reasons:
auditors'
by different persons from different • Depend
on
divisions, this case is depend on the
integrity
auditors' integrity. If they have strong
integrity they wouldn't be affected, but if
they have w e a k integrity, they would be
affected. So, it is depend on h o w good
audit firms m a n a g e their staff and
divisions, and h o w strong integrity of their
auditors.
W e have s o m e different divisions to
handle different works. W e offer audit and
non-audit to the s a m e clients but those • N o effect
services conducted by different person
from different divisions. I think because Reasons:
w e have such procedures, w e have no
• Have different staff and
ependence even w e
divisions
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provide both services.
I have no clients that accept both of our
services. If they are audit clients, I don't
offer them non-audit services. If I offer
them non-audit services, I don't want to
be as their auditor. Also I don't offer tax
service in m y business, because in m y
opinion taxation is more negotiable. S o I
have no experience in providing both
services
to
the
same
clients.
Consequently, m y independence has
nothing to do with that issue.

Never offer both services to the
s a m e clients
Reasons:
• Avoid conflict of interests

I think we can't provide both services for
one clients, I never do that. If there is a
request for that, I give that assignment to
other partners. In m y opinion doing both Never offer both services to the
services to the s a m e clients will have s a m e clients
conflict of interests. S o I refuse to do that
because
it
could
impair
m y Reasons:
• Avoid conflict of interests
independence.
Independence in appearance probably
could be affected by this situation,
because financial statement users will
look at us that w e do both services to our
clients. However, they have to know that
in m y case, providing both audit and nonaudit services to the s a m e client will have
no effects to m y in fact independence,
because different services done by
different staff and division and certainly
different partner. S o to m e , providing both
services to the s a m e clients would have
no effect to m y independence.
I think m y independence could be
affected by this issue. However, I try to
minimize this by sending m y different
staffs to the s a m e clients to do different
services. I have also s o m e different
divisions, so m y independence in doing
audit is not m u c h affected.

•

Could impair independence
in appearance, but
• N o effect on independence
in fact
Reasons:
• Public view
• Have different
divisions

•

staff and

Could impair

Reasons:
• Have different staff and
divisions

If we want to provide those services we
then have to establish another consulting
firm which is separately managed. S o I Never offer both service to the
never accept both audit and non-audit s a m e clients
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will generate conflict of interest and Reasons:
impair independence in appearance. • Avoid conflict of interests
However, if I face this situation (providing
both service) I a m still be independent
because I've locked m y self from any
intervention.
AA

I haven't provided both services for the
s a m e clients. But, for example I face this
situation I will be independent, because in
m y opinion independence is depended on
the person, I m e a n auditor mental
attitude. A n auditor w h o has strong
mental attitude and integrity as an
independent auditor, he would not be
affected by any situation he is facing.

Never offer both service to the
s a m e clients
Reasons:
• Avoid conflict of interests

BB

I don't think it can impair independence,
because actually there other services that • N o effect
can enhance auditor independence such
tax consulting and tax diagnostic review. Reasons:
If one w e do offer these services together • Depend on what N A S is
offered to clients
with audit services, I think independence
will not be impaired. S o m e other services
m a y be can impair independence.

CC

In m y audit firm, all those services # N 0 effect
conducted by different staff from different
divisions. So, in m y opinion, I think Reasons:
. H a v e different staff and
accepting both services wouldn't be
problems. Because w e have all that tools
divisions
to maintain our independence.

S u m m a r y of the Effect of Providing Non-Audit Services (to audit clients)
to Auditor Independence
• 5 Auditors never offer NAS to audit clients
• 24 Auditors offer N A S to audit clients
Providing NAS has no Effect on Auditor Independence (20
Auditors)
Reasons:
• Big firms have different divisions, small firms send different staff
for different services (15 auditors)
• Selective in offering N A S (3 auditors)
• N A S offered have no significant roles in clients' decision making
process (2 auditors)
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•
•

Strong auditor integrity (1 auditor)
Follow audit rules and standards (1 auditor)

Providing NAS Affects Auditor Independence (impairment for 3
auditors; small amount of impairment for 1 auditor)
Reasons:
• Auditors have conflict of interests
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Appendix 3

The effects of clients' background/reputations on auditor independence.
A

M y experience w h e n I did audit a
company owned by National Company,
they have s o m e auditors and interact with
m a n y auditors, I have to be more careful
because there are m a n y smart people. It
is different from small and the new client
that start to grow. However, the only
difference is treatment what w e do to
them in auditing works, I m e a n w e should
suit our treatment with clients' conditions
and
situations. But in term of
independence it's not different.
B In conducting audit, my early perception
is affected by their backgrounds.
However, its effect is not significant, I
m e a n it does not affect m y independence
because everything must be investigated
by audit program and procedures.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect

C I don't care about clients' background in
term of m y independence, because I
audit them with the s a m e standards. But
in term of scope of works and audit
requirements caused by clients size and
listed or non-listed clients for examples,
they s e e m to be different, it's normal.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect

D Our perception is only perception, but
everything depends on the audit works. I
m e a n w e can perceive a client is a good
client, but if w e find that they need to be
corrected, w e will m a k e a correction. Our
independence is not affected by such
background. W h a t will m a k e different is
only scope of works and audit
requirement caused by different clients'
size, listed and non-listed clients and so
on.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect to independence

Other effects:
• Different treatment to suit
clients' situations

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other effects:

Other Effects:
• Scope of works
• Audit requirements

Other effects:
• Build early perception
• Scope of works

I never differentiate m y client by such
background, because w e have to do all
audit program and procedure s a m e to all
clients. W h a t will m a k e different for them
are such as company's size, complexities
and listed or non-listed companies.
These differences will m a k e different in
term of audit time, scope and audit
requirements, but not in the perceptions
whether they are better or worse than the
others. S o in m y opinion companies'
background that you asked m e has
nothing
to
do
with
my
audit
independence.
Well, to me clients who have good
backgrounds will have good points in
audit works. So, I a m not in doubt to
accept that engagements, because I
hope that client will have clean opinion, or
clients have good reports that can be
audited. However, all of those will depend
on audit process. This view just like a
feeling, notfinaljudge.
I never relate about clients' background
and their financial statements. In m y
experience, the perception is built after
doing audit works, not before. The things
can m a k e difference for example is their
background like they are listed or nonlisted companies, this is in relationship
with audit standards requirements. But
other things, I think it will be same.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other effects:
• Scope of works

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other effects:
• A s a consideration
accepting engagement

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other Effects:
• Different
in
requirements

In my audit experience, I am not affected Effect on independence:
by those backgrounds. But if w e observe • N o effect
companies at share market, there are
m a n y listed companies with clean opinion Other Effects:
collapsed recently, w e know w h o are their
auditors. From this phenomenon, it might
has relation between backgrounds and
opinion for the others. But in m y case, I
a m not affected by clients' backgrounds.
I treat all my clients with the same
Effect on independence:
treatments : scepticism, don't trust them • N o effect
without proper investigation. So, in m y
opinion clients' backgrounds have nothing
Other effects:

will h a p p e n is different companies will
have different scope of works.

S c o p e of works

In m y audit experience, I treated all Effect on independence:
clients with the s a m e treatments. I never • N o effect
differentiate them based on their
backgrounds, I never think to over or less Other effects:
appreciate to clients because of their
backgrounds. M y duty is to audit their
financial reports, so m y duties are the
s a m e to all clients. That's it.
K

M y perceptions about clients' financial Effect on independence:
statements are not affected by their • N o effect
background you have said. In m y
experience, w e d o all audit programs and Other Effects:
procedures and then after that w e would
issue audit opinion. I will issue an audit
report w h e n I have completed all those
works. M y independence is not affected
by w h o is m y clients.

L As I said, I don't care whether my client is
big or small, listed or non-listed, and
whatever. A s a professional auditor, I
have to d o m y works equally to all m y
clients. T h e things that can be different is
about working hours, it d e p e n d s on the
client's size big or small, and listed
company m a y need more works than
non-listed
because
of
different
requirements.
M

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other Effects:
• Scope of works

To m e all m y clients will have the s a m e Effect on independence:
treatments. I don't care about their • N o effect
background or reputation, I never promise
them about audit opinion. I will not believe Other Effects:
clients just from their appearance or
background as you asked, but audit
process and testing must be executed.
This is the rule. So, m y independence
can work properly.

N In term of independence I never
differentiate m y clients based on their Effect on independence:
backgrounds. What m a k e them different • N o effect
are size of firms will generate different
scope of works, listed or non listed Other Effects:
• S c o p e of works
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requirement and so on. All audit process
and procedures must be taken properly
for all clients.
In conducting audit, I am not affected by Effect on independence:
those information or reputation. All m y • N o effect
clients must be audited at the s a m e
practices and audit standards, no matter Other Effects:
w h o they are. I have no pre-judge before
audit works are conducted.
In doing audit, I never committed m y Effect on independence:
emotion, like prejudgment and so on. I • N o effect
more rely on audit works. In m y
experience, whoever become m y clients Other Effects:
will be audited as normal and not
depended on their management or
owners reputation. Audit process must be
done before audit report is produced.
Q

In normal situation, I do audit evenly to all
m y clients, I m e a n I never do special
treatment to them, I do m y audit works as
set by standards. However, when I audit
the company in which the owners have
committed with the Court, I have to be
more careful in doing audit. For example I
have to disclose something more than
other clients, to avoid audit misconducts.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other Effects:
• More careful with clients
committed "court"

I do not differentiate our clients becauseEffect on independence:
of their background. However, listed • N o effect
companies for instances, they have more
requirements, but it has no relevancy with Other effects:
our independence, W e are independent • Scope of works
whoever our clients, no matter they are
listed or non-listed companies.
In my opinion, all clients must be treatedEffect on independence:
equally. I audit m y clients with s a m e rules • N o effect
and standards, nothing special. Clients'
background should not be considered as Other effects:
factors in doing audit works, because our • Scope of works
job is based on audit standards. What
can m a k e they're different in scope of
works are like large or small companies,
listed or non-listed companies.
I can not refuse that m y image about Effect Q n i n d e p e n d e n C e :
clients is affected by their backgrounds. _ N Q effect

However, w e have to do audit process
and procedures s a m e for all clients Other effects:
whatever their backgrounds. I m e a n m y • Early perceptions
early perception is only perception, but
everything is depend on our audit
findings. So, in doing audit works, this
perception about clients backgrounds do
not affect m y independence.
U In doing audit works, I always avoid
Effect on independence:
personal sense. I m e a n m y subjectivity • N o effect
must be taken away. What w e can do in
audit is w e do audit program and Other Effects:
procedures based on audit rules and
standards whoever our clients are. In this
regard, clients' backgrounds must not
affect audit works, because everything
must be investigated based on audit
standards.
V

I never think that good persons must Effect on independence:
produce a good financial statement. Good • N o effect
financial statement m e a n s that financial
statement is prepared as set by Other Effects:
accounting standards. I always do audit
as already set by audit program and
procedures, all stages must be done.

W

Basically in doing audit I a m not affected
by such backgrounds. However, the
scope and rules for listed clients
(subsidiary of listed) I think different from
non-listed clients. Therefore, listed (or
subsidiary listed) clients have s o m e more
rules to be met, however it doesn't affect
m y independence.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect

X There is no effect on my independence
whoever m y clients is. Those information
I got, will not lead m e to loosen m y
independence.
However,
some
requirements from the Institute and
Government will more apply to listed
companies, but there is no impairment of
m y independence.

Effect on independence:
• No effect

Other effects:
• Scope of works

Other effects:
• Scope of works

Y Yes, I think I have a feeling that a good
Effect on independence:
person should have a good report. • N o effect
However, this perception will not affect

audit findings. If I found something that Other effects:
needs to be adjusted or corrected I have Build an early perception
to tell them to change it. Anyway, so far
m y feeling or perception is affected by
client's backgrounds.
In m y view all clients are the same. W e
have to treat them with the s a m e rules Effect on independence:
and audit standards, there is no exception • N o effect
for them. So, whoever they are, they will
be treated evenly. Clients backgrounds
have no effects to m y independence.
AA

BB

CC

In doing audit works, I am not affected
such background and information. I can
be independent from those, however the
scope of works and risks of them are
different, but in term of independence I
treat them evenly.

by
Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Other effects:
• Scope of works

In a normal audit situation w e should do
survey before audit. By doing survey w e
will get enough information such as how Effect on independence:
big the risks w e will face. However, the • N o effect
clients' backgrounds what you mentioned
will not affect our audit opinion or audit Other effects:
tasks. W e do audit process s a m e to all
clients, and w e always do audit based on
standards not feeling.
In general clients' backgrounds do not
have any effect to m y audit works. But in
term of complexity and regulation, listed Effect on independence:
and non-listed clients for example have • N o effect
different requirements. So, when I audit
listed clients I will be more careful Other effects:
• Scope of works
compared to those non-listed clients.
Those things m a k e different works, but
not in term of independence.

S u m m a r y of the effects of Clients' Backgrounds/Reputations on Auditor
Independence
All auditors stated that Clients' Backgrounds/Reputations had no Effect on
Auditor Independence:
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Reasons:
Auditors apply s a m e audit rules and standards to all clients, and apply s a m e
audit program and procedure.
Eighteen Auditors stated that Clients' Backgrounds/Reputations had Other
Effect on Their Perceptions:
Scope of work (mentioned by 12 auditors)
Different audit requirements (mentioned by 4 auditors)
Build early perceptions (mentioned by 3 auditors)
Consideration in accepting audit engagement (mentioned by an auditor)
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Appendix 4
The roles of corporate audit committee
independence.

B
C

and its effect o n auditor

I have an experience with the company Roles:
which has audit committee, I used the • Cooperative
audit committee to cooperate with m e • M a k e easier for audit works
because that committee know much
about the company and they do audit not Effect on independence:
on the spot like m e but they audit as a • H a s positive effects if
auditors still investigate
continuos form. By cooperating with them
information provide by audit
and I do audit as set by standards, it is
committee
the advantage for m e to m a k e m e
"easier" to audit the client. For m e as long
Has negative effects if
as I stick to the standards, I feel that audit
auditors just rely on them
committee is very important. It has
positive or negative effect to the
independence, because s o m e times they
also will steer us, it is dangerous to the
independence. T h e committee also has
good effect when they provide data or
information that I need, it will also can
affect m e not to be independent if I
always trust them. But for m e , the
important thing is not run out from the
standards. I do audit process and
procedures as stated by standards, and I
don't really care with what they do.
No, I have no experience to audit clients
w h o have audit committee.
Yes, I have audited those clients. Their Roles:
rules normally assist us in providing data • Cooperative
and information. W e discuss with them • Discussion about findings
about ourfindings.That committee is
useful in doing our audit tasks. I think, thisEffect on independence:
committee has no bad effect to our • N o bad effect as long as
beware of them
independence, because w e view this
committee as corporate audit committee,
so w e have to be aware about them.
Yes I have audited such clients. The roles Ro|es.
of that committee is normally as our # A s a partner
partner, they provide information that w e # DDiscuss
i s c u s s a abut
b u t finding
need, they become
our partner
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discussion, and w e discuss about audit • Useful for audit works
findings. That committee 1 think is useful
to our audit works. W e have no problems Effect on independence:
with our independence because w e take • N o bad effect, as long as
viewed as partner
them as our counterpart.
W e have audited s o m e clients with such
committee. In here, clients w h o have
audit committee are normally banks and
large companies. The role of this
committee to our audit work is very
useful. I prefer to audit companies, w h o
have audit committee, however if won't
affect m y independence, because I
believe that committee works for them not
for us, so w e have to be careful, but as I
said that it is very helpful to audit works.

Roles:
• Useful for audit works
Effect on independence:
• No bad effect as long as be
careful with them

No, I have not.
We have some clients with audit
committee, and they role normally
support our works, but w e do not rely on
them. W e see this committee as our
partner to support us, but w e do not treat
them as our reference. The role of this
committee has no effect to m y
independence.
Yes, I have some clients with audit
committees. Their roles normally provide
some information for us in relation to our
audit work processes. For example w e
discuss about auditfindings,w e discuss
about their progress. W e view audit
committees as our counter parts. The
existence of these committees are very
useful for us in doing audit works. It has
no relation to our independence.

Roles:
• Useful for audit works
Effect on independence:
• N o bad effect as long as do
not treat them as a
reference
Roles:
• Useful for audit works
• To discuss about findings
Effect on independence:
• N o effect

They normally assist us when we need
some information, but w e don't really rely Roles:
on them, because they are corporate • To discuss about findings
audit committee anyway. However. In m y • Useful for audit works
experience the existence of that
committee is helpful for our audit tasks. In Effect on independence:
doing that, I think audit committee has no • N o bad effect
effects to m y independence.
Yes I have audited such clients. In m y
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experience w h e n I audit this client, I feel
that I must be more careful because Roles:
something wrong could happen with • A s a partner
these clients, consequently I did audit
Effect on independence:
with a feeling "more independent".
• Enhance independence
K I have no clients who have audit
committee, because all m y clients are
non-listed and small and medium
companies.
L Yes I have audited some clients who
have audit committee. Normally big
companies and all banks have this
committee. The role of this committee is
to mediate between company and us
(independent auditor). W e don't rely on
audit committee, but they rely on our
findings. W e work "together" with that
committee and also with internal auditor.
The existence of this committee is useful
for us.
M
No I haven't audited client w h o has such
committee, because I think audit
committee is a n e w thing in Indonesia.
And it is also expensive to be established
in a company.

Roles:
• Cooperative
• Useful for audit works
• Mediator between clients
and auditors
Effect on independence:
• N o effect

N No I haven't audited such clients.
0 Until now, there is no requirement from
the Government or the institute to
establish audit committee. So, not many
clients w h o have this committee, only
banking companies and listed companies
normally they have this committee. To
me, the existence of audit committee is
not affecting m y independence, the things
that can m a k e difference from clients
without this committee, is w h e n I audit
companies w h o have this committee, I
can work together with the committee to
discuss about findings or problems in
audit works. That's it.

Roles:
• Cooperative
• To discuss about findings
Effect on independence:
• N o bad effect

P Yes, I have audited some clients who
have audit committee. Their roles
normally
as
representative
of
Roles:
commissioners
board,
and
audit
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committee also become our discussion
partner to talk about audit findings and
relevant things. In doing our audit works,
the existence of audit committee is useful,
however I work critically with that
committee.

•
•
•

Representing commissioner
To discuss about findings
Useful for audit works

Effect on independence:
• N o effect, as long as work
critically

N o I haven't.
Audit committee is a new thing in
Indonesia. But I have met them in several
clients, banking clients or big companies
clients. Their role is to discuss our audit
findings and the existence of audit
committee is very helpful. However, there
is no relevancy between audit committee
with our independence. W e do audit to
all clients with "scepticism", so w e do not
rely on them. W e treat all clients with
s a m e treatments. In m y experience,
m a n y clients complaint m e by stating
"why your audit staff are so suspect to
us?" D o you know what does it m e a n ? It
m e a n s that in this audit firm all audit staff
must be independent, not just rely on
information given by clients, but w e have
to investigate them.
No I haven't audited such clients.
Yes, I audited s o m e clients with audit
committee. Their roles normally assist us
in providing information and assist us
w h e n w e need s o m e discussion, they
also discuss with us about audit findings.
In m y opinion, their existence is useful to
our audit tasks, but if their members
consist of management or directors, their
independence should be questioned. But
if their m e m b e r s consist of the owners or
other independent elements, it would be
independent, and w e could more work
together with them.
The roles of audit committee normally is
to assist in audit process. They monitor
the operation of company's business. So
the existence of audit committee is helpful
for us. There is no effect in relation to

Roles:
• To discuss about findings
• Useful for audit works
Effect on independence:
• N o effect, because apply
scepticism

Roles:
in
providing
• Assisting
information
• To discuss about findings
• Useful for audit works
Effect on independence:
• Depends on w h o are the
members of committee,
directors or shareholders?

Roles:
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V
W

auditor independence, because however • Assisting in audit process
that committee is work for clients, so w e • Helpful for auditors
always be aware and careful in dealing
with them
Effect on independence:
• N o effect, as long as be
No, I haven't audited clients w h o have
careful with them
audit committee.
N o I haven't

X Well, many clients don't have audit
committee. Only s o m e clients do and
their role normally as source of
information for us, like to m a k e s o m e
discussions. After audit process w e meet
them to discuss our findings, they provide
s o m e information, however w e don't rely
on them, such information w e treat those
as additional information that still need to
be investigated. So, our independence is
not affected by the existence of this
committee in our clients.
Y
All m y clients are non-listed and they are
small and medium companies. So, I have
no clients w h o have audit committee. I
have no experience about that.

Roles:
• Source of information
• To discuss about findings
Effect on independence:
• No bad effect, because treat
them
as
additional
information

Z No, I have no experience with clients who
have audit committee.
AA No I haven't.
BB

Well I have audited s o m e clients w h o
have audit committee. S o m e committee Roles:
can work properly, but s o m e others don't. • Helpful for audit works
If they work properly they will be helpful
for us to assist and co-operate in doing Effect on independence:
audit. They can provide documents that
• N o bad effect
w e need or other things that w e require.
However, our independence is not
affected by this relation.

CC

No, I haven't audited such clients.
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S u m m a r y of the roles of corporate audit committee and its effect on
Auditor Independence:
Roles:
• Useful and cooperative to audit work
• Provides additional information
• To discuss findings
• To mediate between clients and auditors
13 Auditors had never audited clients with a corporate audit committee
16 Auditors who had audited clients with a corporate audit committee
• Corporate Audit Committee has no effect on auditor
independence (13 Auditors)
Reasons:
• A s long as they are beware of audit committee
• View audit committee not as the only reference
• Corporate Audit Committee has Effect on Auditor Independence
(3 Auditors)
1 auditor said that this committee enhanced auditor independence, he is
more careful in performing audit tasks.
1 auditor stated that this committee could impair or enhance depending on
how he interacted with them
1 auditor said that the effect of this committee on auditor independence
depended on w h o were the members.
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Appendix 5
The effects of major clients (fee dependence) on auditor independence.
I have a pressure because to be honest I • Could impair
a m worried to lose m y major clients. But I
always maintain myself to work based on Reasons/Treatments:
standards. That is m y key point, because • Follow rules and standards
however maintaining independence is m y
business.
B

Yes I have some, but not really extreme • Could impair
major clients. In m y experience this
position can put us into hard situation, I Reasons/Treatments:
think it could lead into independence • Hard situation
impairment.

C Yes, we have some major clients. But in
term of office's income I think this office
does not rely on s o m e major clients,
because this office has enough number of
clients. W h a t w e do to "retain" those
clients is through quality improvement, w e
do audit works as ruled by standards, so
our audit report will be valuable.

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Have many clients
• Quality audit
• Follow rules and standards

D Yes I have some major clients, but we
• N o effect
have to remember that the bigger clients
theriskierand more works need to do. So Reasons/Treatments:
in m y opinion, big or small clients are not • The bigger clients, the
significant,
because
they
have
riskier
proportional size in term of fee and risks
or works to do.
Yes w e have major clients among several
• Impair
hundreds of our clients. W h e n w e audit
those major clients, to be honest that Reasons/Treatment:
there is a tendency to fear of loosing • Fear of loosing clients
them, the more extreme our major clients,
the more fear of loosing clients.

No, I have not major clients
G

N o major Clients

W e have s o m e major clients. But w e
don't have to worry about that. Because •

No e

ff ect
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the bigger clients the more risky they are.
And such clients also need more staffs to
do audit and also the time needed to do Reasons/Treatments:
audit is longer than small clients, so in m y • The bigger clients, the
opinion it has no effects to m y
riskier
independence.
• The bigger clients, the more
staff needed
Yes we have some major clients. But in
m y experience, I feel more comfortable • No effect
when audit big companies compared to
small companies because the big ones Reasons/Treatments:
normally have a better management. Big • Big clients will not easily
clients will not easily change their
change their auditors
auditors without clear reasons. S o w e • Rely on quality audit
feel, more convenient. W e have no fear of
loosing clients because w e believe that
w e have quality and client will buy our
quality.
I think my independence can be
maintained even w e are auditing major • N o effect
clients. Because w e have self-confidence
that our audit quality is well recognized, Reasons/Treatments:
so our clients will need us.
• Rely on quality audit
Yes I have some major clients. I have an
experience w h e n I audited a big clients, in • N o effect
m y opinion there w a s something to be
corrected, but w h e n I discussed with m y Reasons/Treatments:
partner, m y partner allow clients' reports, • Rely on quality audit
no need to be corrected. I think one of the
reasons because that client is a big client
and that thing w a s still clearable and still
in the "corridor". I believed that even
though w e are auditing a big client, but
when the mistake is significant, m y
partner will correct it.
We have some major clients, but we are
not depended on them. W e know that • N o effect
each client has its o w n rule in changing
its auditor. W e can not control them, so Reasons/Treatments:
w e have nothing to do about that. There • N o fear of loosing clients
is nothing to fear about major clients.
We have more than two thousand clients,
w e are not depend on s o m e major clients.
N o effect
All clients are big and
medium
companies, and there is no client w h o Reasons/Treatments:
constitutes a major contribution to our
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total fees, normally they are similar in
term of fee size. So, w e have no problem
with major clients.

Have m a n y big clients
No clients constitute a major
income

My clients are relatively same in term of
fee, so I have no really major clients.
However, I never fear of loosing clients. • No effect
Because I believe, that the wealth will be
given by the God, w e don't need to worry Reasons/Treatments:
about this. What w e do, is do our best as • N o clients constitute a major
set by the rules and standards, that's it.
income
M y independence is not affected by such • Religious approach
situation.
• Follow rules and standards
Yes we have some major clients. But in
doing audit works, w e have self
confidence. Even s o m e clients said that • N o effect
they will change their auditors, but they
normally c o m e back to us, it might Reasons/Treatments:
because our quality. W e never depend on • Rely on quality audit
s o m e clients.
W e have to remember that the larger fee
w e can receive the bigger clients they
are. So, w e should be careful in accepting
big clients. Even though their accounting
system generally is better than the small
companies', but they also could have a
bigger potential risks. And also, the
bigger clients the more jobs w e should
do. Those are become our consideration
in accepting them as our clients.
Accordingly, in m y opinion major clients
would not impair our independence.
Yes I have some major clients. But in
doing audit, s o m e clients c o m e and go, I
have no problems with this. I a m not fear
to lose clients, because by doing
independent people will tell the other
clients and they will rely on m e in the next
time.
To be honest if w e can be independent
w e will be happy and nothing to worry.

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• The bigger clients the more
works to do
• The bigger clients, the
riskier

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Building
good
image
through being independent

• N o effect
All our clients is average in size. We have
no major clients for now. But w e have
s o m e major clients last time, but it w a s Reasons/Treatments:
not a problem. I can be independent • Want to be free
because I don't want to be dictated by
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clients.
You can't think that our independence is
affected by major clients. W e have more
than a thousand clients, w e won't be
worry if s o m e clients leave us. W e are not
depended on individual client. Every year
about one hundred become our new
clients and about thirty clients leave us.
Even though w e have s o m e major clients
but it is no problems with them to our
independence.
We
maintain
our
independence as tight as possible, this is
our commitment.
Yes, w e have s o m e major clients. In
relationship with clients w e don't perceive
clients as employers but rather as
partnership relation. So, in doing audit
works w e works for public interests to tell
the true as facts w e found. Not to work for
clients as employers. W e have integrity
and professionalism as an independent
auditor.
Yes w e have s o m e major clients. But w e
should be aware that the larger audit fee
the biggerrisksw e will face and the more
works w e have to do, conversely the
smaller audit fee w e receive, the less
risks w e will face and the less works w e
have
to
do. All things
have
consequences, I don't see that w e are
depend on s o m e clients because w e also
consider their risks and scope of works.

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Have m a n y clients
• N o fear of loosing clients
• Maintaining independence

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Serve public interest
• Perceive clients as partner
not as employers

•

No effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• The bigger clients, the more
works to do
• The bigger clients, the
riskier

Yes I have some major clients. But I think
• N o effect
when I perform audit works, I never follow
what they want. But rather to refer to Reasons/Treatments:
audit standards. A s long as w e can resist • Follow rules and standards
our professionalism, major clients have
no effect to our independence.
There are some major clients from seven
clients that w e have. Even though this
audit firm has s o m e major clients, it
doesn't m e a n that our independence can
be compromised with them. I realize that
s o m e clients have rules that every three
years they have to change their auditor,

•

No effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• N o fear of loosing clients
• Nothing to do with auditor
change
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w e can't do anything with this rule. There
s o m e clients c o m e and go I a m not
worried about this.
W

S o m e times there are effects from this
situation. However, I have some • Could impair
restrictions in doing this, I can suggest
and compromise about our audit works Reasons/Treatments:
but those are still in the audit standards. I • Try not to violate rules and
standards
can be flexible but still in order not to
violate our standards.
Yes w e do have s o m e major clients. As I
have said that w e are not worried about
loosing clients, so in conducting audit w e
are confident with our performances and
therefore w e don't really care whether
clients will be coming back or leaving us.
It doesn't affect m y independence.

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• No fear of loosing clients
• Rely on quality audit

All my clients are small and medium
companies, so in general all m y clients No major clients
generate an average number of fees. I
have no major clients, so
my
independence is not affected by this.
We have no major clients. All our clients
are average in fee sizes. So w e don't rely No major clients
our income on the certain clients. In this
regard, w e have no problems with our
independence
because
all clients
contribute fees to our income almost
evenly.
AA

Yes I have s o m e major clients. I can be
independent because I try to distribute m y
income from all m y clients and not to fear # ^ 0 effect
to lose clients because w e do our best
service, w e believe that public will rely on Reasons/Treatments:
us
• Rely on quality audit

BB

I have s o m e major clients. But w e have to
remember that the bigger fees the larger • No effect
risks and scope of works. So w e are not Reasons/Treatments:
depend on our clients even big clients.
• The bigger clients, the more
works to do
• The bigger clients, the
riskier
Yes w e have s o m e major clients. But our

CC

audit firm has many other clients, so it is
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not a problem with our independence. W e • N o effect
are a big audit firm, w e have confident to
be exists and clients will c o m e to us to be Reasons/Treatments:
audited.
• Rely on quality audit

Summary of the effects of Major Clients on Auditor
Independence
• 3 Auditors have no major clients
• 26 Auditors have major clients
Major Clients have no effect on auditor independence (22 auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditors rely on quality audit
• The bigger clients, the more work and risks auditors face
• N o fear of loosing clients
• Follow audit rules and standards
• Apply religious values
Major Clients Impair Auditor Independence (4 auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditors tend to retain such clients, because they have economic
dependence.
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Appendix 6

The effects of tight
independence.

competition

among

audit firms

on

auditor

This depends on the auditors themselves.
I a m not worried about this reality,
Depends
on
auditors'
because m y core business is not audit
integrity
but m a n a g e m e n t consulting. However, in
m y opinion if w e perform good quality of Reasons/Treatments:
work, client also will satisfy with our job, it • Providing good quality
in
accepting
does not m e a n that w e always agree with • Selective
clients
what our clients do. I also don't like a
client w h o looks for a low fee. If I meet
such client, I even ask him to look for
other audit firms.
B

I think it has negative effect to audit fee
competition
among
audit
firms.
Consequently, auditor independence
could be affected by this situation.
However, in this audit firm w e never offer
a low fee, w e always compare between
fee and auditriskor business risks.

•

Could impair

Reason/Treatments:
• Avoid irrational fee
• Consider audit and business
risks

C To be honest, as a staff in this office, I • Slightly impair
can feel that the effect of competition
a m o n g audit firm can little bit impair our Reasons/Treatments:
independence. But, this effect is not • Try to minimize it
significant, it's still tolerable I guess.
D I try to build this firm as a good audit firm.
• N o effect
S o in doing audit, I do it carefully not only
doing business but also concern with our Reasons/Treatments:
audit quality. O n c e w e do audit wantonly • Providing good quality
and compromise our independence, bad • Building good image
label will be attached to us forever. S o in
getting and retaining clients, I more rely
on our "good name".
E Other partners and I feel confident that
our services offered to clients are highly • N o effect
respected by clients and public. I know
Reasons/Treatments:
that competition a m o n g audit firms is
• Rely on good quality
getting tighter from time to time, but as I
said that w e are not worry about this
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issue, even though w e offer our service
with a high rate, but w e sell our quality
and clients and public know that.
I think a tight competition has led audit
firm to reduce or cut their audit fee. In m y • Uncertain
opinion, with a low audit fee, it would
relate to risks, because auditors would Reasons/Treatments:
not do audit properly. Matter of • Depends
on
independence would depend on auditors'
mental attitude
mental attitudes.

auditors'

In this audit firm w e believe that our
products and quality are highly respected, • N o effect
so in competing with other audit firms w e
never reduce or cut our fee, because w e Reasons/Treatments:
also have to pay staff at a high rate • Rely on good quality and
salary. In this audit firm also w e have an
staff
unwritten agreement to accept clients • Selective
in
accepting
w h o only will generate a minimum certain
clients
number of fee, except for the m e m b e r of
group companies w e can accept them.
S o in this audit firm, issued about tight
competition in attracting and retaining
clients have
no
effect to our
independence.
I know that our competitors some time cut • N o effect
their audit fee into a low rate when
proposing audit fee. This is possibly Reasons/Treatments:
caused by a tight competition a m o n g • Offer a reasonable fee
audit firms, but in this firm w e never cut • Rely on good quality
audit fee into an irrational rate. Because
w e believe that by maintaining a rational
and reasonable fee, w e can do audit
works properly with a high quality.
Otherwise, junk opinion and poor quality
audit will be produced.
Our philosophy here is to get business
and maintain our quality. Those two
things must be run harmoniously. W e will
not accept an engagement or do audit
works if they will put us into troubles even
though they will generate good income.
So, in this regard w e will never drop our
audit fees below our standards, because
it will cause improper audit works.
I a m not a partner, in doing

m y job I

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Run business and quality
harmoniously
• Avoid 'risky' engagement
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never involved to find clients. In m y • Slightly impair
opinion, I think competition could affect us
to tend to follow clients' wants and Reason/Treatments:
expectations, however these things are • Refuse 'bad clients'
done if they are still meet the rules and • Follow rules and standards
standards, I m e a n if those things still
tolerable and reasonable to be done, w e
can do that. But w h e n clients' wants do
not meet audit standards w e will refuse
them. In m y opinion, there is an influence
of competition but it's not dangerous.
We don't establish this firm to rely on our
life. S o w e run this firm not so hard like
others. In proposing our fee, w e • N o effect
determine our fee from m e n hour w e will
use. S o w e never propose for an irrational Reasons/Treatments:
fee. W e also never sell our independence • This audit firm established
just to get clients.
not for m o n e y
• Never offer an irrational fee
No..no..no..we don't do like that. We
never reduce the fee just only to get client
until w e meet difficulty for paying our staff • N o effect
that is impossible. If w e offer a low audit
fee to our clients, and then w e pay our Reasons/Treatments:
staff at a low rate salary, w e can imagine • Hire qualified auditors
h o w bad the audit quality. In this firm, w e • Offer a high fee
hire qualified auditors, w e pay them at a • Generate quality audit
high rate and consequently w e offer a
high rate also to our clients, so w e can
maintain our audit quality. If there are
clients w h o look for a low audit fee, they
can find other audit firms. W e never
reduce audit fee because it can reduce
audit quality and w e don't want to breach
audit standards.
I think you'rerightthat competition a m o n g
audit firms is getting harder as w e can
see, but Alhamdulillah (Thanks God), until
• N o effect
n o w our audit firm can survive without
impairing our integrity. W e compete with Reasons/Treatments:
other firms, with our confidence that w e • Reasonable fee
serve better public interests, so all parties • Rely on good quality
will k n o w that our office has a high
reputation. W e never offer a very low fee
to clients, but offer "reasonable" fee with
a high audit quality, this is what w e sell to
our clients. So, issue about a tight
competition a m o n g audit firms does not
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affect our independence.
I think , that is depended on what kind of
clients w e have. If our clients have bad
manners, they will try us to violate the
rules and standards, but if our clients
have good manners they will follow the
rules and standards. Normally, I meet • N o effect
good manners w h o never ask us to
compromise the rules and standards, and Reasons/Treatments:
in
accepting
those w h o have bad manners they seek • Selective
clients
other auditors.
We offer a reasonable fee to all our
clients do all audit programs and
procedures. W e never reduce the fee just
only to get clients and w e reduce s o m e
audit programs and procedures for
example, w e don't do that. But w e do
audit works efficiently and effectively, so
w e can compete our rate and quality with
other audit firms. W e have no problem
with competition a m o n g audit firms.
It is depended on auditor's mental
attitude. If an auditor has a weak mental
attitude as an independent auditor,
his/her independence will be impaired by
that issue, because he/she will be worried
not to has clients. However, as an auditor
I feel confident to be independent in
competing with other firms. In offering
audit fee, I also offer a normal fee, it
depend on h o w big work scope and m a n
hours. Competition will only impair auditor
independence those w h o have bad
attitude.
We are female auditors so we don't rely
on our salary as major income for our
family. Consequently, w e don't really
seek clients as m a n y as w e can. W e
more maintain our quality than income.
W e are professional that must be
independent, not to sell or impair our
independence for money. So, competition
a m o n g audit firms is not a problem for us,
it won't impair our independence.
In term of fee, our audit firm is well known

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Offer reasonable fee
• Be effective and efficient
• Maintaining good quality

•

Uncertain

Reasons/Treatments:
• Depends
on
auditors'
mental attitude
• Reasonable fee with quality
audit

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Quality
• Objective of audit firm is not
to seek money
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as an expensive firm. This is to select our
clients, the worse clients the more
expensive fee will be offered to them. So
the "worse" clients will turn to other audit
firms as the clients prefer. W e s o m e
times not to accept next audit
engagement if w e consider that this client
have so m a n y troubles. Even still in the
audit work process, w e can stop
immediately if w e are not happy with the
clients' response or clients tend to push
us to do something "risky". W e ever
refused audit engagement with billions
Rupiah fees because w e know that such
companies have troubles, w e don't want
to put ourselves into problems, w e select
our clients, not all clients bring us honey,
but s o m e clients also bring us poisons,
w e have to be careful.
W e propose an audit fee with a
reasonable price. Because if w e offer a
very expensive fee w e will not have
clients, and if w e offer a very low fee, w e
can not survive and finally w e will
generate a poor audit quality. By
proposing this fee, w e don't need to worry
not to have clients because w e have
certain clients and what w e do is to do
our best in audit works.

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Selective
in
accepting
clients
• Avoid 'risky' clients

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Offer a reasonable fee
• Rely on good quality

Competition is a business issue that
N o effect
could
lead
auditors
to
impair
independence. However, strong auditors
could separate and differentiate between Reasons/Treatments:
business decision and independence, • Strong integrity
competition
shouldn't
impair their
independence. I m y self can be
independent while a tight competition
take place.
In this audit firm, when we propose audit
fee, w e always consider m a n hour, how • N o effect
m a n y staff, level of staff, scope of works,
risks and so on. W e always propose a Reasons/Treatments:
reasonable fee, w e never drop our fee • Considers , cost, scope of
under the costs. By doing this w e can
works, risk and so on
maintain our audit quality.
In this firm our fee proposal is based on
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scope of works and m e n hour of staffs.
W e never propose a fee without those
considerations. S o w e never offer fee at a
very low rate, because w e need to cover
our costs. W e offer audit fee proposal at a
normal rate. I have no problems with m y
independence in this regard.

• No effect

I think there will be impairment caused by
tight competition, however it still can be
managed, I m e a n this effect is not so
serious. Because auditors also will not go
too far only for getting clients, they also
will consider about risks.

•

I think this situation would no impair m y
independence, because when w e charge
audit fee w e have calculated how long
one assignment can be finished and w h o
will do that job, so w e can calculate how
much the fee can be offered to our client.
W e will not offer audit fee under our
operational cost, w e are not worried to
lose our clients, they know w h o w e are.

•

Reasons/Treatments:
• Offer a normal fee
• Consider scope of works,
m a n hours and so on
Slightly impair

Reasons/Treatments:
• Competition
• Minimize risks
No effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Consider m e n hours, length
and scope of works.
• Offer a normal fee

"I think competition a m o n g audit firms
• Impair
can impair auditor independence. In m y
experience, about fifty percents of m y Reasons/Treatments:
clients are continuous clients. I even have • Conflict of interests
clients w h o have been audited for more
than seven years. The taxation office has
no problems with this audit tenure. But,
for the banks' purpose s o m e times they
ask clients to change their auditors.
Anyway, I think competition issue can
lead auditor independence to impairment"
That might be true for some other audit
firms. But, if you see in this audit firm w e
have several level or position from the
bottom to the top. It will allow us to do
audit works more professional, based on
our profession and expertise. In this firm
w e also have a philosophy that wealth
c o m e from the God, it is not only based
on our efforts. This philosophy will lead us
to do the best but not to be greedy. So
the tight competition has no effects to our
audit
performance
especially
our

•

No effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• D o audit work professionally
• Religious approach
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independence.
AA
In offering our audit fee, we consider
s o m e factors like work scope, risks, w h o
will be in charged and other things, and
so far w e never offer audit fee under the
expected costs. S o even though w e are
facing a tight competition w e never impair
our independence by reducing huge
expenses.

•

No effect:

Reasons/Treatments:
• Offer a normal price
• Consider scope of works,
risks, and so on

BB

CC

I don't know for the other audit firms. But • N o effect
for m e and this audit firm, a tight
competition
will not
impair our Reasons/Treatments:
independence.
• Auditors' integrity
personality
I think my audit firm never cut audit fee
into a very low rate, but rather to offer a • No effect
normal fee. S o the selection of audit firms
would depend on clients' choice. Our Reasons/Treatments:
independence is not affected by this
competition.
• Offer a normal fee

and

S u m m a r y of the effect of competition a m o n g audit firms on auditor
independence
Competition has no effect on auditor independence (21 auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditors offer normal fee with quality audit
• Selective in accepting audit engagement, to avoid risks
• Considers m a n hours, long and scope of works in determining fee
• Maintaining auditor integrity
Competition impairs auditor independence (2 auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditors have pressure to lose clients at any time
Competition slightly impairs auditor independence (3 auditors)
Reasons:
• There is a little impairment, but not serious
Not certain whether competition impairs auditor independence or not (3
auditors)
Reasons:
• Depends on auditors themselves
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Appendix 7

The effects of directors' roles to auditor independence.
It depends on auditor integrity. Even most • N o effect
of m y clients are by managements, but I
try to maintain m y independence because Reason
I have to.
• Must be independent
B

Even though m y clients are share- • Impair
holders, s o m e times our relationship with
management could lead to independence Reasons/Treatments:
impairment. Because
auditor and • Auditors and clients are
management are interdependence.
interdependent

C I think that situation could lead to a little
• Slightly impair
bit independence impairment, but that is
not significant. Because w e do audit Reasons/Treatments:
works still in the rules and standards. If • Refuse risky clients
w e face a materialrisks,w e will refuse to • Try to follow rules and
do that, but if still tolerable, w e could do
standards
that.
The relation between clients and us is • N o effect
professional relation, no one is more
superior than other. S o in doing audit Reasons/Treatments:
works I think w e do not compromise our • Professional relationship, no
independence but rather to enhance our
one is more superior
service quality to our clients. For example
w e complete our works as have been
scheduled. If they are satisfied with our
works quality, they will appoint us for the
next engagement.
Well, the shareholders annual general
• N o effect
meeting normally delegate to the
management to arrange about their Reasons/Treatments:
auditor.
S o w e will involve with
• Stick to the rules and
management in dealing about audit
standards
appointment and remuneration. Even
• Avoid wrong doings
though this procedure could lead both
auditor and management to "mutual
advantage" but as I said that in doing
audit works I try to be always
independent, and not to retain our clients
by compromising our independence.
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Because in m y opinion, once I did
mistakes
by
compromising
my
independence, for example, public will not
rely on m e or this audit firm. Because
client w h o has m a d e deal with m e will tell
others that I can be bribed.
Even though w e are a small firm, w e have
• N o effect
integrity to be independent. W e never
compromise our independence just to Reason
grab and retain clients.
• Auditor integrity
I think in the listed company, normally
• N o effect
their management change every year. So
management has no role in this regard. In Reasons/Treatments:
the
shareholders
Annual
General Management/directors change
Meeting, they appoint audit firm and then every year
management deals with us about fee. In • Auditors have a bargain
this negotiation w e have a bargain
position, not to be dictated
position to negotiate audit fee. Normally
audit fee increase every year, it is
depended h o w big the scope of work of
clients. W e have bargain in this thing and
w e are not dictated by clients.
This office is very strict in maintaining• N o effect
independence both in appearance and in
facts of their staffs. This office has Reasons/Treatments:
confidence that w e sell quality, w e do • Rely on quality services
business but w e don't want to sell junk
products. W e
never negotiate or
compromise our independence to get or
retain clients.
I don't think we practice those things. • N o effect
Because in m y experience, w e try to stick
to the rules and standards. However, in Reasons/Treatments:
s o m e situation I can "help" them but still • Stick to the rules and
in the legal corridor. I can adjust audit
standards, do not violate
works as clients propose without any
them
violating standards. That is the only thing
what I do for m y clients.
I think there will be influence from this • There is a (bad) influence
situation. Because, however w e are
h u m a n being, clients have proposed us to Reasons:
be selected as the next auditor, and w e • Take and give relation
have to do something for them. But w e do • However, try not to go too
audit still in the audit rules and standards.
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W e can not go further to violate those
rules and standards.

far

I never build a social relationship with my
clients. M y relation is limited to business • N o effect
matters, I never expect more than that.
Even though I can close to them, I never Reaso ns/Treatments:
compromise m y audit works. M y • Relationship is limited to
relationship with clients has no effect to
business matters only
m y independence.
It backs to auditor himself. If he has a
good mental attitude he will have no • N o effect
problem whether he will be appointed for
the next engagement or not. H e will tell Reasons/Treatments:
everything as facts he found. Also from • Depends on strength of
the client's management, a good
auditors' mental attitude
management (client) will ask auditor to
show all "bad" things that can be found
and finally those things will be adjusted
as set by rules and standards. In m y
experience, I have no problem with this
situation in relation to m y independence.
I know that the board of directors propose
audit firms in the annual meeting and also • N o effect
the board has authority to negotiate audit
fee and remuneration with client. But you Reasons/Treatments:
have to know that our staff try not too • Relationship is limited to
close with our clients, even though for
professional
relationship
example w e have a close relationship
only
with our clients, our relation is limited to • D o not expect to be selected
professional relation. And w e are still able
for the next engagement
to maintain our objectivity. I don't really
worry whether I will be selected as the
next auditor or not, I don't expect our
client assign us for the next audit
engagement
by
negotiate
our
professionalism.
I don't think we do that thing. What we do
to serve our clients is to increase our • N o effect
quality for example w e do our audit work
as w e have planned, w e do it on time. W e Reasons/Treatments:
tell them about their limitation and w e • Offer quality service
advise them to m a k e them better. W e • B e professional
never m a k e a deal to compromise our
profession like that.
I think w e

have to build our good
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relationship with clients. But w e have to
be aware to differentiate between • N o effect
professional and non-professional relation
to avoid ourselves into trouble. W e should Reasons/Treatments:
• Avoidance of wrong
have good relation and be able to work
doing
together with clients in order to improve
• Offer quality services
our works quality, not to violate
profession and auditor code of ethics. In
this regard, I don't think m y independence
could be affected.
I think our independence is not affected
• N o effect
by directors' roles, because w e have
commitment to be independent auditor, Reason
otherwise w e breach the rules.
• Auditor integrity

Q

I don't see any impairment with this kind • N o effect
of relation. Even though w e have direct
deal with them, w e can maintain our Reasons/Treatments:
independence. W e never bargain or
• Never
compromise
compromise our independence to retain
independence
our clients.
I think auditor independence is not
# N Q effect
impaired because w e don't want to be R e a s o n
dictated w e follow audit rules and
# Fo||ow gudjt
standards not clients wants.
standards
In m y experience, I have no problem with
m y independence w h e n I a m doing audit.
Because dealing audit appointment is not
m y responsibility, that is m y partner job,
so m y duty is to do audit works. A s far as
I know there is no force from
management to do their order, and there
is no intention from us to serve clients
with "special service" to retain them for
the next engagement.
I don't think this situation could lead
compromise our independence. Because
w e normally deal with financial manager,
not with financial director so our relation
can be still maintained, not too close with
client's decision maker. From m y point of
view, our fee proposal is also challenge

m|es

and

• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• N o force from management
• N o 'special service' for
clients

us to
• N o effect
Reasons/treatments:
• Never deal with decision
maker
• Propose normal fee with
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by audit quality and other fee proposed
by other auditfirms.S o in m y opinion, this
situation wouldn't m a k e us to compromise
our independence.
U In my experience I didn't follow what
clients propose if they are not meet
standards. So, I will argue with clients
and refuse them, when they us to do
something which could violate rules and
standards. I don't need to be feared to
lose clients because when w e maintain
our audit quality, people will know us, and
in the future they will recognize us.

quality services

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• N o fear of losing clients
• Offer quality services

V Our relation is professional relation. We • N o effect
never build a social relation, because w e
are worried it could impair our Reasons/Treatments:
independence.
Be professional
W Yes, my independence some times can
be compromised because of force from • Impair
the directors. In m y case it is hard to
avoid it because, the directors are also Reasons/Treatments:
the owners of the company w h o appoint • Directors are owners of
us to do audit. W h a t I can do is to
companies
maintain that I do audit works still follow • Try to minimize wrong doing
the rules and standards.
X My philosophy is do our best, do our audit
work as ruled by standards. I believe that • N o effect
if w e maintain our quality clients and
public will know what w e have done. So I Reasons/Treatments:
don't care whether are proposing us or
• D o the best
not. I won't "negotiate" our independence
• Offer quality services
to be selected as the next auditor for
them.
Y I think auditor independence is not
impaired by directors' roles because w e
• N o effect
have integrity to be independent and not Reason
to be dictated by directors.
• Auditor integrity
Z I have no any concern whether clients will
appoint m e for the next engagement or
• N o effect
not. Because once I expect for the next
appointment, I would more compromise in Reasons/Treatments:
anything. It is dangerous for m y • D o not expect to be selected
independence. What I do is do audit
for the next engagement
works as best as I can by following audit
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rules and standards, so
professional auditor.

I can

be

I think this situation could lead auditor into
impairment
of
his
independence,
especially in the case of mine. Because in
here, our clients are the owner of the
companies, so w e deal with them in audit
appointment, w e have to choose whether
w e will solely be profession or also w e
would be a businessmen. If w e will be
professional, w e will have no problem
with independence, but if w e will be both
professional and businessmen, w e might
impair our independence. It's a critical
situation for m e .
W e have no problems with this situation,
w e are a big firm. W e are not fear of
loosing clients, because every year
clients c o m e and go. But the number of
clients w h o c o m e are much larger than
w h o leave. W e are very confident with our
services offered to our clients, and w e
can do audit and other services
effectively and efficiently, so w e can
compete with other audit firms. So w e
don't
need
to compromise
our
independence to retain our clients, w e do
our audit as what standards ruled.
As I said that audit firm will consider
between fee and risks. If the risks are
higher than what benefits w e will have,
that engagement would be refused. In
other world w e will select our job after
considering those factors.

Do the best

•

Impair

Reasons/Treatments:
• Clients are the owner of the
companies
• Need to choose to be a
"businessman"
or
professional

•

N o effect

Reasons/Treatments:
• Offer quality service
• Have m a n y clients

•

N o effect

• Reasons/Treatments:
Consider risks and fee
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S u m m a r y of the Effects of the real directors' roles o n auditor
independence
The real directors' roles have no effect on auditor independence (25
auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditors follow audit rules and standards
• Auditors rely on quality audit
• Auditors limit their relationship with clients
• Auditors do not expect to be selected for the next engagement
The Real directors' roles affect auditor independence (impair for 3
auditors; slightly impair for 1 auditor)
Reasons:
• Auditors and clients are interdependent one with other
• Small audit firms have small clients (in which directors are the owners),
more pressure
• Closeness with clients
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Appendix 8
The effects of audit tenure (old clients) on auditor independence.

B

C

I feel the longer I audit the client, the Effect on independence:
easier the audit process will be. For most • Uncertain
clients the longer they interact with
auditors, they turn to be better in term of Reasons/Treatment:
financial statement they have. It makes • Easier to do audit works
m e easier to do audit. It's hard to say • Follow rules and standards
whether m y independence is affected or
not, but the feeling I possess w h e n I audit
such clients is I do audit easier. I can't
answer and say I a m affected or not,
because as long as I do audit and follow
the standards whatever the feeling, it will
be all right.
I a m not doubt that through this client Effect on independence:
auditor independence can be impaired, • Impair
because there are s o m e "mutual
interests" between the two.
Reasons/Treatment:
• There are s o m e mutual
interests
I think the closeness with clients could Effect on independence:
lead us to be more flexible, I m e a n in this • Little impair
regard there is a little impairment. But
once again that all things will be based on Reasons/Treatments:
standards. If those things are very risky, • If it is too risky, it wouldn't
w e will not do that.
be done

D I think it could be a trap for auditors. To Effect on independence:
avoid bad effect from old clients, in this • Could be a trap
audit firm, w e rotate our staff for a certain
period.
Reasons/Treatment:
• Staff rotation
In m y case I have a close relationship
with m y clients, but is limited with
profession relation only. In m y opinion, by
having close relationship with clients it will
m a k e our works easier. However, there
will be also a bad view from public
opinion. People have to know that even
though w e have audited a certain client
for several years, our audit staff changes

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Staff rotation
• Clients' staff change from
time to time
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from year to year and also clients' staff,
they change from time to time. So there is
no reason for fearing of "collusion"
between the two.
In my experience, this situation can be Effect on independence:
managed not to impair m y independence. • No effect
However, it depends on the auditors
themselves.
Reasons/Treatments:
• Can be managed
• Depends
on
auditors
themselves

H

There are s o m e differences for old
clients, for example w e can more open in
discussing our problems encountered
during audit engagements compared to
our n e w clients. In our discussion w e
always refer to audit standards as
guidelines, w e never went out of those
standards. S o w e can still be independent
in doing audit even though w e are facing
our old clients and have "good"
communication, because our work are
based on audit standards.
W e have good relationship with such
clients. But this m e a n s that w e can
communicate good with them because
w e already audited them for several
times. However, w e never this relation
does bot affect our independence,
because w e do audit works based on
audit rules and standards. Our office also
has risk assessment, if the engagement
then will impair our independence w e will
refuse that engagement.

Effect on independence:
• No effect
Reaso ns/Treatments:
• Easier to do audit works
• Follow rules and standards

Effect on independence:
• No effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Follow rules and standards

Effect on independence:
W e have staff rotation as an internal • N o effect
policy to avoid improper relation. Besides
that, from our mental attitude also w e R e a s o n s / T r e a t m e n t s :
have a tight discipline h o w to be a
Staff rotation
professional auditor. So by practicing
Staff discipline
these ways, w e can maintain our
independence.
I don't t think this situation can m a k e m e
less independent, because I have an Effect on independence:
experience with m y old client. At that time • N o effect
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m y old clients asked m e not to change
their financial reports, but I argue to Reasons/Treatments:
change or correct it, because it w a s • Avoid violating rules and
material number to be corrected. The
standards
clients didn't want to change it and I • N o fear of loosing clients
wanted to correct it, so w e have no
choice except I stop to audit them, and
then that client looked for other audit firm.
I have some clients who have been
Effect on independence:
audited for several years. But I have no • N o effect
special relationship with them. I keep m y
relation as business relation, no more Reason/Treatments:
than that. Their directors and staffs • Limited relation
changed from year to year, so w e will not • Most clients' directors (staff)
have special relation. Every year w e meet
change every year
n e w directors and staffs, even though for
example there are s o m e old directors, I
can m a n a g e m y distance with m y clients.
It wouldn't be problem with m y
independence.
I have a good relationship with clients, but
Effect on independence:
it will back to us as an auditor. If w e have • N o effect
a strong mental attitude and commit to
professional ethics, w e
will not Reasons/Treatments:
differentiate whether our client is big or • Never differentiate between
small, old or n e w client. W e will do audit
n e w and old clients
clients as ruled by standards. I have no
problem with this situation.
In doing audit I always send my manager
and m y staff to our clients. And I also
rotate our manager and staff, in m y case
the rotation takes place about every four
years, so our relationship with clients is
not too close. By rotating our manager
and staff w e
can maintain our
professionalism, and besides that after
several years there is possibility that the
board of directors has changed. So
according to m y experience, audit tenure
has no effect to our independence.
With old clients, normally we know their
mistakes, and usually they m a k e
mistakes similar with the last reports. W e
have a good relation but it is limited to
professional relation only, w e are also
sent by office in a rotation mode. M y

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Staff rotation
• Clients' directors change

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Keep distance with clients
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independence is not affected by those old
clients.

Staff rotation

To m e , old or n e w clients are not Effect on independence:
different. They have to be treated as • No effect
professional as possible. Even though I
a m more familiar about m y old clients Reasons/Treatmentscompared to the new, in m y opinion there . E a s i erto do audit works
In^np^frT * , J008!", ,,"* # Follow rules and standards
independence. Because I have to follow
the rules and standards.
Even though w e have already maintained Effect on independence:
our business relation for several years, if • N o effect
w e have strong integrity and personality,
our clients will not insist something that Reasons/Treatments:
can impair independence. In m y • Have strong integrity and
personality
experience long relationship with clients
have no negative effects to m y • No fear of loosing clients
independence. If their report according to
accounting standards needs to be
corrected and adjusted, I will correct them
based on standards, I a m not going to
compromise that. I a m not fear to be left
by clients, because m y responsibility is
not only to public interests but also to the Effect on independence:
• Could
make
improper
God.
To avoid this situation we have a policy to relation
rotate our audit staff. By doing this, it is Reasons/Treatments:
expected that improper relation between • Staff rotation
auditors and clients can be minimized.
No..no., m y independence is not affected Effect on independence:
by such relation. In m y case, if I have a • N o effect
friend w h o wants m e to audit his Reasons/Treatments:
company, I will ask other partner to audit • Avoid conflict of interests
it.
Yes w e have a good relationship with
Effect on independence:
clients but is limited to professional
• N o effect
relation. W e normally feel easier in audit
process because w e have known already Reasons/Treatments:
their financial statement and problems, • Easier to do audit
but it doesn't m e a n that w e easy to • Follow rules and standards
approve or agree with them. W e do audit
processes and procedures same as set
by audit rules and standards.
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The relationship with old clients, in m y
experience, it would m a k e easier in
accessing data w h e n w e are auditing
them. They are more open and honest in
discussing anything. So, what w e do is to
serve them better, w e serve them what
they need and what they want, off course,
all things will be based on rules and
standards. There is no independence
impairment, but more relax in doing audit.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Easier to do audit works
• More relax and open

We have a policy to rotate our audit staffEffect on independence:
for a certain time. And w e also have • N o effect
strong self-discipline to be independent.
So, through these things, the relationship Reasons/Treatments:
with old clients would have no problems • Staff rotation
with our independence.
• Selves discipline
W e have s o m e old clients for about four
years. I don't think this relation could
impair our independence, because w e
send different staff and they directors and
staffs also changed from time to time. So
it has no impact to m y independence.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Staff rotation
• Clients' directors change

Effect on independence:
It's hard to say whether m y independence
• Uncertain
is impaired or not. Because in practice I
follow standards but I still be flexible, but Reasons/Treatments:
again I still follow the rules and standards. • Follow the rules and
If m y clients ask m e to go "further" I will
standards, but still "be
refuse their assignments, because it is
flexible"
tooriskyto violate rules and standards.
• Try not to go too far
W e should be careful, what kind of
relation w e are maintaining with clients.
W e have close relationship with clients
not to be impaired our independence, but
to know more what they want to do, what
they want to develop from their business.
This is part of our services, w e maintain
this relation in order to know such needs.
If w e don't have a good relation clients
will look for other "better" audit firm. A s far
as w e are able to be independent this
close relation will be no problems.

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• K n o w clients' needs more
• Serve clients better

304
Y e s this relation sometimes could impair
m y independence, because I know m u c h
about them so w h e n they ask m e
something sometimes it's hard to refuse
them. However, I try not to go too far with
clients' "expectation". If I think that what I
do will put m e into trouble, I rather to
refuse them.
This relation doesn't affect my
independence. Because I rotate m y staff,
I only left one old staff for the next audit
works. By doing staff rotation, I expect
that m y staff can maintain professional
relationship with clients in audit works,
and I left one old staff to avoid
unnecessary questions which can bother
our clients. I don't care whether n e w or
old clients, if I find something needs to be
changed or corrected I willtellm y clients
to do that.
In m y opinion, it is obviously can affect
m y independence, because w e have
maintained our relation for several years.
I a m as an auditor must be independent,
but I a m a h u m a n being, it's hard to
separate m y position as an auditor and
m y relationship with old clients.

Effect on independence:
• Impair
Reasons/Treatments:
• Try not to go too far

Effect on independence:
• N o effect
Reasons/Treatments:
• Staff rotation
• Stick to the rules

Effect on independence:
• Impair
Reasons/Treatments:
• Hard to separate position as
an auditor and "old client'
(conflict of interest)

We have good relationship with our
Effect on independence:
clients especially with "old client", but • N o effect
remember
this
relation
is only
professional relation as auditor and client, Reasons/Treatments:
no more. Because while w e audit our • Easier to do audit works
client w e also teach and guide them to be • Tell the truth
able to prepare financial statements as
guided by accounting standards. If w e
have not good relationship with our
clients w e will face difficulties in doing
audit and education process. But once
again that this relation is only professional
relation, so it has nothing to do with our
independence. Even though w e have a
good relation, if w e find s o m e thing wrong
w e will tell them to solve it, w e won't let it.
Yes we have a good relationship with
Effect on independence:
clients, but only professional relation no
• N o effect
more. I don't think this relationship with
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clients could impair m y independence
because w e concern to maintain Reasons/Treatments:
perceived and in fact independence as
• Be independent in fact
and in appearance
independent auditors.

Summary of the Effects of the length of audit engagement (audit tenure)
on auditor independence
Audit tenure has no effect on auditor independence (21 auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditfirmsrotate their staff
• Clients' managements also change from time to time
• Auditors maintain professional relationship only
• Auditors follow audit rules and standards
Audit tenure impair auditor independence (4 auditors)
Reasons:
• Mutual interests between auditors and clients
• Hard to separate as auditor and relationship with old clients
• Hard to refuse clients' order because have more pressure
Audit Tenure slightly impaired auditor independence (2
auditors)
Reasons:
• Long engagement creates improper relation
• Long engagement makes auditors more "flexible" in doing audit tasks
Not sure whether audit tenure has effect or not on auditor independence
(2 auditors)
Reasons:
• The longer the engagement the easier it was to do audit tasks, but still
followed audit rules and standards
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Appendix 9
The effect of sanctions (punishments) to auditor independence.
That's good. M a n y auditors do audit
independently or based on standards
because of the fearing of punishment.
Otherwise auditor will do everything they
want, because s o m e auditors wherever
they go, they bring their stamps. People
or clients meet them anywhere, and ask
them to stamp their financial statements,
audit process have finished, very instant
audit.
B

To improve auditor independence I agree
that government and professional body
must actively monitor its member. Now,
their roles still need to be improved. If
their roles are getting better, I believe that
auditor independence of its m e m b e r
should improve.

C I agree with law enforcement to punish
those w h o produce a poor audit quality,
because it will force auditors to be more
independent. But accounting body must
be fair in treating its members, they also
have to monitor actively its members not
only to wait s o m e complaints.

I agree with law enforcement, especially
sanctions for those w h o have poor audit
quality, because, by applying sanctions
equally to all auditors it will improve
auditor performance, especially auditors
independence. The role of accounting
professional body I think still need to be
improved.

•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Fear of sanctions
Suggestion to IAI

•

Enhance independent

Reasons:
Suggestions to IAI:
• lAI's law enforcement need
to be improved
• Enhance independence
Reasons:
• Auditors are forced to be
independent
Suggestion to IAI:
• Fair in treating its members
• More actively monitor
• Enhance independence
Reasons:
• Improve
formance

auditors' per-

Suggestions to IAI:
• Applying sanctions equally

I agree that the Accounting Professional
• Enhance independence
Body set up the rules and audit standards
include the punishment or sanctions for
Reasons:
auditors w h o breach the rules
and
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standards especially
independence • Auditors are forced to be
matter. But it is not easy to trace who
independent
perform a poor quality audit, unless there
Suggestions to IAI:
is a person or body w h o report to the
• Properly apply punishments
Institute about that. However, if sanctions
or punishment properly applied to them, it
will lead auditors to do audit better or
more independent.
• Enhance independence
I think punishment or law enforcement
can improve auditors' independence. Reasons:
Whatever the reasons, being independent • Independence is a must
is a must for auditors. So, I agree with
that. But I see that Indonesian Institute of Suggestions to IAI:
accountants' role in this regard still need • IAI' roles need to be
improved
to be improved.
I agree that the professional body should • Enhance independence
monitor its m e m b e r in order to enhance
our professionalism. About sanctions or Reasons:
punishments given by the professional • Auditors become more
careful
body to those w h o produce a poor quality
audit, I think this will support auditors to Suggestions to IAI:
be more careful and independent, not to
violate rules and standards.
• Enhance independence
I agree with the law enforcement to
improve audit quality of auditors. By Reasons:
applying sanctions and punishments I • Auditors become
more
believe that auditors will be more
careful in accepting and
independent in accepting and doing their
doing audit works
works. However, I hope that the Institute Suggestions to IAI:
can apply this rule evenly to their • Apply its rules evenly to all
members.
members
I think those w h o perform bad attitude
and poor quality are deserved to be
punished. Because without punishments
or sanctions, auditors will work wantonly.
In this regard, I think punishments can
enhance audit quality especially auditor
independence.
I agree with the punishments or sanctions
given to the auditors w h o produced poor
audit quality. Because through this way, I

• Enhance independence
Reasons:
• Avoid working wantonly
- t0 ,A|.
Suggestions to IAI.

q

Enhance independence
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believe that auditors will be more
independent and careful in doing their
profession. However, I view that the roles
of the Institute of Indonesian Accountants
still need to be enhanced, in order to
improve its m e m b e r quality.

Reasons:
• Auditors will be more careful
Suggestions to IAI:
• lAI's roles need
improved

to

be

The sanctions given to auditors who
perform poor quality audit would make • Enhance independence
auditors
become
more
careful.
Consequently
auditor
independence Reasons:
would be positively affected by the • Auditors become
more
sanctions or punishment application.
careful
Suggestions to IAI:
In this audit firm all staffs from all level
are evaluated for every certain period.
So, all staffs have to do their work as
good as possible. Otherwise, if they fail to
meet our evaluation standards they will
get into trouble. In Indonesia as w e know,
that the audit license is issued by Ministry
of Finance, however the license holder
must register as m e m b e r of the
Indonesian Institute of Accountants.
Therefore, if there is an auditor w h o does
improper deeds, and he found guilty, the
Institute can cancel his membership and
automatically his audit license will be
cancelled. So, the role of punishment
from the Institute, I think could support its
m e m b e r to be more independent in doing
their audit profession.
The Institute has rules that have to be
followed by its member. If there is a
m e m b e r w h o violate the rules the
Institute can apply its punishments to its
member, from warning to m e m b e r
cancellation, it is depend on h o w big the
mistakes they did. If you asked m e how
the effect of the punishment to auditor
independence, I think it is obvious that
punishment can maintain and improve
auditor independence.
I think punishment and sanctions will
force auditors to be more independent,
otherwise they will get punishment from
the professional body. The Institute of

•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Auditors will avoid troubles
Suggestions to IAI:

•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Fear of sanctions
Suggestions to IAI:

Enhance independence
Reasons:
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Accountants' roles still need to be • Auditors are forced to be
improved to actively monitor its m e m b e r
independent
especially for those w h o generated poor
audit quality.
Suggestions to IAI:
• IAI should more actively
monitor its members
I think this law enforcement is very
important, to attract a very good • Enhance independence
professional image. In m y opinion,
auditors w h o produce a low audit quality Reasons:
need to be warned by the Institute and • Attract good professional
then if they are still violate the standards
image
and code of ethics, the Institute have to
punish them. Of course, the role of Suggestions to IAI:
punishment in maintaining auditor
independence has positive effects.
I think law enforcement in audit
profession is very weak. Government and
professional body do not actively monitor
auditors' performance, but rather based
on complaints of (potential) victims. In this
regard as far as the law enforcement is
properly applied by government and
professional body, I believe that the role
of sanctions or punishment will enhance
auditors' independence.

•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Auditors performance are
monitored
Suggestions to IAI:
• IAI needs to be more active
• Apply sanctions properly

I think punishment or sanctions given by
• Enhance independence
the accounting profession to those w h o
produced poor audit quality will force Reasons:
auditors to be independent but until n o w I • Auditors are forced to be
see that the roles of the accounting body
independent
is still weak, they have to more enforce
the rules and laws.
Suggestions to IAI:
• IAI needs to enforce its roles
more
Yes, sanctions and punishment could
force auditors to be independent • Enhance independence
otherwise they will get problems.
Reasons:
• Avoid problems
I agree to punish those w h o produce poor
audit quality, because by applying
punishment auditors will think m a n y times
to violate rules and standards. It will
improve auditor independence. I see the
roles of the institute still need to be

Suggestions to IAI:
• Enhance independence
Reasons:
• Auditors will not violate the
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improved. They have to apply rules to all
m e m b e r s equally.

rules and standards

Suggestion to IAI:
I agree with that. I see some auditors who• Apply rules equally
sell their stamps, they didn't do audit
works properly, so their audit quality will • Enhance independence
be poor. It is not good for other auditors, it
will generate a bad image. I hope our Reasons:
accounting
professional body
can • Avoid poor quality
improve its m e m b e r s to be more • Enhance auditors professionalism
professional. I see that accounting
professional body's roles need to be Suggestions to IAI:
• Its roles need to be
improved.
improved
I agree with punishments or sanctions
given by audit profession, as long as the
punishments is given fairly. Because
through this way, I think auditors will be
forced to be more professional, especially
they must be more independent other
wise they will get punishments or
sanctions.

S o far, the Institute doesn't actively
monitor its m e m b e r w h o produces a poor
quality audit. However, the Institute will
do something if there is s o m e body or
institution
report
its
members'
misconduct. I agree if the roles of the
Institute can be more activated, auditors
will be more aware about their profession
which requires to be independent.
However, I think there are s o m e auditors
w h o sell their stamp without audit works
and process. W e never do that, w e never
issue our opinion without working paper.
I agree with the law enforcement, to
punish auditors w h o produced a poor
audit quality. However, so far I see that
the Accounting Profession still need to
improve their law enforcement. Because I
see that there is injustice in giving
sanctions, they s o m e times treat
differently for the s a m e cases.
Yes, punishment will lead auditors to

• Enhance independence
Reasons:
• Auditors are forced to be
more professional
Suggestions to IAI:
• Sanctions must be applied
fairly
•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Auditors will be more aware
of their profession
Suggestions to IAI:
IAI need to be more active

•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Avoid poor quality
Suggestions to IAI:
Sanctions must be
evenly to its members

applied
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maintain their independence, otherwise
Enhance independence
they will be in trouble. In here, I see that
the role of the Institute is very significant Reasons:
to force its m e m b e r s to follow the rules • Avoid troubles
and standards. However, I view that the • Force auditors to be
Institute still need to improve its
independent
performance by ruling something that has
not been touched. For example, the Suggestions to IAI:
Institute must think about h o w long • Need to improve lAI's roles
auditors have to responsible with their • Need to revise its rules
works, ten, twenty years or h o w m a n y
years. There is still no rule about this, so
w e don't offer audit fee at a low price.
I think the existence of the professional
body is to protect and to regulate its • Enhance independence
member. If its m e m b e r has problems, this
professional body will try to help the Reasons:
member. However, in regulating its • To protect and regulate
m e m b e r the professional body also need
auditors
to give sanctions to its m e m b e r w h o
violate rules and standards and this could Suggestions to IAI:
lead to enhancement of auditor's
performance. In relation to auditor
independence, I think this will enhance it.
I think punishment or sanction will force
auditors to do more professional in audit • Enhance independence
works. It will improve audit quality of
auditors,
and
automatically
their Reasons:
independence can be enforced. However, • Force auditors to be more
we
should
apply sanctions and
professional
punishments strictly, I see that accounting • Improve audit quality
Professional Body is trying to do this,
s o m e levels of warning, membership Suggestions to IAI:
cancellation are being applied to those • Sanctions must be applied
w h o violate audit rules and standards.
strictly
I agree for those who produced poor audit
quality, the institute or government give
them sanctions or punishments. Because
• Enhance independence
through that way, I believe that auditors
will do audit works more carefully and Reasons:
they would be more independent • Auditors will be more careful
accordingly. However, as far as I know,
the law enforcement conducted by Suggestions to IAI:
government and audit profession still • IAI need to improve law
need to be enhanced.
enforcement
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BB

Sure, punishment will m a k e auditors to be
more careful and independent because if
Enhance independence
auditors did something wrong the Institute
can take action by giving those Reasons:
punishment. The Institute can cancel • Auditors become
more
careful
member's license.
Suggestions to IAI:

CC

Regulation and punishment enforcement
have significant role in maintaining and
improving
auditors
independence.
Because however, auditors will be
considering punishment they will get if
they violate rules and standards. The
problem need to be solved is how to
enhance our professional body's role in
monitoring its m e m b e r activities.

•

Enhance independence

Reasons:
• Sanctions will avoid violation
Suggestions to IAI:
• IAI needs to be more
active in monitoring its
members

S u m m a r y the effect of sanctions on auditor independence:
29 auditors agreed that sanctions could enhance auditor independence
Reasons:
• Sanctions m a k e auditors more careful in accepting clients and
performing audit tasks
• Through sanctions, auditors are forced to be independent
• Sanctions encourage auditors to be more honest.
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Appendix 10
The effects of auditors' religious values on auditor independence.
A

Consciously or unconsciously it has effect • Positive effect
to m e . For example w h e n I w a s asked to
manipulate taxes calculation, I didn't do Reasons:
that, this because I don't want to be a • Religious obedience
liar. I a m not sure, is that affected by m y
religious values or not, I don't know. But I
know that normally "naughty" auditors,
should be not religious persons.

B In my life, I am a moderate person. I do
• N o effect
the s a m e things to anybody regardless
their religion. W h e n I do something or I Reasons:
have to decide anything in relation to m y • N o
relevancy
between
audit works, I never connect them to m y
profession and religion
religious values. S o in m y opinion, m y
religious has no effects to m y
independence.
C Well, I view this life is to worship God. • Positive effect
Working as an auditor in order to seek
money is also a part of worship. So in Reasons:
doing audit works, I always remember • Religious obedience
that responsibility is belong to public and
also God. So, I have to be discipline to
follow the rules and standards not to
violate them. If I violate rules and
standards that m e a n s I a m no longer
independent and I breach God's order to
do the right things.
D In this audit firm religious matter is one of• Positive effect
our concern, because w e are aware that
religious values have positive effects to Reasons:
our independence. W e believe that being • Religious obedience
independent is a must for this profession, • Independent is a must
otherwise w e violate the rules and
standards.
E In my experience, I never incorporate
• N o effect
religious matter to m y business life. A s an
auditor, I do m y works based on rules and Reasons:
standards, so religious values doesn't • Independence
ruled
m a k e any effects to m y independence.
profession not religion
Because I believe that religion teach us to
be a good person in relationship with G o d

by
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not with audit profession.
In m y experience, religious values could
maintain and improve m y independence. • Positive effect
Because for example, I can not lie to
myself or other people because I will Reasons:
have a guilty feeling if I to do s o m e thing • Religious obedience
wrong. So, in this regard religious values
have
positive
effects
to
my
independence.
I think religious values can build my
independence, for example I have a lot of • Positive effect
private and confidential information that
can be sold for money, but I don't do that. Reasons:
I also will refuse if s o m e body try to bribe • Religious obedience
m e , because I believe that bribery is
something prohibited by religion.
H

K

In my experience, religious values have
strongly affected m y work attitude. • Positive effect
Especially with m y
independence,
religious values positively supported m e . I Reasons:
think religion has general guidance for • Religion as a guidance
their follower regardless what religion is.
I don't see any involvement from religious
values into m y work attitude. Because as • N o effect
far as I know, s o m e auditors w h o perform
religious duties also sometime violate Reasons:
rules and standards. And I can be • N o
relevancy
between
independent as long as I practice audit
profession and religion
rules and standards.
• C a n be independent by
following
rules
and
standards
In building m y characters, religious values
have significant contribution.
In m y
• Positive effect
experience, in relation to auditor
independence religious values have Reasons:
positively enhance m y independence. • Religious obedience
Because religion teaches us to do the
right things, otherwise w e will get sins.
This thought has led m e to be always do
the right things, and not to violate the
rules.
I don't think m y religious values can affect ' N o effect
m y independence. In m y opinion, religion
and profession are something different. Reasons:
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W h o e v e r professional he/she can be as
an independent auditor, regardless
he/she is religious person or not.
L It's hard to say that religious values have
any relation to independence. In m y
opinion, religion and independence are
two different things, I can't see any
relation. W h o e v e r whether they embrace
any religion or no, they can be
independent as long as they are
professional as an auditor and follow the
rules and audit standards. In m y opinion
religion teach the good things, but not
independence.
M Well, I think religious values among other
things have contribution in building
auditors' characters. Especially in auditor
independence, religious values have
positive effects to enhance a better
performance and responsibility. Normally
auditors w h o possess religious values
have philosophy that they are responsible
not only to persons but also to their God.
Therefore, they have "internal" control in
doing their works.
N In my experience, religious values could
maintain and improve m y independence,
because through religious approach I can
treat m y self into self discipline. I don't
need to be supervised by person, but
myself is also being supervised by the
God.
0 Well, as person who embrace a religion, I
believe that any improper deeds, like
violating the rules or standards are not
allowed. Then, I also believe that our
responsibility is not only to person or
profession but also w e have to
responsible to our God. Public might be
tricked, but no with God. So, in m y
opinion the roles of religious values are
significant in maintaining and building m y
independence.
In m y experience, religious values have
p
significant contribution in maintaining and

religion and profession are
not related
•

N o effect

Reasons:
• Religion and independence
are not related
• Religion
teaches
good
things, but does not teach
independence

•

Positive effect

Reasons:
• Responsible both to public
and G o d

•

Positive effect

Reasons:
• Self supervised (by G o d )

•

Positive effect

Reasons:
• Responsible both to public
and G o d

*

Positive
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enhancing m y independence as an
auditor. According to m y belief, auditor is Reasons:
not only responsible to public interests • Responsible to both public
but also to the God, so w e have to be
and G o d
careful in conducting audit works. In m y • Professionalism
and
opinion,
the
combination
of
religious
values
form
professionalism as an auditor plus
independence
religious values will generate an
independent auditor.
Q In my experience, religious values have
contributed m y attitude building in m y life.
Positive effect
In relation to m y work, as an auditor I feel
that religious values also positively affect Reasons:
m y independence.
build
• Religious
values
mental attitude
R I think in my opinion, religious values
have positive contribution to build • Positive effect
people's character, also to build
independent attitude. Of course, this is Reasons:
true if they perform their religious duties • Religion
people's
build
regardless what their religion embraced.
characters
Yeah.. I agree that religious values can
have
positive impact in building
independence attitude of an auditor.
S In my experience, religious values can
positively affect m y works especially m y • Positive effect
independence. I see there is a positive
relation
between
religious
values Reasons:
possessed by auditors with their attitude. • Religious
values
have
relation to auditors' attitude
T Yes, religious values can make me more
independent, because by using this • Positive effect
approach, I think our responsibility in
audit works is not only to public as h u m a n Reasons:
being but also to G o d w h o knows every • Responsible to both public
thing. So, in m y opinion religious values
and G o d
positively affect m y independence.
U
In m y experience, religious values have
no strong effects into m y audit works, • Little effects
especially m y independence. W h a t m a k e
m e independent is m y professional Reasons:
values as an independent auditor. • Professionalism is the most
important
However, religious values have only little
bit
contribution
in
building
my
independence.
V
Religion rules about the relations
between h u m a n and the God. While

317
auditor independence is ruled by audit • N o effect
profession. So, in m y opinion they have
no relation between the two. Auditors, Reasons:
who
are
not
independent
their • N o relationship between
responsibility is to the profession not to
religion and independence
the God. In other words they are not
professional, w e can't call them as
sinners. In m y opinion, religion has
certain place and not in work place.
In m y experience, religious values have
significantly contributed to m y daily life.
This includes what I've been doing as an • Positive effect
independent auditor. In other words,
religious values positively affect m y work Reasons:
especially m y independence, because I • Responsible to both public
and G o d
believe that an auditor has responsibility
to serve public interest and also to the
G o d in doing the right things.
In my opinion there is no relation between
religion and independence. G o d teaches
us to be a good man, but not to be • N o effect
independent. While independence is
ruled by the standards and professional Reasons:
ethics, not by the religion. All religion talk • N o
relevancy
between
about good thinks, even people w h o have
religion and independence
no religion they can be independent as an • C a n be independent without
auditor.
religion
In my experience, I think my religious
values have no effects to
m y • N o effect
independence. Because in doing audit
works I follow clear rules and standards. Reasons:
To be independent just follow
In my experience, religious values have
rules and standards
positive effects into m y works especially
m y audit works. Religious values m a k e • Positive effect
m e b e c o m e more careful because m y
responsibility not only to h u m a n being but Reasons:
also to the G o d w h o knows everything, • B e c o m e more careful
so I have to be careful, no cheating no • Responsible to public and
lying.
God
I involve my religious values into my daily
life. A s an auditor I also attach m y
religious values into m y work ethics. In • Positive effect
m y experience as an auditor, I have been
affected by m y religious values. For me, Reasons:
religious values have positive effects in
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performing audit works especially m y
independence.
BB In my experience, my work is affected by
m y religious values. In relationship with
auditor independence, I think m y
independence is also affected by m y
religious values. I m e a n m y religious
values can maintain even improve m y
independence. However, I can still see
other people w h o do not perform their
religious duties or even people w h o have
no religion they can still be independent
as long as they work professionally.

Religious values affect daily
life

•

Positive effect

Reasons:
• Religious
values
build
attitude to be independent
• However, an auditor can be
independent as long as he
is professional

CC In my opinion religious values could
positively affect m y independence.
Because with this approach, w e will be
responsible both to public and God. I • Positive effect
agree that religious values should be
considered as factor that can maintain Reasons:
• Responsible to
our independence.
public and God

both

S u m m a r y of the effect of religious values on auditor independence
Religious values have no effect on auditor independence (8 auditors)
Reasons:
• There is no relevancy between religious values and auditor
independence
• Auditors can be independent without involving religious values
Religious Values enhance auditor independence (20 auditors)
Reasons:
• Auditors are responsible both to public and God.
• Being independent is a kind of obedience
• Religious values build people's characters
• Professional and religious matters are essential elements of mental
attitude
• They're being supervised by God at any time.
Religious values slightly enhance auditor independence (1 auditor)
Reasons:
• Religious values have little contribution in maintaining independence
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Appendix 11
Auditors' Perceptions of Their Independence
A Auditors can be stated as independent
w h e n they are free to do audit works and
freely to state their opinion. They also do
not have conflict of interests.

Free in doing audit works
Free in stating opinion
Free of any interests

B

Neutral,
interests

Independence is meant as an attitude
that must be possessed by independent
auditor. H e must be neutral not to tend to
certain parties, but serve public interests.

C In my opinion, independence is meant as
an objective action. Auditors must not
have conflict of interests, auditors must
not interfered by any parties. Auditors
must be free in stating opinion.
D In my opinion independence is similar to
pillars which protect auditors from wrong
doings. Auditors must be free in stating
their opinion, and auditor must be free
from any interests.
E In my opinion, there are many meanings
of independence. It can be free from any •
interests, The important thing according
to m y opinion is to apply independence.
F I view independence as what theory
stated that is a mental attitude in which
not easy to be interfered by other parties.
Auditors must not depend on their clients.
They must free to state their opinion.
G In my opinion, auditor can be stated as
independent if auditor do their task as
ruled by audit standards. Even though
auditors are paid by their clients, auditors
must serve public interests not to defend
clients' interests.
H In my opinion an auditor can be said as
independent if he does audit works and
meet audit rules and standards.
I

serve

public

Objective action
Free of any interests
Not interfered with by others
Free in stating opinion
Protection from wrong doing
Free in stating opinion
Free of any interest

Free of any interests

Not interfered with by others
Not depend on clients
Free in stating opinion

Follow rules and standards
Serve public interest

Follow rules and standards

In m y opinion, independence can be • Free from any forces and
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K

L

perceived as a situation in which an
auditor can face and solve any internal
and external forces and threats, so he is
still trusted by public.

threats

In my opinion independence means that
w h e n w e do audit works, w e have to stick
to the rules and standard and w e are not
interfered by other parties.

•

As we know that independence has two
aspects, independence in appearance
and in fact independence. Independence
in appearance is independence as
perceived by others. In fact independence
is our independence in relation to our
mental attitude. In this independent, only
w e can say w e are independent or not.
This could be normally affected m y
vested interests.
Well, as an auditor our duty is to do attest
function. It m e a n s that w e have to see
everything as it is. W e have to be
independent, not to tend to certain
parties' interests.

M In my opinion and understanding,
independence m e a n s that in doing audit
works w e should stand in the middle not
to tend to defend certain parties'
interests, but rather to serve public
interests. T h e important thing in here is
w e should maintain our integrity as
independent auditor.
N In my opinion independence means that
an auditor follow audit rules and
standards w h e n he is doing audit works.
Auditors do not follow clients' want and
orders, and auditors are not interfered by
other parties.
0 Well, in my opinion independence means
that auditor not to tend to a certain party,
but auditor must be professional. In this
audit firm every year all staff have to sign
independence declaration, and also every
assignment w e sign the form.

Follow
rules
and
standards
• Not interfered with by
others

•

Mental attitude

Objective
Neutral

Neutral
Serve public interests
Maintaining integrity

Follow rules and standards
Not to meet clients' interests
Not interfered with by others

Neutral
Professional
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In m y understanding independence
m e a n s that auditor can do audit freely
from any interests, he can do audit based
on standards, and he can issue opinion
as facts he found.

Free from any interests
Follow rules and standards
Objective

Q

I perceived independence as an attitude
in which an auditor stand in the middle,
he serve public interests, not certain
interests.

Neutral
Serve public interests

R

In m y opinion, independence m e a n s that
auditor must be independent, not
interfered by other parties and not to tend
to certain parties.

Not interfered with by others
Neutral

S In my opinion independence is meant as
a right decision, not bias and auditor feel
free to state his opinion.

Right decision
Free in stating opinion

T I view independence same as what
theory said, that is not easy to be
interfered by other parties. Auditors must
be objective and not to tend to defend
certain parties' interest.

Not interfered with by others
Objective
Neutral

U In my opinion independence is meant that
an auditor presents audited financial
statements as they are, without taking
any advantages. Independence m e a n s
also that auditors can be fair to all parties.

•
•

Objective
Fair

V In my understanding we can say as
independent where w e can be free from
any interest. Also w e are able to state
anything as what facts found in the field.

•
•

Free of any interests
Objective

W I think I should follow what stated by
standard, that is auditor should not easy
to be interfered by other parties, auditors
should not tend to certain parties.

Follow rules and standards
Not interfered with by others
Neutral

X In my opinion independence is a situation
that w e are as auditors freely can express
our
findings
and
opinion,
and
independence also can be stated w h e n
there is no intervention from other parties
to auditors.
Y

In m y opinion independence m e a n s that

Free in stating opinion
Not interfered with by others

m

Neutral
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auditor must be neutral and not to defend • Serve public interests
a certain party, but has to serve public
interests.
Z

In m y opinion, independence m e a n s that
auditor is not affected by anything, in
whatever situation. In m y experience, if I
found something wrong, I will tell them to
be changed.

Not affected by others
Objective

AA In my opinion independence is meant as
a mental attitude in which an auditor can
work and state his opinion freely as facts
he found. H e is not affected by other
interests in doing audit works.

Mental attitude
Free in doing audit works
Free of any interests

BB I think what I understand about
independence is s a m e with what the
Institute stated, but I'd like to add s o m e
words so independence m e a n s not easy
to be interfered by other parties with
professional belief of the auditors.

Not interfered with by others
Professional

CC In my opinion, independence is meant as
an attitude in which auditor works based
on audit rules and standards. If an auditor
works with independent mental attitude
and free of any interests, he can be
stated as independent.

Follow rules and standards
Free of any interest

S u m m a r y of auditors' perceptions on their independence:
• Neutral, to serve public interests (10 auditors)
• Not interfered with by other parties (9 auditors)
• Free of any interests (8 auditors)
• Objective (7 auditors)
• Follow audit rules and standards (7 auditors)
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Appendix 12
Major factors that could impair auditors independence
A

I think dependence of auditor to major
client issue is the most dangerous factor
in impairing independence. The second
m a y be good relationship with clients can
be barrier to be independent.

Major clients
Good
relationship
clients

B I think the major factors that can impair
auditor independence are first, close
relationship with clients or management.
With old clients normally w e have good
relation and it m a k e s m e hard to be
independent. Second, audit fee from
major clients that contribute a significant
number of total incomes can also impair
auditor independence

Close
relationship
clients
Major clients

with

with

C Weak integrity of auditors and lack of
knowledge of auditors can become major
factors in independence impairment.

W e a k integrity
Lack of knowledge

D In my opinion, the relationship with old
clients could be a major factor in
impairing auditor independence.

Relationship with old clients

E There is no major factor that can impair
m y independence because I always
maintain m y integrity and personality,
however to be honest I s o m e times help
m y clients by "creating" a better solution.
M y '"solution" however still meet rules
and standards set by the Institution, not to
manipulate it. It's c o m m o n in audit work
as long as not to breach rules and
standards.

N o major factors, "helping"
clients but still in the corridor

F I think close relationship with clients and
dependence on clients are the most
major factors in impairing auditors
independence, because auditors will rely
their firms' life on their clients.

Close
clients

I think major clients w h o generate
significant fees could affect auditor
independence, because auditors will try
to retain such clients to run their

#

relationship

M a j o r c,ients

with
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business.
H

T h e major threat in impairing auditor
independence c o m e s from auditors'
integrity and personality. Those w h o have
weak personality and integrity will be
easily affected by any other force and
temptation. Their attitude can change
because they have w e a k integrity (Mr. H).

I Those who are money hungry will be
easily impair their independence.

Weak
integrity
personality

Money hungry

J I try to do audit works based on
standards, but s o m e times I have
disagreement even with m y partner. I said
no, but m y partner viewed that it still can
be tolerated. So, I have to follow m y
partner.

Superiority of partner

K Integrity and professional weaknesses of
auditors s e e m to be major factors in
impairing independence. However, in m y
case I try to maintain m y integrity and
professionalism as an auditor.

Weak
integrity
professionalism

L In my observation, I think conflict of
interests such as having share in the
audited company, the owner of audited
company is family m e m b e r or relative and
major client are very dangerous in
impairing independence. However, in m y
case all those conflicts of interests have
been eliminated by refusing to accept
audit engagement.

Conflict of interests
Major clients

M

and

In m y case, I don't see any factors
seriously impairing m y independence.
However, I could see that s o m e auditors
in other firms are depended on their
major clients w h o generate a large
amount of fees. Another thing that I can
view is about the closeness between
auditors with their clients, this will tend to
more jeopardize auditor independence.

N I think audit firms size can make auditors
depended on their clients, so it become
r\

Major clients
Close
relationship
clients

Audit firm size

and

with

the most dangerous in independence
impairment.
In my opinion, everything is depended on
the person (auditors). However, as an
auditor I have s o m e "bad" experiences.
A s an auditor I have a good relationship
with m y clients, and this relation leads m e
into a hard situation. Clients sometimes
ask m e to "help" them. A s an independent
auditor, I have to do m y works as guided
by standards, and therefore I "help" them
as long as everything still on the right
track as ruled by standards and code of
ethics.
I perceive there are s o m e factors that
could affect auditors' independence.
However, I more look at the lack of
confidence of auditors. For example if an
auditor faces his clients are West Man,
auditor will have no confident in front of
his clients, and consequently, auditor will
tend to follow his clients' order. But in m y
experience, I can solve this problem
because as an auditor I have to be
independent whoever our clients. Integrity
and personality are key success to be
confident.
The survival of the audit firm will be most
danger for small audit firms, because they
have to cover all costs, and they could
loosen their consideration about risks in
accepting and doing audit works.
Since the beginning if some one has
decided to be auditor he has to be
consistent to be independent, because
audit
profession
requires to
be
independent. But If from the beginning he
becomes auditor and he has ambiguous
attitudes he won't be independent. For
example
many
students
choose
accounting major not to be a good auditor
but to find job easily, to get much money,
they s o m e times forget what attitude they
have to be possessed. To m e building
character to be independent is very

Close
clients

relationship

Lack of
auditors

confidence

Size of audit firm

No major factors
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from the university for example, students
have to be try to be independent.
Therefore, if this attitude has been
possessed by auditors, they will be
always independent no matter where they
work, in big five audit firms or in small
audit firms. N o matter they audit big
clients or small clients, once again,
independent is individual matter that has
to be owned by auditors.
S The fear of losing major clients seem to
be threat for auditors w h o have no strong •
integrity.

Major clients

T In my observation I think relationship with •
Relationship with old clients
old clients with the s a m e management • Early stage of audit firm
could be major factor in affecting auditor
establishment
independence. For n e w audit firms,
seeking clients in the early establishment
of audit firms could be a critical phase in
independence impairment.
U I think fee dependence on clients will be a .
most threat for audit firms.

Fee dependence on clients

V In my opinion the major factor that can .
impair auditor independence is vested
interests, auditors' mental attitude and
loyalty to the profession. But in m y
experience to maintain m y independence
I try to avoid m y vested interests, and I
can maintain m y integrity and loyalty.

Vested interest
Auditor's mental attitude

9

W In my opinion, providing audit and non- m
audit service without having non-audit
services division will be the most major
factor in impairing auditor independence.
That's w h y I don't provide both services
to the s a m e clients.

Providing non-audit services
without separating divisions

X No, but the most dangerous phase for #
auditors is w h e n they are at the first time
to operate their audit firm. At this stage,
audit firm have to get clients from their
relation or even families because it is not
easy to get clients directly, obviously at
this m o m e n t auditor independence in
appearance will impair. However, after a
ld public

Early stage of audit firm
establishment
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image to get more public trust.
Most of m y clients need audit report
normally for credit proposal to the bank
not for public needs, so I have no
problems as faced by a big audit firm.
Therefore, it's hard to mention certain
major factors, but I can feel that force
from client or banker is the most major
factor that could impair m y independence.

Intervention
bankers

Z

I think the closeness with clients can be a • Close
clients
major threat for auditors.

AA

In m y opinion, providing audit and nonaudit service without having non-audit
services division will be the most major
factor in impairing auditor independence.
That's w h y I don't provide both services
to the s a m e clients.

BB I don't see any factor that can impair
auditor independence. And also at this
audit firm I haven't observed other
auditors' independence affected by those
factors. However in m y point of view, high
competition in audit market could lead
auditor not to be independent, but this
also depend on h o w auditors view this
competition. I m e a n to auditor A m a y be
competition is viewed as high, but
according to auditor B competition is
looked as normal.
CC I think it depends on auditors' mental
attitude, I m e a n auditors w h o have weak
mental attitude can be easily compromise
their independence.

from

relationship

clients'

with

Providing non-audit service
without non-audit service
divisions

Competition
firms

among

audit

W e a k mental attitude

Summary of major factors that could impair auditor
independence
• Close (improper) relationship with clients (8 auditors)
• Major clients (6 auditors)
• W e a k auditor integrity (5 auditors)
The following factors are only mentioned by one or two auditors:
• Auditors' lack of knowledge
• Fee dependence
• Superiority of partner
• Conflict of interests
• Auditfirmsize
• Auditors' Lack of confidence
. NAS
• Competition
• Intervention from clients' bankers
• Early stages of establishing audit firms.
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Appendix 13
Major factors that could enhance auditor independence
A

For m e , m y future is very important, if I
a m not independent m y future will be
destroyed. Yes, punishment or sanctions
is the most factors ask m e to be
independent.

Punishments or sanctions

B As an auditor the things that can support
m y independence are, first, m y profession
itself as an auditor, requires m e to always
stick to the rules and standards. However
the fear of sanctions from government or
professional body also enhance our
independence.

Professionalism of auditors
Punishments or sanctions

C I think auditor integrity and sanctions from
accounting body can be major factors to
maintain
and
improve
auditor
independence.

Auditor integrity
Punishments or sanctions

D In my opinion by improving knowledge
and skill of auditors, it can become the
most major factor in maintaining and
improving auditor independence.

Improving
skill

E I am an auditor, so I have to devote my
life to the profession. To be professional, I
must have a professional spirit, that is a
spirit which always ask m e to be
independent and confident as an auditor,
if I have no this spirit, I think I a m not
really an independent auditor.

Professional spirit

F Punishment or sanctions enforcement
could be the most effective in maintaining
and improving auditors independence.

Punishments or sanctions

G In my experience religious values can
support m y independence, besides that
the spirit of audit profession can maintain
m y independence.

Religious values
Professionalism

H In my opinion law enforcement
(punishments and sanctions)

Punishments or sanctions

can

knowledge and
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b e c o m e best inducer for auditors to be
independent.
I I think auditors' consistency and integrity
can be major factors in maintaining their
independence.

Auditors' consistency and
integrity

J In my experience religious values and
profession understanding can m a k e m e
independent.

Religious values
Professionalism

K In my experience, my mission and vision
of being an auditor can be a significant
factor in supporting m y independence. As
m y mission and vision to establish this
firm is to accommodate m y professional
needs, so I have to work professionally. It
m e a n s that I have to be real and true
independent auditor.

Mission and vision
auditors
Professionalism

L Fearing of punishment from the audit firm
and from the Institute.

Punishments or sanctions

M In my opinion, to improve auditor
independence m e a n s that w e have to
improve the ability of auditors. Auditors
must improve their knowledge by reading
current relevant books and journal articles
and also auditors have to improve by
following continuos educational program.
S o they have a high self- confidence in
doing their works, therefore they will be
more independent.

Ability of auditors

N In my experience, sanction and
punishments can m a k e m e
more
independent. Because, once w e violate
rules and standards, w e will get
punishment and we'll finish.

Punishments or sanctions

O To me, auditor is a profession that must
be done as good as possible. To be a
good auditor, I have to be independent,
not compromise m y independence. The
major reason w h y I a m independent is
about m y future. O n c e I a m trusted by
public as a qualified auditor, it m e a n s that
m y career as an auditor in the future can
be
relied. Therefore,
maintaining

Future (business)

of
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conducting audit works, because it will
affect m y future's career as an auditor.
P In my opinion to enhance auditor
independence can be achieved through
continuos education program. However,
the quality of education must be
improved. For example program should
more concern about auditor ability in
analysis not only in technical works.
Attending course and seminar also useful
in order to broaden auditors' knowledge.

Education of auditors
Analytical skills

Q In my opinion, auditors' integrity will be
the most major factor in determining h o w
independent they are.

Auditors' integrity

R To me building character to be
independent is very important to be
started from early stages, from the
university for example, students have to
be try to be independent.
Therefore, if this attitude has been
possessed by auditors, they will be
always independent no matter where they
work, in big five audit firms or in small
audit firms. N o matter they audit big
clients or small clients, once again,
independent is individual matter that has
to be owned by auditors.
S Professionalism of auditors, I mean
auditors can put their positions in a right
way. Auditors treat their clients as clients,
and auditors treat themselves as auditors.
D o the right things.

Building character to be
independent from early age

T Idealism of an auditor and religious factor
could b e c o m e major factor in maintaining
and improving auditor independence.

Idealism of auditors
Religious values

Audit firm internal policy and personality
U
of auditors can be major factors in
maintaining independence.
My vision and mission of the
V
establishment of this firm is the major
factor to support m y independence.
Because to m e , this firm is not for m o n e y
but for having fun to accommodate m y

Professionalism of auditors

Audit firm internal policy
Auditors' personality

Mission and vision
auditors and audit firm

of

332
professional needs. S o in doing business,
I don't have to really compete to seek
clients and money. I a m not depended on
thisfirmbecause I have other main job.
W

In my experience, the roles of religion has
b e c a m e the most major factor in
maintaining m y independence.
Religious values
Inherently I can be independent because
of m y profession has ruled and set it.
Audit profession has a lot of standards
and code of ethics. The audited financial
statements also used by public, so those
me
automatically
things
make
independent. But, in m y case, I always try
to be independent because of m y
willingness to be a big and trusted
auditor. These
expectations won't
b e c o m e true if I a m not independence
that's it.
I think education has significant
in
building
auditor
contribution
independence. However the fear of
loosing audit license or other sanction
from the profession are also s o m e aspect
of factors that could support m y
independence.

Professionalism
Willingness to be a big
auditor

Education
Sanctions and punishments

I think auditors' integrity and personality
are the most important factors in
Auditors'
integrity
maintaining
and improving
auditor
personality
independence.
AA

BB

CC

In my experience, the roles of religion
have b e c o m e the most major factor in
maintaining m y independence.
It 's hard to pick one factor as the most
important in maintaining independence. I
think
the combination
between
professional values of auditors and law
enforcement from the institute are the
most factors that can m a k e auditors
independent or always try to be
independent.
In m y opinion, punishments or sanctions

Religious values

Professionalism
L a w enforcement

and
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can become the most major factor in • Punishments or sanctions
maintaining
auditors
independence.
Because auditors will be afraid to do
wrong things when they know that certain
punishments will be charged to them.
Summary of major factors that could enhance auditor independence:
• Auditor integrity (13 auditors)
• Sanctions (10 auditors)
• Religious values (5 auditors)
• Level of auditors' education (3 auditors)
The following factors that could enhance auditor independence but only
mentioned by one to two auditors:
• Auditfirm'internal policy
• Building independence from the early stage of auditor
• Auditors' mission and visions
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Appendix 14

Whether or not Auditors b e c o m e totally independent.
A I try to be independent as much as I can, • Try to be independent
but w e are h u m a n beings, it's hard to m e
to answer that question.
B

It's hard to be totally independent, but as • Try to be independent
an independent auditor m y duty is try as
much as I can to be independent.

C

I try to be independent as much as I can. •Try to be independent

D

As a human being, it's hard to answer .
that question. What I do is try to be
independent as much as I can, by
following the rules and standards.

Try to be independent

Yes, I can be totally independent because # Can be totally independent
that is m y commitment to be independent
auditor.
As an auditor I have to try to be #
independent, but I can not claim that I can
be totally independence, because w e are
human being.
I can be totally independent because m y
profession is independent auditor, I have
enough salary, I work independently,
there are no reasons for not independent.
H

Yes, I can be totally independent.

Try to be independent

#

C a n b e t o t a „ y inde pendent

Can be totally independent

I Yes, I can.

Can be totally independent

J I try to be independent as far as I can, I
always refer to audit rules and standards.

Try to be independent

K Yes I try to be independent as much as
possible. In doing audit I try to stick to the
rules. I have nothing to lose if s o m e thing
happen to m e , because m y objective is
not money, but work satisfaction.

Try to be independent
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L

I try to be independent by following audit
rules and standards.

M Yes I can be totally independent. But we
have to be aware that auditors are h u m a n
and clients are h u m a n either. S o even
though w e do our works based on
standards but our approach to our clients
are also important in maintaining our
relation. I don't perceive that being
independent then w e have to be like
robots w h o only understand yes or no
instructions. I a m independent but I a m
still flexible, for instance if I meet clients
have problems I advice them to solve
those problems as long as still in the
corridor of standards. To me, audit
process is till like educate our clients to
be able to provide financial statements.
N I try as independent as possible, because
I a m a h u m a n being I can't say that I can
do it perfectly.

Try to be independent

Can be totally independent

Try to be independent

O I try to be independent as much as I can
by stick to the rules and standards in
doing audit works.

Try to be independent

P I think there is no one can be totally
independent, because w e are human
being. However as an independent
auditor I try to be always independent by
following rules and standards not to
violate them. I try to tell the truth.

Try to be independent

Q As an auditor I have to be independent as
set by audit standards and code of ethics.
I never compromise m y independence
with clients, what I do is I do m y best try
to audit as stick as possible to the rules. I
never violate the rules and standards.

C a n be totally independent

I can be totally independent, because it is
R
a must for m e otherwise I violate m y
profession.

Can be totally independent

S

Y e s I can.

Can be totally independent

T

Yes I can.

Can be totally independent
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U

Y e s I can.

V I try as much as I possible to be
independent, but if other people have
other perception about m y works, it's up
to them. In m y life, I don't want to be
dictated by other people to compromise
m y independence.

Can be totally independent
Try to be independent

W It's hard to tell this, but I try as much as I Try to be independent
can become independent but I also still
"compromise" something as far as not to
violate accounting and audit standards.
X 1 can be totally independent because
without independence auditor is useless
and mislead.

Can be totally independent

Y I am a human being, it is hard to say to
be totally independent, because to be
honest s o m e times there is a feeling to
'help' clients as long as still in the rules
and standards corridor.

Try to be independent

Z Yes, I can be totally independent.

Can be totally independent

AA It's hard to tell this, but I try as much as ITry to be independent
can become independent but I also still
"compromise" something as far as not to
violate accounting and audit standards.
BB Yes I can be totally independent as
auditor.

Can be totally independent

CC Yes, I can be totally independent.

Can be totally independent

S u m m a r y of whether auditors can be totally independent or not:
. Try to be independent, as much as auditors can (15 auditors)
• Can be totally independent (14 auditors)
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Appendix 15
Efforts taken by auditors to maintain independence.
A Follow the standards, standards as work • Standards as guide lines
guide lines.
B

In m y experience, I think integrity of • Strong integrity
auditor has very important role in • Selective
in
maintaining and enhancing auditor
engagements
independence. Also, considering any
risks that w e will face can make us more
independent, don't accept any works that
will put us into trouble.

accepting

C

Beside my integrity and personality .
secret to be independence is to avoid as
much as I can things that can build bad
image, especially relationship with m y
clients.

D

•
Religious approach
I do worship to God, to maintain our faith. . Improving knowledge and
Because in m y belief, independent
skills
auditor must be independent. To be
independent w e need ask God for that. At
the s a m e time w e also have to develop
our knowledge and skill in order to
maintain and improve our independence.
• Strong integrity
accepting
in
D o m y best, honest and maintain m y # Selective
engagements
integrity, not easy to be induced by things
that can put m e into trouble. I will refuse
to accept audit engagement from any
clients w h o have a bed tendency.
Understand about duties
I think as an auditor, we must understand ^Accommodate
between
what is our duties. W e have to be aware
clients' needs and rules and
about h o w to serve our clients, how to do
standards
our job properly. W e have to be able to
accommodate our clients needs and
wants and rules and standards.
Pay auditor a high salary
I think auditors must be independent. To
be independent they have to be paid at a
high salary, with this pay, auditors would
not seek other income from selling their
independence.
In
my
opinion
independence impairment is caused by

Avoid bad images
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seeking money.
H

K

To maintain my independence, I always
try to be a good independent auditor.
Good auditor means that auditor must
follow audit rules and standards. H e must
have strong personality and integrity
when facing any situation and conditions,
so rules and standards can be done
properly.

Follow rules and standards
Strong
personality
and
integrity

To be an independent auditor has
required m e always to follow audit rules
and standards in doing any audit works.

Follow rules and standards

I think moral and religious values can
maintain m y independence.

Moral and religious values

In doing audit I try to stick to the rules. Follow
I
rules
have nothing to lose if s o m e thing happen
Work satisfaction
to m e , because m y objective is not
money, but work satisfaction.
I have to look for clients, I have to
manage our staffs. If w e fail to get clients
and fail to manage our staff w e won't be
successful. W e have to manage all risks
to avoid uncertainty in the future. W e
have strategic planning, at least for next
three years.

M

N
O

Managing risks
Avoid uncertainty

Ha ...ha..ha... I have no secret formulas. To be honest
But if you asked m e to answer it. I think
Religious values
the most important to m e as an auditor is
w e have to be honest to ourselves.
Another thing that also support m y
independence is m y religious values, to
m e these values have very great
contribution.
Follow rules and standards
Try to follow the rules and standards.
To be always independent as an auditor
w e have to improve our knowledge in
m a n y things, w e have to monitor new
technology, n e w
trade regulation,
government regulation and so on. W e
have to follow them for examples by
reading
and
attending
seminar.
Therefore, w e can do and solve properly

Improving knowledge and
skills
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if for example there is a problem relates
to n e w things.
In maintaining my independence, I do my
religious approach. I maintain and
improve m y faith not to fall down because
it will affect our mental attitude and
professional skills. In m y opinion, it is very
important because without faith, auditors
will be easily affected by bad impacts.
Q

As an auditor, I have to maintain and
improve m y audit quality so I have a good
image viewed by clients and public. By
doing this, I have to be always
independent otherwise public will view m e
as an incompetent auditor.
Well... First we have to be committed to
our profession. If w e will accept our new
staff or partners,firstthing w e have to
observe is their commitment to this
profession. If they have no strong
commitment, they will fail to be
independent auditor. To m e the most
important thing in doing audit is to
maintain our independence, once w e
depend on some-one else w e will easily
not to be independent. W e have to build
our independence since early age.
Stick to the rules and standards not drop
our profession by compromising our audit
works.
From my self as an auditor, we must have
strong integrity and from the office
policies, office should rotate its staff for a
certain period.

U
V

W

I always avoid my self from vested
interest in doing audit works.
Vision and mission of auditors. Objective
for being an auditor, money/business only
or m o n e y and independent profession?
W e have to ask ourselves, what w e are
going to be,
Try to stick to the rules and standards as

Using religious values

Improve audit quality

Building character to be
independent from early age

Stick to the
standards

rules

and

Strong integrity
Staff rotation

Avoid vested interests
Visions and
auditors

missions of
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m u c h as I can, and think that I
responsible to both h u m a n and God.

Follow rules and standards
Involve religious values

In my case, I always try to be
independent because of m y willingness to
be a big and trusted auditor. These
expectations won't become true if I a m
not independence that's it.

Want to be a big auditor
Better future

To be able to maintain m y independence
I always try to be stick to audit standards.
However, in m y experience the needs for
audit is not for public need, but for
company itself like for bank requirement
and taxation purpose.

Follow the
standards

I always maintain m y image as viewed by
public that I a m an independent and
professional auditor.

Building good images

AA

Try to stick to the rules and standards as
m u c h as I can, and think that I
responsible to both h u m a n and God.

Follow rules and standards
Involve religious values

BB

M y ways to maintain independence is w e
have to always remember that w e must
serve public interests, not interest of
clients. W e are paid by our clients but not
working for their interests, but rather
public interests.

Serve public interests

CC

Always follow the rules and standards.

S u m m a r y of Efforts
Independence:

Taken

by

Auditors

Follow the
standards

to

• Following audit rules and standards (13 auditors)
• Strengthening auditor integrity (10 auditors)
• Applying religious values (6 auditors)

maintain

rules

rules

and

and

Auditor

•
•
•
•
•

Selecting clients (2 auditors)
Managing proper relationship with clients (2 auditors)
Auditors' ability (1 auditor)
Auditor's job satisfaction (1 auditor)
Auditor's missions and visions (1 auditor)

